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It now lately sometimes seemed a black miracle to me that people could
actually care deeply about a subject or pursuit, and could go on caring this
way for years on end. Could dedicate their entire lives to it. It seemed
admirable and at the same time pathetic. We are all dying to give our lives
away to something, maybe. God or Satan, politics or grammar, topology
or philately–the object seemed incidental to this will to give oneself away,
utterly. To games or needles, to some other person. Something pathetic
about it.
A flight-from in the form of a plunging-into. Flight from exactly what?
These rooms blandly filled with excrement and meat? To what purpose?
This was why they started us here so young: to give ourselves away before
the age when the questions why and to what grow real beaks and claws. It
was kind, in a way.
David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three essays that study the interplay of consumers,
insurers, and providers in the health care market. These chapters address the role
of insurance plan design in shaping the incentives of market participants, and how
this translates into economic outcomes. The results presented here shed light on how
consumers respond to health care prices, and how this factors into equilibrium pricing
and welfare.
The first essay studies the impact of tiered cost sharing in health plans. Consumers
in tiered plans face variation in out-of-pocket prices across provider tiers, creating an
incentive to use low-cost facilities. I use detailed administrative claims data from New
Hampshire, a state where these plans have become increasingly common, to study
both the demand-side and supply-side effects. I find strong evidence that the tiered
programs lead to a reduction in per-episode spending on an array of lab, endoscopic,
and arthroscopic medical procedures. Expenditure reductions are driven in part by
an increase in the use of low-cost providers, and in part by a decrease in prices overall.
The second essay develops a structural model of the health care market to explore
the equilibrium implications of tiered cost sharing. I first employ a discrete choice
model to estimate the demand for providers, exploiting variation in out-of-pocket
vii
costs across providers, plans, and time. I next estimate a model of bilateral bargaining
between insurers and providers, which incorporates variation in benefit design across
plans. Counterfactual simulations imply that tiered plans are more effective than
other popular plans in steering consumers toward low-cost facilities.
The third essay provides new estimates of the price elasticity of demand on the
intensive margin for a suite of common medical services. I develop an instrumental
variable strategy that exploits consumer inertia and average plan characteristics to
account for endogenous out-of-pocket prices. I employ this method in both linear and
nonlinear settings to ascertain the extent to which consumers respond to variation in
out-of-pocket prices when choosing a health care provider. I find that elasticities on
this margin are relatively modest, and exhibit heterogeneity across services.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Tiered Cost Sharing on
Choices and Payments: Evidence from
New Hampshire
1.1 Introduction
Medical care prices in the United States vary widely, even within relatively homoge-
neous markets. For example, the costs of a lower-limb MRI vary by a factor of twelve
across the country and roughly two-fold within hospital referral regions (Cooper et
al., 2019). From a market-based perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that medical
care prices in the U.S. exhibit these characteristics. Prices paid by consumers and
those received by providers are mediated by insurance plans, blunting standard mar-
ket incentives toward price competition. Insured consumers often have little incentive
to choose lower-priced providers, generating an empirically price-inelastic market.
In response to these issues, insurers and policymakers have increasingly embraced
consumer-directed health care. While difficult to define precisely, the overarching
principle of consumer-directed health is a focus on the incentives and behavior of
individuals seeking care. Many recent insurance designs in this spirit, such as high-
deductible health plans, tiered networks, and reference pricing, try to improve the
incentives of consumers to make cost-effective decisions regarding their health care.
The hope is that such incentive structures will bring down expenditures both directly,
via consumers moving to low-cost providers, and indirectly, through the impact of in-
1
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creased competition on the equilibrium distribution of prices.
The defining feature of most plans under the consumer-directed health care um-
brella is a relatively high deductible. There has been substantial growth over the
last two decades in the share of privately insured individuals enrolled in IRS-defined
high-deductible health plans, totaling 29% in 2018. More generally, the share with a
deductible exceeding $1,000 has increased from 38% in 2013 to 58% in 2018 (Kaiser
Family Foundation, 2018). However, the proliferation of high deductibles has been
met with some concerns. For one, the greater exposure to medical costs induced by de-
ductibles diminishes some of the risk-sharing benefits of insurance disproportionately
on lower-income and sicker enrollees. Additionally, recent studies of high-deductible
plans indicate that the majority of the effect on utilization comes at the extensive
margin (Brot-Goldberg et al., 2015; Haviland et al., 2016). That is, these plans tend
to lead to an outright reduction utilization (i.e., the extensive margin), as opposed to
a shift in demand toward cheaper providers (i.e., the intensive margin).1 Importantly,
if consumers cannot distinguish well between high and low-value care, then the re-
duction in demand may be welfare-reducing. More broadly, the failure of deductibles
to generate substitution effects has negative implications with regards to the goal of
reducing prices through competition.
Tiered cost-sharing plans, which impose stark out-of-pocket cost differentials across
groups of providers, may mitigate some of the issues with simple deductible-based
plans. Tiered designs emphasize the intensive margin of demand by incentivizing con-
sumers to use low-cost providers. On the consumer side, the availability of relatively
inexpensive providers encourages the use of these options, as opposed to forgoing
care altogether. Moreover, out-of-pocket costs for those consumers using incentivized
facilities can be set sufficiently low enough to offer significant insurance value. On
1Throughout this paper I use “extensive margin” to refer to the decision of whether or not to
use any care and “intensive margin” to refer to the decision of where to obtain care conditional on
seeking it.
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the supply side, tiered structures may promote price competition among providers
in response to increasingly price-sensitive consumers. Moreover, tier assignment can
be used by insurers to gain additional bargaining leverage in reimbursement nego-
tiations. Importantly, there is scant evidence on the equilibrium impact of tiering.
While there is some evidence on consumer responsiveness to tiered plans with fixed
copayments, it is unclear both how these plans compare to other consumer-directed
plans, and whether the fixed-copayment design is optimal. Additionally, there is
scant evidence on the response of providers to the increasing penetration of tiered
and other consumer-directed plans. In this paper, I help fill this gap by studying
an innovative tiered cost-sharing design that has taken hold in the New Hampshire
Market. I provide new evidence on the effectiveness of these plans and estimate a
structural model of supply and demand to compare it to alternative designs.
I first examine the demand-side effects of tiered cost sharing. In particular, I esti-
mate the effect of tiered incentives on consumer choices and associated payments for
lab, endoscopic, and arthroscopic services. I exploit the introduction of tiered cost
sharing for these services by the state’s two largest insurers in a generalized difference-
in-differences framework to quantify treatment effects. I find strong evidence that the
tiered incentives measurably affect consumer behavior, which generates per-episode
savings on each service. Expenditure reductions are driven in large part by an in-
crease in the use of low-cost, independent providers. I find moderate heterogeneity
in treatment effects across treated groups, over time, and by demographics.
I next study the impact of offering tiered plans on negotiated prices between
insurers and providers. By conditioning on specific insurer-provider-procedure groups,
I estimate the extent to which Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim have negotiated lower
prices overall for these services. I find suggestive evidence that both insurers have
been able to cut reimbursement rates after rolling out tiered plans.
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Finally, I address the extensive margin by estimating the response to tiered incen-
tives at the individual-year level, as opposed to the episode level. I find that tiered
plans are associated with lower yearly spending among those that use any care. Im-
portantly, tiered plans appear to have no impact on the propensity of individuals to
receive any care. I conclude that yearly savings associated with these plans is being
driven by a reduction in per-episode spending, rather than by a decline in utilization
overall. To the extent that moral hazard is more severe on the intensive margin than
the extensive margin, these results suggest that tiered plans are superior to competing
plans that do not generate substitution effects.
I estimate all models using detailed administrative data from the New Hampshire
All-Payer Claims Database (APCD). These data contain comprehensive information
on the insurer, provider, and individual involved in each claim, and encompasses the
universe of medical claims in the state from 2006-2016. This information allows me
to construct an elaborate picture of the financial incentives facing consumers during
each choice situation, providing a basis for the supply and demand models.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper fits into several different strands in the literature. Perhaps most broadly,
it is related to the vast body of work on the interaction of plan design with health
care demand. Beginning with the classic RAND Health Insurance Experiment, health
economists have long been interested in estimating the elasticity of demand for health
care, with various forms of cost sharing used to expose consumers to medical prices
(Manning et al., 1987; Eichner, 1998; Duarte, 2012; Einav et al., 2015; Kowalski,
2016; Ellis et al., 2017.) Notably, most work thus far on health care price elasticities
is focused on the extensive margin of demand. Two notable exceptions are Whaley
et al. (2017) and Prager (2016), who estimate intensive-margin demand elasticities
for colonoscopies and hospital admissions, respectively. In contrast to Whaley et al.
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(2017) and Prager (2016), I develop a generally-applicable framework that can be
used to estimate the demand for disaggregated services using claims data of sufficient
size. My approach accounts for endogeneity in monthly out-of-pocket prices and does
not rely on one specific plan type for identification. I provide elasticity estimates on
the intensive margin for a common lab test and colonoscopy procedure.
This paper is also related to several studies using quasi-experimental methods to
evaluate the effectiveness of various consumer-directed health care initiatives. Price
transparency is one such initiative that has received growing attention in the public
debate over the future of health care. Interestingly, prior work on the effects of price
transparency has produced mixed results. Lieber (2015), Whaley et al. (2014), and
Desai et al. (2016, 2017), studying the impact of price-search tools find small to
moderate effects of shopping, although the ladder two studies report low rates of
take-up. Brown (2019a) examines the effects of HealthCost, the New Hampshire
price transparency website, and estimates a 3% reduction in spending on imaging.
Importantly, the information provided by the kinds of lookup tools studied in the
aforementioned is not always both relevant and easy-to-use for consumers. Tiered
initiatives improve upon existing transparency efforts by combining search tools with
more explicit incentives.
On the benefit design side, the primary focus in consumer-directed health care
has been on the use of high deductibles.2 A growing literature, typically relying on
firm-level event-study-type designs, examines the direct effects of high deductibles on
consumer behavior (Sood et al., 2013; Huckfeldt et al., 2015; Brot-Goldberg et al.,
2015; Haviland et al., 2016). In general, these papers report a significant reduction in
2Often, high-deductible plans are synonymous with consumer-directed plans. The practical differ-
ence is typically taken to be that consumer-directed plans include a tax-advantaged health spending
account. I use consumer-directed health care loosely to refer to a class of plans and initiatives
designed aimed at increasing the extent of shopping for health services.
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spending and utilization, concentrated in pharmaceutical and outpatient spending.3.
Brot-Goldberg et al. (2015) address both margins of demand by decomposing the
reduction in spending induced by a high-deductible plan into extensive and intensive
components, and find that nearly all of the savings is at the extensive margin.
To address the intensive margin of consumer choices more directly, some insurers
have utilized limited or tiered networks to steer consumers. Limited networks exclude
expensive providers from the set of covered providers, while tiered networks typically
include all providers in a market but apply different cost sharing to different groups of
them. Tiered provider networks have been around since the early 2000s and can take
many forms, including networks of hospitals, physicians, and pharmacies (Sinaiko,
2012; Starc and Swanson, 2019). To the extent that these plans direct consumers
toward low-cost providers, we should expect a reduction in costs both directly, due
to the change in demand, and indirectly, due to a shift in equilibrium prices (Fron-
stin, 2003; Robinson, 2003). The evidence thus far suggests that these plans work
reasonably well. Gruber and McKnight (2016), studying a narrow network plan of-
fered by the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission, estimate a 40% reduction
in expenditures among individuals who switched into the plan, reflecting both overall
quantity reductions as well as a decline in payments per service. Frank et al. (2015)
and Prager (2016) estimate consumer responses to a tiered hospital network structure
and find significant changes in demand toward preferred facilities. The setting here
differs from many of the previous studies in that tiered incentives apply only to lab
and outpatient services, and cost-sharing is fixed only in one preferred tier. Also, I
compare the tiered plans used in the New Hampshire market to other common plan
types and alternative tiered designs. In doing so, I shed light on both how tiered
plans compare to other disparate designs and how to better apply the tiered design.
An alternative to high-deductibles and tiered networks, but very much in the same
3See Bundorf (2016) for a comprehensive discussion of this research.
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spirit, is the reference pricing program instituted by the California Public Employees
Retirement System. Under this design, patients bear 100% of the difference between
a provider’s price and a reference price, provided that this difference is positive.
Robinson et al. (2015) estimate that this program saved $7 million on spending in
the first two years following implementation. Whaley et al. (2017) study the effect of
reference pricing on the choices and payments for colonoscopies specifically and find
that it led to a shift in demand toward low-cost providers.
1.1.2 Institutional Background
New Hampshire has consistently been at the forefront of the movement towards price
transparency and active consumer decision-making, making (the evolution of) its
health care market an excellent area of study. The first significant step in this process,
and one that has made this research possible, was the state-mandated creation of an
all-payer claims database. In 2007, leveraging this powerful data source, the state
launched HealthCost, a website that residents can use to compare prices for common
medical services across different providers. Notably, the HealthCost website reports
insurer-specific bundled rates, as opposed to the much more common charges data,
which very likely strengthens the connection to the actual consumer experience.
In tandem with state-sponsored transparency efforts, insurers have begun to op-
erationalize their own price-comparison tools for consumers. As of now, Anthem,
Harvard Pilgrim, and Cigna all have online applications with which enrollees can ob-
tain cost estimates by procedure for providers in their network. Large self-insured
employers also have the option to contract with third-party providers such as Alight
to provide transparency tools to their employees.
On the benefit-design side, New Hampshire has seen significant penetration of
consumer-directed health care features into plans. As with consumer-directed health
care nationally, the deductible has been the biggest target of insurers in the state.
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Enrollment in high-deductible health plans has grown from 1.5% of the commercial
market in 2006 to 18% in 2011 to about 47% in 2016 (New Hampshire Insurance
Department, 2008, 2014; Samgula et al., 2017).
Another benefit innovation that has gained traction is the use of networks to
steer consumers towards providers with whom insurers have negotiated favorable re-
imbursement rates. The strictest form of this plan type, limited network HMOs,
provides coverage only when consumers go to designated in-network providers and
subjects consumers to full-pay rates outside of the network. Both Anthem and Har-
vard Pilgrim offer limited network HMO plans, which feature prominently on the
state exchange.4 Notably, premiums for these plans are as much as 30% lower than
similar plans with a broader network (New Hampshire Insurance Department, 2014).
A more flexible and perhaps more consumer-friendly version of the network concept
that has taken a small hold in the New Hampshire market is the tiered network de-
sign. These plans feature a much broader network of providers and nudge consumers
using differential copayments or coinsurance across tiers.
The innovation that has gained the most steam combines features of high-deductible
plans and tiered network plans, what I refer to as tiered cost sharing. This feature
provides targeted financial incentives for consumers to choose low-cost providers for,
in particular, lab services and common outpatient surgeries. In general, low-cost
provider designation is based on whether the provider is an independent ambulatory
surgical center or a hospital-based facility.
Currently, both Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim incorporate tiered cost sharing in
many of their plan offerings, Anthem calling its program “Site of Service,” and Har-
vard Pilgrim using the name “LP” (for low-cost provider). Anthem first introduced
the Site of Service Option into some plans in 2010 and subsequently made it a stan-
4In some years, the only plans available through the exchange were limited network HMOs (New
Hampshire Insurance Department, 2014).
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dard feature in all small-group plans and some fully-insured large-group plans (New
Hampshire Insurance Department, 2014). Perhaps in response to the success of An-
them’s program, Harvard Pilgrim followed suit in 2013, introducing the LP feature
into many small-group and some large-group fully-insured plans (Tu and Gourevitch,
2014). In 2014, the New Hampshire government, the state’s largest employer, added
tiered cost sharing to all plan options. Initially, both Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim’s
tiered incentives applied only to lab tests and ambulatory surgeries, but have more
recently expanded to include services such as imaging and physical therapy.
An important aspect of these programs is the relative simplicity of the incen-
tive structure provided to consumers. Figures A2 and A3 show advertisements for
Anthem’s Site of Service program and Harvard Pilgrim’s LP program, respectively.
For lab services, consumers that choose an independent facility face no cost sharing,
whereas those that use a hospital-based lab are subject to the full negotiated price
if they are still under their deductible. This amounts to a cost difference of roughly
$50-$100 depending on the specific test. For outpatient surgeries, the potential out-
of-pocket cost differences are significantly larger. Individuals who use ambulatory
surgery centers face a flat copayment of $75-$150 while the out-of-pocket cost can be
on the order of $1,000-$3,000 if the procedure is performed in a hospital.
In the spirit of transparency, insurers have made efforts to make it easy for con-
sumers to locate providers that have been designated as low-cost. Both Anthem and
Harvard Pilgrim have released a number of advertisements such as A2 and A3 describ-
ing how the program works, along with lists, as seen in Figure A4 with provider names




The bulk of the data for this project are derived from the universe of medical claims in
the State of New Hampshire over the period 2006-2016. These data are collected and
maintained via the New Hampshire Comprehensive Health Care Information System.
(NHCHIS). New Hampshire was one of the first states to curate an all-payer claims
database for the purposes of research, transparency, and other initiatives. In partic-
ular, this database has been used to operationalize NH HealthCost, a website that
allows consumers to search for and compare prices among medical service providers
in the state.
These claims records contain comprehensive information on the patient, provider,
insurance, and payments associated with each claim. For the patient, I observe age,
sex, race, zip code, and relationship to the insurance policyholder. I complement this
basic demographic information with zip code level data on income, education, and
population density from the American Community Survey. Patients can be linked to
information about their primary insurance coverage. For this, I observe the carrier,
type of plan (i.e., HMO, PPO, etc.), size of the insured group, whether the group
is fully insured or self-insured, and an insured group identifier. I define a plan as a
unique combination of the aforementioned characteristics.
Each claim contains a provider identifier that can be linked to geographic and
taxonomy information such as address and facility/provider type. I use national
provider identifiers along with data from the National Plan and Provider Enumeration
System to aggregate providers that are part of the same practice. I use patient and
provider zip codes along with Google API to compute driving distance in both miles
and minutes between patients and providers.
For payments, I observe the amount billed by the provider, the amount paid by
the insurer, and payments made by the patient in the form of deductible, coinsurance,
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and copayments. The sum of payments made by the insurer and patient for a partic-
ular service reflects the negotiated price for a particular insurer-provider-procedure
combination.
Each claim includes an array of procedure and diagnoses codes used to characterize
the service provided. I use Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) and Healthcare
Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes to organize and filter claims.
I focus on three main procedure categories for which shopping is incentivized by
both Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim’s tiered plans: lab work, endoscopic procedures,
and arthroscopic procedures.5 Procedures in these categories are particularly well
suited for intensive margin demand analysis because they are common, relatively
homogeneous, and display significant variation in price across providers. Figure 1
displays this dispersion in prices for four of the most common services in my analysis
sample: complete metabolic panel, diagnostic colonoscopy, knee arthroscopy, and
cataract removal. I define a provider’s price as the median total bundled payment
across all episodes in the data.6
For a given patient-day, there are typically a host of different charges. I de-
fine primary procedures as procedures with a CPT/HCPCS code on my list and for
which there is no other procedure received on the same day associated with a larger
bill. This eliminates, for instance, lab services that occurred in tandem with a more
significant medical procedure. Additionally, I identify inpatient hospital episodes as-
sociated with each individual and discard matched services that occur within these
episodes. I remove these episodes because patients likely had no opportunity to shop
5A list of the CPT/HCPCS codes I use to filter claims into these categories is given in Figure
A5.
6There is some concern that some providers who appear “expensive” are simply treating more
complicated cases. However, given that the level of aggregation here is at the CPT code level
and the procedures are common outpatient procedures, this is much less of a concern than for
inpatient stays. For robustness, I compute regression-adjusted prices using health and demographic
information. These are not much different than the baseline prices.
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for alternative providers for the ancillary services received.
An important question regarding payments is on the appropriate level of aggrega-
tion of related services. In my primary specifications, I follow Brown (2019a, 2019b)
and construct total bundled prices by summing payments for all procedures that occur
on the same day as an identified primary procedure. This is essentially the approach
taken by the HealthCost website in responding to cost-comparison queries, and likely
reflects best the price that is most relevant for whoever is paying the bill.7
Table 1 displays summary statistics covering the episodes in the main sample for
each major service category. Anthem is the dominant insurer in the New Hampshire
marketplace, covering a little under half of the privately insured population in the
state. Harvard Pilgrim also maintains a significant share of the market and is An-
them’s only real competitor in the small group market. Most individuals are covered
by an HMO, PPO, or POS plan, although plans differ markedly in cost sharing, even
within these categories.
1.2 Demand-Side Effects
I first present a theoretical framework to motivate the demand-side regression equa-
tions and parameters. Each individual i, is enrolled in an insurance plan j ∈ J , where
J is the set of plans offered in a market. A subset of individuals seek a particular
medical procedure, k, and choose a provider r from among the set available providers
Rjk. Individuals choose the provider that induces the highest level of utility, which
depends on individual characteristics xi, provider characteristics zr, the out-of-pocket
7A downside of using bundled prices is that providers may vary in the quantity and prices of
ancillary services, somewhat muddling the analysis. To address this, I construct an alternate data
set with episodes defined at the claim line level and replicate most exercises with it. In some cases,
noted explicitly, I use this data set for the primary analysis.
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Table 1.1: Average Characteristics of Epsiodes
Arthroscopic Labs Endoscopic
Total Payments 6263.10 153.41 1922.55
OOP Payments 495.55 23.58 185.68
Non-Hospital Share 0.73 0.49 0.65
Distance in Miles 18.13 27.65 17.01
Age 45.63 49.48 51.07
Male 0.54 0.46 0.47
Charlson Score 0.09 0.14 0.17
Median Income 41629.43 41344.18 41600.69
HMO 0.45 0.45 0.44
PPO 0.32 0.34 0.32
POS 0.16 0.14 0.16
EPO 0.04 0.04 0.04
Anthem 0.49 0.41 0.49
Harvard Pilgrim 0.22 0.27 0.22
Modal CPT Code 29881 80061 45378
Count 33559 1515878 314797
Notes: Includes all episodes with primary CPT/HCPCS code on Figure
A5. Episodes are defined by the primary CPT/HCPCS code and, where
applicable, claims are aggregated to the patient-day level.
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Figure 1·1: Price Dispersion for Common Services
Notes: Each bar represents the mean bundled price of a single provider for CPT
codes 80061, 29826, 29881,43239 ,45378, and 31575, respectively. Bundled price is
computed as the sum of total payments for a given patient-day, excluding those
that occur during multiple-day inpatient stays. Mean is taken over all episodes
associated with each provider over the period 2011-2014. The sample is restricted
to providers who performed billed for the associated CPT code at least 30 times
over the period. All prices deflated to 2011 dollars.
cost OOPijkrτ , and a random component εijkr, summarized by.
uijkr = U(xi, zr, OOPijkr; Θ) + εijkr
The out-of-pocket price depends on plan characteristics and, if applicable, the amount
remaining on the individual’s deductible. Then, assuming the random component of
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utility is additive and distributed according to F (ε), the probability that individual
i uses provider r is given by
sijkr =
∫
1{uijkr > uijkr′}r′∈RjkdF (ε)
Individuals’ choices among providers translate into aggregate-level data on prices,
payments, and market shares. Let yijkr denote the value of a particular outcome
of interest, say the total procedure price, which may depend on both the provider
and the individual. Conditional on the set of individuals in a plan who are seeking









where NIjk is the number of individuals in plan j who obtain procedure k over the
time period. This equation makes clear the relationship between plan design and
expected payments for a particular service. That is, out-of-pocket costs influence the
relative odds of using different providers, which, as Figure 1.1 shows, may have vastly
different prices. Tiered plans are devised to steer consumers toward providers at the
lower end of the price distribution by imposing a steep gradient in out-of-pocket prices.
Table 1.2 reports, for six common service types, the average total payments and out-
of-pocket payments made at preferred and non-preferred providers by individuals in
tiered plans. For upper gastrointestinal endoscopies, for example, the mean out-of-
pocket expenditure is $237.16 at a preferred provider and $903.06 at a non- preferred
provider. Among arthroscopic shoulder surgeries and common lab tests, the mean
differences in out-of-pocket payments between the two groups are $791.41 and $45.56,
respectively. The stark differences in total payments, which correspond, roughly, to
prices, between preferred and non-preferred facilities illustrates the motivation behind
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the design of these tiered plans.8
Table 1.2: Prices at Preferred and Non-Preferred Facilities Under
Tiered Plans
Total Payments Out-of-Pocket
Preferred Non-Preferred Preferred Non-Preferred
Knee Arthroscopy 4050.64 7999.08 293.13 1084.54
Shoulder Arthroscopy 7917.25 11583.08 246.58 1350.58
Lab 53.77 136.97 1.32 46.88
Colonoscopy 1928.10 2856.95 54.22 269.13
Upper GI Endoscopy 2166.70 3583.63 237.16 903.06
Notes: Mean total payments and out-of-pocket payments, computed at the visit level,
at preferred and non-preferred providers for five common service types. Means are
taken across all realized episodes covered by Anthem’s Site of Service and Harvard
Pilgrim’s LP feature.
To conceptualize how tiered plans may affect episode-level spending, consider the
simple case with just two providers, a preferred provider whose price is $1500 and a
non-preferred provider, whose price is $3000. Assume also that choice probabilities
take the multinomial form, and that the quality (in terms of willingness to pay) of the
non-preferred provider is $500 greater than the non-preferred provider. Figure 1.2 be-
low plots the relationship between the expected price paid and the out-of-pocket cost
differential for various levels of price-sensitivity. As the gap in out-of-pocket prices
between the two providers increases, the probability of using the preferred provider
increases, reducing the expected price paid. This happens more rapidly among highly
price-elastic consumers and more slowly among price-inelastic consumers.
As Table 1.2 shows, tiered plans feature a significant out-of-pocket price differ-
ential between preferred and non-preferred providers. Then, to the extent that indi-
8Total payments differ from provider prices at the episode level because payments are computed
at the visit level, and thus, sum the prices of all ancillary services in addition to the primary service
line price.
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Figure 1·2: Out-of-Pocket Cost Difference Between Provider Tiers
and Expected Payments
Notes: Simulated relationship between out-of-pocket cost differential between pre-
ferred and non-preferred providers and expected provider payments. Assumes pre-
ferred provider price of $1500 and non-preferred provider price is $3000.
viduals respond to this differential, introducing these tiered incentives should reduce
observed mean per-episode spending. This motivates the following reduced form
equation, which relates outcomes to individual and plan characteristics, including an
indicator for tiered cost sharing:
yijkt = θtieredjt + βxijt + λt + λj + λmt + λk + εijkt (1.1)
Here, yijkt is the outcome of interest for an episode of care associated with individual
i, enrolled in plan j, obtaining procedure k, at time t; and tieredjt is an indicator
for tiered cost sharing. I control for individual characteristics Xijt, which include
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age, gender, and CCI. I also include plan fixed effects, λj, procedure fixed effects, λk,
and time (year and month) effects, λt.
9 To account for geographic heterogeneity in
both demographics and provider accessibility, I absorb zip code fixed effects. Lastly,
I include insurer-year fixed effects to account for variation in negotiated prices across
insurers and over time. I argue that any remaining variation is due to behavior at
the individual-choice level, which I refer to as demand-side effects.
The empirical approach here relies on variation across both plans and time in
the presence of either Anthem’s Site of Service program or Harvard Pilgrim’s LP
program. Importantly, the level of aggregation at which treatment is assigned is
fairly narrow.10 In particular, treatment depends on insured-group-plan, which, in
practice, means employer-plan, indexed by j throughout. Over the period 2010-2016,
there was a steady increase in the number of insured-group-plans with a tiered cost-
sharing option, thus defining the empirical strategy here.
The coefficient of interest is θ, which is a generalization of the common difference-
in-differences estimate to multiple groups and periods. As discussed in Goodman-
Bacon (2018) and Callaway and Sant’Anna (2019) the central identifying assumption
here is a generalization of the common trends assumption which applies to all pairwise
treatment-control groups, conditional on X.11 In this context, the level of observation
is an episode as opposed to an individual. As such, the assumption of conditional
pairwise common trends relates to trends in the underlying characteristics that de-
termine an episode. To get a sense of this requirement, it is useful to think about the
9Procedure fixed effects are disaggregated to the CPT code level. While I estimate models for
lab services, endoscopic procedures, and arthroscopic procedures separately, there are many CPT
codes that map to each of these categories.
10This helps mitigate some concerns stemming from having a small number of treated groups
discussed in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Donald and Lang (2004).
11Notably, this condition is weaker than the standard unconditional parallel trends assumption
(Goodman-Bacon 2018; Callaway and Sant’Anna 2019). Under this assumption, the standard
difference-in-differences estimator with no covariates identifies the treatment effect. For compar-
ison, I estimate all equations with no covariates and report the results in Table A1.
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two-by-two case with two insured groups and two time periods, where one insured
group implements tiered cost sharing at the start of period two. Episodes, say colono-
scopies, arise from different individuals within each group and time period. Common
trends, roughly speaking, requires that the distribution of characteristics underlying
the realizations of the colonoscopy details is stable across the two periods in the ab-
sence of treatment. If the treatment group experiences an increase in colonoscopies
from, say, particularly frugal individuals in period two, it is impossible to distinguish
between the effect of program incentives and the impact of a changing composition
of those who received the procedure.12
An additional assumption here, which has recently received much attention in
the difference-in-differences literature, is the homogeneity of treatment effects. This
assumption is important to the extent that the researcher hopes to identify a partic-
ular structural parameter of interest (e.g., the average population treatment effect or
average treatment effect on the treated).13 This fact complicates matters given that
treatment effects are unlikely to be homogeneous in many settings studied by applied
researchers, including this one. While I do find evidence of heterogeneity, presented
in the subsequent section, the estimates from the baseline model presented here cor-
respond, roughly speaking, to a weighted average of these groupwise heterogeneous
effects.
In general, the nature of medical claims data is such that there are many levels
of aggregation within which we might expect correlation among regressors and unob-
servables. In similar settings, Brown (2019a) clusters standard errors at the month
level, while Whaley et al. (2017) cluster at the hospital referral region level. Fol-
lowing Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge (2017), the motivation for clustering
12I discuss this issue in further detail,l and present evidence that it is not a major concern, in
section 2.6
13See Goodman-Bacon (2018), Abraham and Sun (2018), Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), Cher-
nozhukov et al. (2013), de Chaisemartin, D’Haultfoeuille(2019), Wooldridge (2005).
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here is that assignment to treatment is clustered and there may be heterogeneity in
the effects of treatment. With this in mind, I cluster at the plan level.
The primary outcome measure is the log of total payments associated with a
particular episode. Conditional on the set of provider prices that prevail within a given
year, lower payments associated with a particular group are indicative of shopping
behavior among that group. In addition to total payments, I estimate models for
non-hospital use and distance to chosen provider. Increasing the propensity to use
non-hospital facilities for lab services and ambulatory surgeries is the main thrust
of the tiered cost sharing programs in New Hampshire, and would lead directly to
a reduction in per episode spending.14 Similarly, changes in the mean distance to
chosen providers is indicative of a demand-side response to the financial incentives in
tiered plans. Provided that low-cost facilities are not, on average, closer to individuals
than the typical chosen provider, substitution towards these facilities will manifest as
an increase in the mean distance to chosen providers.
For ease-of-interpretation, I estimate separate models for lab services, endoscopic
procedures, and arthroscopic procedures.15 The tiered incentives originally released
by Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim targeted lab services and ambulatory surgeries specif-
ically, of which endoscopic and arthroscopic procedures are the two most common
types.
1.2.1 Baseline Regression Results
I present the baseline model estimates, corresponding to estimating equation (1.1), for
each outcome and major service category in Table 1.3 below. Column 1 reports the
results for log total payments when I do not include insurer-year fixed effects. These
14Preferred facilities correspond almost exactly to non-hospital facilities, although there are some
exceptions. In particular, some non-hospital facilities are not on both Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim’s
preferred lists.
15I include a table of specific CPT codes that map to each of these service categories in the
appendix.
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estimates thus capture both supply-side and demand-side effects, given that relative
prices are changing between insurers over time. In this way, the estimates lack a
straightforward interpretation. In any case, they are suggestive of a significant reduc-
tion in total spending for each service category associated with tiered cost sharing.
Specifically, the coefficient estimates imply reductions of 34.8%, 7.6%, and 7.4% in
total payments for lab services, endoscopic procedures, and arthroscopic procedures,
respectively.
Column 2 shows the coefficient estimates associated with log total payments for
models that include insurer-year fixed effects. These coefficients are more easily in-
terpreted as demand-side effects in the sense of the discrete choice model presented
above. That is, these coefficient estimates reflect the average effect of tiered cost
sharing on per-episode spending, adjusting for insurer-specific trends in negotiated
prices, and the composition of individuals underlying the episodes. These estimates
suggest that tiering, as operationalized in these Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim plans,
is associated with per-episode spending reductions of 14.5% for lab services, 3.3%
for endoscopic procedures, and 2.9% for arthroscopic procedures. Relative to mean
payments, these numbers imply per-episode savings of $27.35, $85.47, and $178.67,
respectively.
Column 3 reports the results of the linear probability model, where the outcome
is an indicator of non-hospital status. These estimates indicate that tiered plans are
associated with an increase in the likelihood that individuals use non-hospital-based
providers for each of these service types. Specifically, the numbers imply increases in
this propensity of 14.8% for lab services, 6.3% for endoscopic procedures, and 4.5% for
arthroscopic procedures.16 The fact that lab services appear to be the most amenable
to this form of substitution is consistent with the fact that these services exhibit the
16Given that the outcome variable here is binary, I also estimate probit models for each equation
and find similar estimates of the average marginal effect for each service category.
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largest declines in per-episode spending as well.
Finally, column 4 reports the results of the models of driving distance between
the patient and the chosen provider. The estimates suggest that tiered cost sharing
is associated with an increase in the driving distance to the chosen provider for lab
services and arthroscopic surgeries, but not for endoscopic services. The relatively
large estimated effect (10.3 miles) for lab services is likely due in part to an increase in
the use of offsite Quest Diagnostics and LabCorp labs. For this reason, it is difficult
to discern the relative roles of patient versus physician behavior in driving the results
for lab services.
Taken altogether, these results demonstrate that tiered cost sharing designs can
reduce per-episode spending by shifting consumers toward lower-cost providers. Lab
services exhibit the greatest potential for savings (in percentage terms), generated on
the demand-side, among the services studied here. Endoscopic and arthroscopic ser-
vices show more moderate potential for savings on this dimension. This discrepancy
between the services is likely driven by the greater location-based flexibility inherent
in lab testing.
1.2.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Treated Group
In this section, I examine heterogeneity in the effects of tiered cost sharing across
treated groups. In this setting, there are many treatment and control groups, many
of which have a status that changes over time. For example, the large-group plans
that adopted Anthem’s tiered feature in 2014 act as control groups prior to 2014 and
treated groups during and after. In the baseline model described above, an important
identifying assumption necessary to recover average treatment effects is that such
effects are homogenous across groups and time. As discussed in de Chaisemartin
and D’Haultfoeuille (2018) and Goodman-Bacon (2018), in the presence of dynamic
treatment effects and varying treatment timing, the difference-in-differences estimate
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Table 1.3: Baseline Estimates by Service
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Total Payments Total Payments Non-Hospital Distance
Panel A: Lab Tests
Tiered -0.348∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 10.304∗∗∗
(0.019) (.011) (0.014) (0.791)
R2 0.441 0.494 0.348 0.243
N 1,195,722 1,195,722 1,195,722 1,195,722
Panel B: Endoscopic
Tiered -0.076∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.024
(.008) (.010) (0.007) (0.261)
R2 0.216 0.522 0.363 0.214
N 202,426 202,426 202,426 202,426
Panel C: Arthroscopic
Tiered -0.074∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 1.358∗∗∗
(0.029) (.011 ) (0.011) (0.408)
R2 0.201 0.433 0.343 0.313
N 31,953 31,953 31,953 31,953
Insurer-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All equations estimated with controls for age, sex, CCI, and fixed effects for CPT, month,
year, plan, zip. Fixed effects for insurer-year included as indicated. Payments are computed
as total spending on all services performed on the same day as the primary procedure, and are
deflated to 2011 dollars. Standard errors, clustered at the plan level, are in parentheses.
of θ is a particular weighted average of pairwise treatment effects in which some
weights may be negative, and might be biased away from the true average treatment
effect.17 In the event that this problem is severe, θ̂ is may not be a useful measure of
the effect of tiered cost sharing.18
17See also Abraham and Sun (2018), Athey and Imbens (2018), and Callaway and Sant’Anna
(2019.
18In a setting without covariates, Goodman-Bacon offers a decomposition of the estimate into a
weighted average effects term, a weighted common trends terms, and a term that reflects treatment
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In this setting, there are a number of factors that could lead to varying treatment
effects across groups and time. At a given time, the effects of tiering likely vary
between Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim plans, based on their differing prices, networks,
etc. Over time, there may be learning or attention effects such that the response to
tiered incentives increases with time after exposure.19 Additionally, time-varying
supply-side factors, such as prices and accessibility, may mediate the effect of tiered
cost sharing.20
To address these concerns, I estimate several models that accommodate variation
in treatment effects across different levels of group and time aggregation. The sim-
plest and most sensible dimensions along which to allow such variation are time and
insurer. To this end, I first estimate separate models for the Anthem and Harvard
Pilgrim populations. Appendix Table A1 reports the results for each insurer. There
is clear evidence of heterogeneity across the two insurers. In terms of total payments,
the demand-side response is larger among Harvard Pilgrim episodes for lab services.
For endoscopic and arthroscopic services, however, the response is larger among An-
them episodes. These differences may be driven by differences in other relevant plan
characteristics, the distribution of negotiated prices, and latent characteristics of en-
rollees. Going one step further, I estimate interactions of tiered status with year for
all years succeeding the initial rollout for each insurer. In this case, the estimating
equations take the form
yijkt = θtieredjt +
2016∑
τ=2008
(γ1τ (t = τ) + γ2τ (t = τ)× tieredjt) + βxijt + λj + λk + εijkt
(1.2)
effects that vary in the post-period.
19Learning and attention may be impacted by advertising on the part of the insurers, which was
not released uniformly over time.
20For example, the opening of a new lost-cost ambulatory surgery center is likely to increase the
response to consumer-directed incentives of those living nearby.
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The treatment effect estimates implied by this model are presented in Table A2. For
both insurers, the estimated treatment effects exhibit moderate heterogeneity across
years. The most drastic example of this occurs for Harvard Pilgrim lab episodes, for
which the implied effects nearly double from the rollout year to two years afterward.
The estimates from the richer models described above indicate that there is non-
negligible heterogeneity across treated groups. This means that coefficient estimates
from these models, while informative qualitatively, lack a straightforward interpre-
tation in terms of an underlying structural quantity (Abraham and Sun, 2018; de
Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille 2018; and Goodman-Bacon (2018). In an effort
to provide a more interpretable parameter, I apply the method of Callaway and
Sant’Anna (2019). The main idea is to define treated groups separately based on
when treatment is first administered, and to estimate separate coefficients for each
group at each time period post-treatment.21 Borrowing notation, let ATT (g, t) de-
note the average treatment effect on the treated at time t, for the group first exposed
to treatment in period g, where t > g.22 The authors show that under a group-time
version of the standard parallel trends assumption, this object is given by











 (Yt − Yg−1)
 (1.3)
where Gg is an indicator for treatment at time g, pg(X) is the propensity score, C is
an indicator for control group membership.23 This object is readily estimated via its
sample counterpart and an estimate of the propensity score.
21Note that this accounts for heterogeneity based on the timing of first treatment, which is different
than what is modeled in Figure 5. This may be important if treatment timing is correlated with
expected effects, for instance, if the early treatment groups were expected to be more attentive to
the incentives.
22Specifically, ATT (g, t) = E(Yt(1)−Yt(0)|g) where Yt(1) and Yt(0) denote potential outcomes at
time t under treatment and no-treatment, respectively.
23In the canonical difference-in-differences case with two groups and two periods, this procedure
collapses to semiparametric difference-in-differences estimator developed by Abadie (2005).
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Figure 3 below displays the estimates of ATT (g, t) for each of the three treated
cohorts. For each group, the coefficient estimates display a similar pattern over
time, dipping below zero in the post-treatment period. Consistent with the previous
results, these estimates imply heterogeneity across both groups and time. The plans
associated with Harvard Pilgrim exhibit the strongest effects, especially a couple
of years after the inititial rollout. The Anthem small group plans also demonstrate
sizable effects, although the magnitude is more stable over time. Estimated treatment
effects associated with Anthem large group plans are more modest, perhaps due to
lower deductible levels in these plans. These estimates are qualitatively consistent
with the results from the baseline two-way fixed effects model and the baseline model
with interactions. Importantly, there does not appear to be any significant relative
shifts in payments for either treated cohort prior to the rollout of tiered cost sharing,
suggesting that, at least leading up to the treatment period, the groups did not have
large changes in unobservable drivers of episode costs.
1.2.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Demographics
In this section, I examine heterogeneity in the demand-side effects of tiered cost
sharing based on individual characteristics. I consider four primary interactions with
tiered cost sharing: CCI, prior-year total medical spending, the HHI of the individual’s
HSA, and an indicator for the first half of the year. Health status, captured by both
the CCI and prior-year spending, may be important in this context if less-healthy
individuals tend to prefer using hospital-based facilities due to more complex medical
needs. On the other hand, less-healthy consumers may also be more experienced
in purchasing health care, and thus might be more responsive to the program. For
similar reasons, high-utilization consumers may respond differently to cost sharing
than other groups. Conditional on health, individuals that tend to spend more on
health care may be more savvy consumers, causing them to respond more, or it might
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Figure 1·3: Lab Payments Group-Time Treatment Effects
Notes: Each point corresponds to the estimated group-time average treatment ef-
fect, described by equation 1.3, where g is given in the top left and t is given on the
x-axis. Red circles correspond to pre-treatment years i.e., t < g while blue trian-
gles correspond to post treatment years defined by t ≥ g. 95% confidence intervals
computed with bootstrap standard errors bracket point estimates.
be that they use a lot of care because they respond little to plan incentives. Given
the geography of New Hampshire, providers are not located uniformly throughout the
state. This imposes different travel costs associated with using preferred providers
28
on different groups on individuals.24 The HHI captures these differences as well as
differences in the size of providers with HSAs. Lastly, I include an interaction with
an indicator for the first half of the year to proxy for differences in deductible levels
that are relevant during an episode. Earlier in the year, individuals are much more
likely to be under their yearly deductible, meaning that the incentives to use preferred
facilities are greater.
To estimate these heterogeneous effects, I modify the baseline estimating equation
1.2 to include interactions of tiered status with each of the four measures described
above. I maintain insurer-year fixed effects but remove zip code fixed effects so that
the model can recover geographic heterogeneity. For outcomes, I restrict attention
only to total payments and non-hospital use. Appendix Table A3 reports the coeffi-
cient estimates that correspond to these interaction terms. Poor health, as measured
by the CCI, appears to dampen the effect of tiered incentives, suggesting that sicker
individuals may have a stronger preference for hospital-based facilities. High spending
in the prior year exhibits no clear pattern in terms of mediating the effects of tiered
status. This may reflect the countervailing forces underlying high spending–those
in poor health appear to be less responsive to the programs while more experienced
health care consumers may be more responsive. Concentration, as measured by the
HHI, exhibits small but statistically significant modifying effects. Individuals living
in more concentrated markets exhibit less responsiveness to tiered incentives, which
is reflected both in terms of non-hospital use as well as per-episode spending. This
result is likely driven by the fact that more concentrated markets generally have fewer
providers overall, and those providers that do operate have more bargaining leverage
to command higher prices.
Higher spending in the prior year is also associated with a weaker response to tiered
24In the models presented in prior sections, I apply zip code level fixed effects to adjust for these
potential differences in access across enrollees. Here I dispense with these fixed effects to explore
the extent to which geography is an important factor.
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cost sharing, although the estimated effect sizes are relatively small. Importantly,
higher spending may be an indication of poor health, preferences for a lot of care,
preferences for expensive providers, and a lack of price responsiveness. Each of these
may reasonably cause consumers to place less emphasis on tiered incentives. Better
access to incentivized facilities is strongly positively associated with program impact.
For lab services, having an additional incentivized facility nearby is associated with a
two percentage point increase relative to the mean effect of tiered incentives overall.
For endoscopic services, this figure is three percentage points.
1.2.4 Extensive Margin Effects
The results presented thus far suggest that tiered cost sharing is effective in steering
consumers toward lower-cost providers, resulting in an overall decline in mean per
episode spending. Importantly, the models considered previously are estimated on
the sample of individuals that actually received care for the particular service type,
meaning that many individuals, enrolled in both tiered and non-tiered plans, are
excluded. Therefore, the results thus far are informative only with respect to the
effect of tiering on the choices of those individuals who actually received care in a
given year. In this section, I expand the sample to all individual years to study the
effects on the extensive margin.
The extensive margin is important for understanding the impact of tiered cost
sharing for a number of reasons. Substantively, there may be important implications
for welfare if tiered plans affect the likelihood of utilizing certain medical procedures.25
Work by Brot Goldberg et al. (2015) and Haviland et al. (2016) shows that a bulk
of the response to high deductibles comes at the extensive margin, meaning that
individuals consume less care overall. While the tiered plans used in New Hampshire
25Of course, the direction of the welfare effect depends on the net value of receiving care, which
is difficult or impossible to measure.
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are typically paired with a high deductible, there need not be a contraction in the
utilization of covered services given that these plans provide low-cost options to avoid
large deductible payments. Another reason why the extensive margin is potentially
important in this context relates to the validity and interpretation of the prior results.
In regards to validity, an implicit assumption made in the difference-in-differences
framework used previously is that the distribution of consumers who actually receive
each procedure in a given year is stable over time across plans. If there were significant
contemporaneous shifts across plans in the set of consumers who obtained a particular
procedure, then inference based on difference-in-differences design may be erroneous.
Even absent any exogenous changes in the composition of enrollees over time, if tiered
incentives affect the composition of individuals who receive care, the estimates from
the intensive margin model will reflect the effects on this group, as opposed to that
of a random enrollee.
The estimating equation here is similar to equation (2), except that the outcome
variable is now measured at the individual-year level, as opposed to the episode level:
yijt = θtieredjt + βXit + λi + λt + λj + εijt (1.4)
An important difference between this equation and (2) is the inclusion of individual
fixed effects, λi. This specification, thus, controls for time-invariant, unobserved
individual characteristics that may be correlated with utilization. In doing so, these
fixed effects help mitigate endogeneity stemming from plan selection. I consider four
different utilization measures: total service-level spending, conditionally-positive total
service-level spending, an indicator for any service-level spending, and count of yearly
episodes. For individuals with exactly one episode in a given year, total spending and
conditional spending are equal to episode cost. The estimate of θ most directly picks
up extensive margin effects in the specifications for any spending and episode count,
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as these do not depend on provider prices. Conversely, total spending and conditional
spending are both affected by provider prices, meaning that the associated estimates
reflect both extensive margin and intensive margin effects.
The results are presented in Table 1.4. Overall, these results suggest that tiered
plans have little impact on the extensive margin. Columns 3 and 4 report the treat-
ment effect estimates for the models of episode count and an indicator for any episodes
in a given year. In each case, the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from
zero, under the presumption that the clustered standard errors are correct.26 Col-
umn two reports the results for the conditional spending model, which most closely
approximates the episode-level models used in previous sections. The estimates are
negative and significant for lab tests and endoscopic services. This is consistent with
the finding that, among realized episodes of care, those insured under tiered plans
exhibit lower costs.
These results suggest that tiered incentives have little to no impact on the compo-
sition of individuals who actually obtain care in a given period. This implies that the
episode-level estimates can be interpreted as reflecting pure intensive-margin effects.
Additionally, this finding provides support for the generalized difference-in-differences
research design used to estimate intensive margin effects.
26Using unadjusted standard errors produces statistically significant effects in general. However,
the size of the estimate in each case is very small. Therefore, even if clustered standard errors are
too conservative, the qualitative point that extensive margin effects are negligible still holds.
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Table 1.4: Extensive Margin Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Spending Conditional Spending Any Spending Episode Count
Panel A: Lab
Tiered -0.087∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.006 0.012
(0.040) (.062) (0.008) (0.042)
R2 0.345 0.372 0.284 0.291
N 3,668,858 1,768,303 3,668,858 3,668,858
Panel B: Endoscopic
Tiered 0.023 -0.057∗ 0.004 0.003
(0.020) (0.027) (0.003) (0.004)
R2 0.306 0.876 0.307 0.284
N 3,668,858 186,347 3,668,858 3,668,858
Panel C: Arthroscopic
Tiered 0.015 0.051 0.002 0.001
(0.012) (0.160) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.307 0.836 0.310 0.295
N 3,668,858 37,493 3,668,858 3,668,858
Panel D: Emergency
Tiered -0.038 -0.018 -0.008 -0.004
(0.020) (0.114) (0.005) (0.009)
R2 0.418 0.815 0.412 0.241
N 3,668,858 508,149 3,668,858 3,668,858
Notes: All equations estimated with controls for age, sex, CCI, and fixed effects for month,
year, plan, and zip. Standard errors clustered at the plan level are in parentheses.
1.3 Supply-Side Effects
Changes in average payments may be driven both by demand-side and supply-side
forces. The results presented thus far suggest that tiered incentives lead to measurable
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shifts in demand toward low-cost incentivized providers. This activity may affect the
price-setting behavior of providers through both traditional market and bilateral bar-
gaining channels. First, conditional on the bargaining leverage of insurers, providers
that face greater demand-responsiveness to their negotiated prices have stronger in-
centives to set low prices. Tiered plans generate substitution both from expensive to
low-cost providers as well as within the group of non-incentivized providers, which
yields competitive-pricing incentives. Second, conditional on demand, providers may
use this plan design to leverage providers during negotiations. Among those with low-
cost designation, the increase in demand raises the value of contracting, potentially
allowing insurers to secure lower reimbursement rates. Providers without low-cost
designation may wish to gain it by setting sufficiently low prices. There is little ex-
isting evidence on how providers respond to cost sharing faced by consumers. One
exception is Whaley and Brown (2018), who study provider responses to the Califor-
nia reference pricing program. These authors find moderate reductions in the prices of
ambulatory surgery centers and no changes in the prices of hospital-based facilities.27
To study supply-side effects, I follow Brown (2019a), Christensen, Floyd, and
Maffett (2015), and modify (1) to include fixed effects for each procedure-provider-
insurer combination. The idea behind this strategy is that conditional on a given
procedure-provider-insurer combination, variation in prices over time is driven by
changes in the negotiated price between the insurer and the provider. Importantly,
because prices are determined at the insurer-provider level, treatment is at the insurer,
as opposed to the plan, level. To summarize price changes that occur following
the implementation of tiered plans, I estimate the following difference-in-differences
27The authors do report a reduction in colonoscopy prices at hospital-based facilities, which have
prices above the reference price. At these providers, consumers pay the full marginal cost of treat-
ment above the reference level, generating potential demand-based incentives for providers to price
low.
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specification separately for Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim:
yijkt = θany tieredmt × Anthem/HPmt + λt + λmkr + µijkt + εijkrt (1.5)
Here, Anthem/HP is an indicator for Anthem, in the sample which omits Harvard
Pilgrim, and for Harvard Pilgrim, in the sample omitting Anthem, and any tieredmt
is an indicator that this insurer uses any tiered plans in year t. I described above, I
include fixed effects, λmkr, for each unique procedure-provider-insurer combination.
Importantly, because this regression is estimated at the individual episode level, the
estimate (θ̂ should be interpreted as a weighted average of supply-side effects, where
weights depend on provider market shares associated with each insurer. For example,
if Anthem successfully renegotiates lower reimbursements rates for colonoscopies with
a major supplier such as Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, this puts relatively
more downward pressure on θ̂ than the same renegotiation with a small ambulatory
surgery center or office. In addition, it is important to point out that θ in this
specification lacks a clear causal interpretation. Given the many factors that impact
bargaining and prices is a given year, it is very unlikely that any form of a parallel
trends assumption will hold. Therefore, these results should be viewed as suggestive
of the impact that using tiered plans may have on prices, but not of a precisely defined
causal quantity.
Table 1.5 reports the results from this specification. The results indicate that
both Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim experienced an overall reduction in conditional-
on-provider average prices for each service type. For each service type, the estimates
imply that Anthem achieved larger price reductions than Harvard Pilgrim. There are
several possible explanations for this result. From a bargaining perspective, Anthem
has a larger share in the New Hampshire market, and thus, has more leverage than
Harvard Pilgrim to employ in negotiations with providers. Interestingly there is
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anecdotal evidence to suggest that Anthem has been using this leverage in tandem
with the price transparency movement to negotiate lower reimbursement rates with
some of the most expensive hospitals.28
An important weakness of the difference-in-differences estimator in this context is
the implicit averaging of yearly post-treatment effects. This is especially problematic
here because treatment intensity, measured by the number of individuals enrolled
in tiered plans, is increasing over the post period for both Anthem and Harvard
Pilgrim. Thus, to the extent that utilizing tiered plans does affect negotiated prices,
we should expect prices to be declining over the entire post period, as opposed to





γτ (t = τ)× Anthem/HPmt + λt + λmkr + µijkt + εijkrt (1.6)
The coefficients γτcapture yearly trends in prices paid by Anthem and Harvard
Pilgrim, adjusted for case-mix. The coefficient estimates from this specification are
plotted in Figure A1. While these numbers do not have an explicit interpretation,
they reflect the yearly variation driving the difference-in-differences estimates above.
Overall, these plots support the fact that both insurers have seen a relative drop in
prices following the introduction of tiered plans, and that these effects have increased
in magnitude as the number of tiered plan enrollees has grown.
1.3.1 Robustness
In this section, I discuss a number of plausible threats to identification in the models
above. Because these models are estimated at the episode level, it will be useful to
28Over 2010-2011 Anthem was engaged with Exeter Hospital, one of the state’s most expensive fa-
cilities in very public negotiations, which resulted in Exeter cutting rates overall (Tu and Gourevitch,
2014).
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Table 1.5: Supply-Side Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Lab Endoscopic Arthroscopic
Panel A: Anthem Supply-Side Effects
Post × Anthem -0.301∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.020)
R2 0.863 0.639 0.689
N 878,019 157,091 20,286
Panel B: Harvard Pilgrim Supply-Side Effects
Post × Harvard Pilgrim -0.170∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.017)
R2 0.821 0.742 0.708
N 711,640 102,297 13,013
Notes: All equations estimated with controls for age, sex, CCI, and fixed effects
for month, year, plan, and zip. Standard errors clustered at the insurer level are
in parentheses.
describe the mapping from individual choices into episode characteristics. Referring
again to the underlying discrete choice model, the expected value of a particular








This implies that significant shifts in unobservables that affect either the probabil-
ity of obtaining care or the likelihood of choosing a particular provider may contami-
nate the difference-in-differences estimates. Changes in the distribution of unobserv-
ables may be driven by contemporaneous shocks or differential plan selection. If there
are significant changes in the distribution of preferences across plans over time, then
the estimates may just pick up the changing composition of individuals, as opposed
to the effects of tiering. Additionally, if there is sorting of individuals into and out of
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tiered plans based on price sensitivity or preferences for specific low-cost providers,
then, again, episodes that actually arise within a tiered plan may just reflect this
changing composition of individuals.
Table A4 presents summary statistics on both episode-level information and indi-
vidual information associated with episodes covered under both tiered and non-tiered
plans. In terms of episode-level payments, tiered plans are associated with signifi-
cantly lower total spending and out-of-pocket payments. This is consistent with both
the demand-side and supply-side models presented previously. In terms of individual-
level characteristics, individuals are very similar across the two groups. The one ex-
ception is in total yearly out-of-pocket spending, which is higher for those in tiered
plans.
I employ several strategies to address the issues above. First, I utilize the lengthy
time-span of the data and estimate models with individual fixed effects on the sample
of individuals with multiple episodes over the eleven-year period. Identification here
relies on individuals who have episodes both while they are under a tiered incentive
plan and while they are not. By focusing on individuals with multiple visits, this
model is robust to contemporaneous shocks that affect the composition of each plan
as well as changes in the extensive margin of demand. The estimates from this
specification are presented in Table A5. Overall, the estimates are relatively close to
those associated with the baseline specification. This suggests that the results are
not being driven by large changes in the composition of individuals who receive care
under each plan over time, which is consistent with the extensive margin estimates.
The model with individual fixed effects is effectively a difference-in-differences
regression in which episodes define the pre and post period. The estimates from this
model will be biased if individuals select into tiered plans based on expected changes in
their demand for medical care. I adopt two strategies to address this possibility. First,
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I examine the extent to which tiered plan enrollment is correlated with observable
measures of preferences in the period before these plans became available. To do so,
I identify individuals who obtained each service type before 2010 and estimate the
following specification using each group
tieredit = γ1Non-Hospitali−t + γ2spendingi−t + βXit + λt + εit (1.7)
Here Non-Hospital−t is an indicator that in individual i used a non-hospital facility
for the service type prior to 2010, and spendingi−t denotes i’s mean yearly spending
(on health care) over this period. The results from this specification are presented
in Table A6. In terms of risk selection, I find that health, as measured by the CCI,
is weakly correlated with enrollment in a tiered plan. However, I find no evidence
that prior spending predicts plan enrollment, suggesting there is no selection based on
preferences for utilization. I find weak evidence that prior use of non-hospital-based
facilities is correlated with enrollment, although the estimated marginal effects are
less than 1% for each service type.
Next, I restrict the sample to individuals who have only one plan offered through
their employer in a given year. This consists primarily of small group plans, which
have been the most consistent adopters of tiered plans. By focusing on this sample,
I significantly reduce the extent of possible forward-looking selection on the part
of individuals that might contaminate the model estimates. Table A7 reports the
estimation results on this sample. These results are, again, roughly in line with the
baseline estimates.
1.4 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effects of tiered cost sharing on consumer choices and
payments. I exploit the rollout of tiered plans covering common outpatient procedures
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by insurers in New Hampshire to provide new evidence on how these incentives affect
consumer and provider behavior. Overall, I find that tiered plans are associated
with significant reductions in mean per-episode spending on lab, endoscopic, and
arthroscopic services.
I first focus on the demand-side impact of tiered cost sharing, assessing the extent
to which the spending reductions are driven by consumers shifting toward lower-cost
providers. I find that tiered plans measurably affect consumer demand, generating
per-episode savings of 14.5%, 3.3%, and 2.9% on lab, endoscopic, and arthroscopic
services, respectively, conditional on the set of prices that prevail within and insurer-
year. Demand-side effects exhibit moderate heterogeneity across treated groups and
demographics. Importantly, tiered plans do not affect the utilization of services on
the extensive margin, implying that yearly demand-driven savings are generated by
consumer switching behavior.
I next study the supply-side effects of tiering by examining changes in the negoti-
ated prices of services covered by tiered plans. I find suggestive evidence that tiered
plans have aided Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim in achieving price cuts from providers.
However, given the multitude of factors that potentially affects the bargaining pro-
cess, a more detailed structural model is necessary to quantify the extent to which
tiered plans contribute to price changes.
Overall, my results suggest that tiered cost sharing plans are quite effective in
reducing costs for common outpatient medical services. From a policy perspective,
these results indicate that tiered plans may be superior to other consumer-focused
designs such as HDHPs, which do not appear to move consumer demand on the
intensive margin. Further work is needed to better understand the effect of tiered plan
design in equilibrium. The results here suggest that the supply-side of the market is




Equilibrium Effects of Tiered Cost
Sharing in the Market for Medical Care
2.1 Introduction
The evidence presented in Chapter 1 suggests that the tiered cost-sharing programs
implemented by Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim have generated significant savings on
lab, endoscopic, and arthroscopic services. The reduction in expenditures is driven
partly by a shift in demand toward low-cost facilities and partly by a reduction
in prices overall. In this chapter, I develop an equilibrium model of supply and
demand for medical services to explore more deeply the causes and implications of
these results.
I first develop and estimate a discrete choice model of provider selection to serve as
the demand side of the market model. I exploit significant variation in out-of-pocket
costs across providers, plans, and time to estimate consumer responsiveness to these
prices on the intensive margin. In this context, an important issue with deductible-
based plans is that shopping incentives are null when costs exceed the remaining
deductible amount. Moreover, deductibles create shadow incentives whereby full-
information consumers should respond only to the expected end-of-year price of care
(Ellis, 1986). To address this, I construct measures of both spot prices and expected
end-of-year prices that individuals face when choosing a provider. To handle potential
endogeneity of out-of-pocket prices, I employ a novel control function approach that
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exploits both inertial plan choice and aggregate plan characteristics to instrument for
individuals’ monthly prices. I find that spot prices drive the bulk of responsiveness
on the intensive margin. Moreover, I find that tiered cost sharing is associated with
higher responsiveness to spot prices for lab services, suggesting that these plans may
increase the salience of consumer costs.
I use the individual-level model estimates to summarize aggregate market condi-
tions facing insurers and providers. Overall, I find small but not insignificant substi-
tution effects across providers, with a mean own-price aggregated elasticity of demand
of -0.28. Not surprisingly, providers that operate in more concentrated markets face
less-elastic demand than providers in less concentrated markets.
To study the implications for plan design, isolating just the demand-side effects
of insurance, I use the estimates of this model to simulate counterfactual outcomes
under alternative incentive structures, holding negotiated prices fixed. I compare the
tiered cost-sharing design used by insurers in New Hampshire to several other pop-
ular plan designs, including coinsurance, high-deductible, and reference pricing.1 I
also compare this tiering setup to the more common version involving fixed copay-
ments for providers in each tier.2 I find that the tiered cost-sharing plans as currently
constituted compare favorably to other plan designs in terms of reducing total ex-
penditures, while placing a modest financial burden on consumers. Specifically, the
simulations imply that moving all consumers to a tiered plan leads to a 6.62% reduc-
tion in expenditures, holding prices fixed. Consistent with the reduced form results,
spending reductions are driven by an increase in market shares for popular low-cost
providers and loss in patient volume at most high-cost hospitals. Reference pricing
1Under reference pricing, insurers set a reimbursement limit, above which patients are responsible
for the full marginal cost of treatment.
2Tiered fixed copayment plans are a variant of the tiered plans I study here in which consumers
face a constant, fixed copayment at all providers within a tier. These type of plans are studied by
Sinaiko and Rosenthal (2014), Frank et al. (2015), and Prager (2016).
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is the only scheme that generates a significant degree of price substitution, although
it comes with high financial exposure to patients.
I incorporate the supply-side with a bargaining model similar to Gowrisankaran
et al. (2015) and Brown (2019b), in which equilibrium prices maximize the Nash
product of insurer and provider surpluses. The solution to this problem depends on
plan design, which mediates demand curves faced by providers. I use the estimates
from the discrete choice model and the first-order condition of the bargaining problem
to estimate marginal costs and bargaining weights. Using the full set of estimates, I
again simulate counterfactuals, this time allowing prices and demand to adjust based
on the particular incentive structure. The full equilibrium simulations highlight the
importance of provider price-setting incentives in determining the relative merits of
different plan designs. Like Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), I find that cost sharing, in
general, is negatively associated with equilibrium prices, although the results suggest
that flat copayments across groups of providers tend to push up the prices of these
providers.
Overall, tiered plans are projected to save 12.38% relative to observed payments,
nearly double the projected savings from the partial equilibrium simulation. In re-
gards to the current design of tiered plans, the equilibrium model predicts that
widespread adoption will push down the prices of high-cost hospitals but push up
the prices of incentivized facilities. These dynamics highlight the potential sensitivity
of tiered plans to the bargaining process with low-cost facilities, although I acknowl-
edge that this prediction is inconsistent with realized trends in negotiated prices paid
by Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim. To accommodate this fact, and to generate more
realistic counterfactuals, I refine the equilibrium model to allow for endogenous as-
signment to tiers. Simulations with this model generate more realistic predictions for
equilibrium prices and suggest that this form of tiering generates greater savings than
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the original design being used.
I estimate all models using detailed administrative data from the New Hampshire
All-Payer Claims Database (APCD). These data contain comprehensive information
on the insurer, provider, and individual involved in each claim, and encompasses the
universe of medical claims in the state from 2006-2016. This information allows me to
construct an elaborate picture of the financial incentives facing consumers during each
choice situation, providing a basis for the supply and demand models. In the reduced-
form analysis, I focus my analysis on lab, endoscopic, and arthroscopic procedures
that are subject to tiered cost sharing under the Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim plans.
In the equilibrium model, I narrow the focus to the market for colonoscopies.
Overall, my results suggest that tiered incentives are effective in constraining
expenditures for a suite of common medical procedures. I find that these plans
generate downward pressure on spending from both the demand-side and supply-
side. Compared to alternative plan designs, tiered cost sharing is more effective
in shifting demand toward low-cost providers while imposing modest cost sharing
on consumers. I also shed light on the importance of benefit design during price
negotiations. Full equilibrium simulations suggest that tiered plans promote lower
prices among previously high-priced providers but may put upward pressure on the
prices of incentivized facilities. Within the class of tiered plans, these results indicate
out-of-pocket prices should vary both across tiers and within tiers to spur demand-side
and supply-side spending reductions.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper builds on a number of prior studies that employ discrete choice models of
provider demand to estimate price elasticity and taste parameters (Capps et al., 2003;
Ho and Pakes, 2014; Gowrisankaran et al., 2015; Prager, 2016; Whaley et al., 2017,
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Brown, 2019b).3 A crucial feature of such models is the mapping from insurance plan
parameters to out-of-pocket costs. I improve on prior work by developing a general
method to incorporate accurate out-of-pocket prices that can be used to compare
vastly different plan designs in counterfactual simulations. I demonstrate this feature
by simulating demand under possible alternative out-of-pocket cost functions.
This paper is also related to the growing literature on empirical models of bilateral
bargaining between insurers and providers (Town and Vistnes, 2001; Capps et al.,
2003; Ho, 2009; Gowrisankaran et al., 2015; Prager, 2016; Brown, 2019b; Ho and Lee,
2017; Ho and Lee, 2019). In contrast to most prior work, my focus is explicitly on the
role of cost sharing in bargaining and equilibrium price determination. In particular,
this paper is the first to explicitly compare vastly different incentive structures in
an empirical model of supply and demand. In the models of Gowrisankaran et al.
(2015) and Brown (2019b), cost sharing takes the form of a coinsurance rate, which is
constant across providers, precluding many of the popular designs currently in place.
My specification accommodates variation across both plans and providers in expected
consumer costs.
Most closely related to this paper is Prager (2016), who studies tiered fixed co-
payment plans covering inpatient admissions in Massachusetts. Like Prager (2016), I
explore both demand-side and supply-side channels through which tiering may impact
expenditures. I use the equilibrium model to explicitly compare the tiered plans used
in New Hampshire with the fixed copayment plans studied by Prager (2016). Both
this paper and the work of Prager (2016) offer important insights into how tiered
plans can be used effectively.
3A number of papers estimate similar models, but do not include the out-of-pocket price in the
specification of patient utility (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Tay, 2003; Ho, 2006; Ho and Lee, 2017.
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2.1.2 Spot Prices
I first describe how out-of-pocket spot prices enter individual utility. Here I model
only the intensive margin of demand, so all quantities are conditional on the fact that
an individual has decided to obtain a particular medical service.4 Given a service
type, an insurance plan j induces a mapping from the set of providers in the network
Rj, with negotiated prices {pjr}r∈Rj , and an individual’s deductible status at date
τ , dedijτ , to a set of out-of-pocket prices denoted by {OOPijrτ}r∈Rj .5 Under a
standard deductible plan, for example, an individual’s spot price at date τ with




min{pjrt, dedijtτ}, if r /∈ Rlowj
min{c̄j, dedijtτ}, if r ∈ Rlowj
(2.1)
where Rlowj denotes the set of designated low-cost providers and c̄j is small, fixed
copayment.6 An important aspect of consumer-directed health care in general, and
tiered cost sharing in particular, is constructing {OOPijrtτ}r∈Rj to steer consumers to-
wards low-cost providers. Tiered cost sharing accomplishes this directly by imposing
a cost difference of min{pjr, dedijτ} −min{c̄j, dedijτ} between any high-cost provider
and any low-cost incentivized provider. For relatively expensive services such as
arthroscopic knee surgery, this difference can be on the order of $2000-$3000. Impor-
tantly, plans differ significantly in terms of the savings generated by shopping. To get
a sense of this, Figure 2.1 below illustrates the relationship between negotiated prices
4It is fairly standard in this context to take the extensive margin as exogenous. Given that I find
no effect of tiered cost sharing on total spending or the extensive margin for any service, I view this
modeling assumption as reasonable here as well.
5The use of τ in a subscript is used to denote a time within year t, as deductible remaining, and
thus, out-of-pocket prices vary within a year.
6In the plans considered here, this is typically $0 for lab services and $75 for outpatient procedures.
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and out-of-pocket prices for colonoscopies under four different plan types. This high-
lights the differences across plans in terms of incentives to shop for providers. Panel
A depicts a flat copayment plan, which generates zero incentives to shop. Panel B
shows spot prices generated by a plan with a low deductible and constant coinsurance.
In this case, the coinsurance provides marginal incentives to shop across providers.
Panel D depicts out-of-pocket prices for individuals facing only a $2000 deductible.
In this scenario, individuals face the full marginal price difference between providers
that cost less than $2000 but face no marginal incentives between more expensive
providers. Panel C shows the spot out-of-pocket prices in a tiered cost- sharing plan
with a small copayment at preferred providers and $2000 deductible at non-preferred
providers. Here, there are very weak incentives to shop within a group, but very
strong incentives to use preferred providers.
Importantly, the prices and out-of-pocket costs depicted in Figure 2.1 are not the
realized prices faced by all individuals in the plan, as the deductible amount remaining
changes throughout the year. For those plans that apply only a deductible towards
these services, all out-of-pocket prices drop to zero once the deductible has been met.
To estimate demand, I observe the actual out-of-pocket price paid by the individual
at the chosen provider and infer the prices that would have been paid at all other
providers in the choice set had they been chosen.7
2.1.3 Choice Model
I now describe the discrete choice framework used to model provider demand. Each
individual i is in need of a medical procedure k. Given the individual’s insurance
plan j, they choose among providers in the insurers network Rj. Individuals face
a menu of out-of-pocket spot prices {OOPijrtτ}r∈Rj for providers in their network,
7For most plans, it is possible to catalog the relevant information on deductibles, coinsurance
rates, and copayment amounts in order to compute counterfactual out-of-pocket costs. I drop plans
for which this is unfeasible due to small sample size or inconsistent information.
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Figure 2·1: Total and Out-of-Pocket Price Under Different Plans
Notes: Each bar reflects the relationship between the total price and out-of-pocket
price for a particular provider in a particular plan. Prices are computed as the
mean bundled price across all episodes between 2011 and 2014 for providers with
at least 30 episodes. Out-of-pocket prices are computed as the costs implied by the
particular plan design. For tiered cost sharing, providers whose prices are below
$1,500 are assumed to be preferred. Deductibles are assumed to be $2000 in both
the high-deductible and tiered plans.
which depends on their deductible status at date τ ∈ t.8 I assume that the perceived
utility for consumer i, enrolled in insurance plan j, who obtains procedure k from
8I take the date of the procedure as exogenous. It is possible that individuals jointly select
providers and dates, possibly depending on current and expected deductible status. Further research
is needed to determine if this behavior is present.
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provider r ∈ Rj at date τ , takes the general linear form:
uijrt = −θ1OOPijrtτ + µt(dir) + β1xitdir + β2xitvr + λr︸ ︷︷ ︸
δijrt
+εijrt (2.2)
In this specification, utility depends on both out-of-pocket costs as well as an array
of other characteristics, δijrt, that likely mediate provider choice. Distance is known
to be one such factor, so I include transformations of the driving distance between
each individual and provider, t(dir). Demand for certain types of providers may
vary across individuals, so I include interactions, xitvr, of individual characteristics
with indicators for whether the provider is a hospital. Individual characteristics
include age, gender, CCI, income and education. To account for heterogeneity in
willingness-to-travel, I also interact individual characteristics with distance, xitdir.
To accommodate unobserved brand or quality differences across providers, I include
provider fixed effects λr. Then, under the assumption that the error term εijrt is
distributed type 1 extreme value, choice probabilities take the standard logit form
s(yijtτ = r|OOPijtτ , δijrt; γ) =
exp(−θOOPijkrtτ + δijrt)∑
r′∈Rj exp(−θOOPijr′tτ + δijrt)
(2.3)
2.1.4 Estimation
Identification in the demand model above relies on variation in the vector of out-of-
pocket prices relevant for each choice situation. The out-of-pocket price associated
with a particular provider varies (1) across plans at a given time, (2) across time in
a given plan, and (3) within an individual-year based on cumulative and expected
spending towards the deductible. A concern with this model is that, because out-of-
pocket prices depend on plan cost sharing and within-year individual spending, they
are potentially correlated with unobserved determinants of demand. The concern
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with across-plan cost sharing is that individuals may select into plans based on the
associated distribution of expected out-of-pocket prices across providers.9 The con-
cern with exploiting within-year variation is that changes in out-of-pocket prices that
result from reaching plan deductibles may be correlated with time-varying health
shocks. For example, individuals in poor health may be more likely to meet their
deductible and to prefer a hospital-based facility.
I employ a control function approach using instruments for spot out-of-pocket
prices that are based on inertial plan prices (Hausman, 1978; Heckman, 1978; Petrin
and Train, 2010). The goal of the control function in this context is to approxi-
mate the component of the error term that is correlated with out-of-pocket prices.
Then, conditioning on this term leaves the remaining variation in out-of-pocket prices
independent of the error. To construct instruments, I first define each individual’s
inertial plan as the plan they would be enrolled in if they did not switch from the
previous period (Abaluck et al., 2018; Prager, 2016; Stockley, 2016). To form the con-
trol function, I regress spot out-of-pocket prices on plan-provider transaction prices
and plan-month average cost sharing of the inertial plan and obtain the residuals.
Plan-provider transaction prices constitute a traditional cost-shifting instrument, as
they are determined via insurer-provider bargaining. These prices are correlated with
out-of-pocket prices through cost-sharing mechanisms but are exogenous to the indi-
vidual.10 Following Ellis, Martins, and Zhu (2017), I compute the average plan-month
cost sharing net of each individual’s contribution to the average. This measure cap-
tures within-year plan-level changes in out-of-pocket prices due to deductibles but is
9For example, if individuals choose plans based on having low expected prices for their preferred
providers, this will bias θ̂ downward. I view selection based on specific providers as a relatively minor
concern, given that individuals would need to anticipate having a procedure in the coming year and
know the relevant prices associated with each plan-provider pair available. A more plausible concern
is selection based on overall cost sharing and a preference for certain types of providers.
10This instrument is based on Dunn (2016), who uses supply-side costs as instruments in a reduced
form model of spending.
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unaffected by an individual’s own experience throughout the year.
The identifying assumptions here are analogous to the standard linear instrumen-
tal variables. That is, that the instruments are both correlated with out-of-pocket
prices and that they enter utility only through their effect on them. The first stage
regressions strongly suggest that the first requirement is satisfied as the F-statistic in
these models is typically around 1000. The exclusion restriction requires that indi-
viduals do not systematically forecast the future distribution of out-of-pocket prices
across plans and providers, and select into plans based on this. In Chapter 1, I
present evidence based on tiered cost-sharing plans, which suggests that this type of
selection is not a major concern. In particular, I find no evidence of selection into
tiered cost-sharing plans based on prior observed preferences. More generally, the rate
of plan-switching from year-to-year is relatively low, with about 80% of individuals
remaining in the same plan from year to year.
As discussed by Wooldridge (2010) and Petrin and Train (2010), under the stated
assumptions, there exists a function of the first-stage residuals that conditions out
the problematic correlation. I estimate specifications using both a two-stage residual
inclusion model (Terza et al., 2008) in which the control function is assumed linear
and a more flexible approach using a fourth-degree polynomial in the residuals.
I estimate the demand for two common services: lipid panels and diagnostic
colonoscopies. I use these disaggregated services, as opposed to broader group cate-
gories, because the estimation procedure here requires specific prices for each insurer-
provider-year combination. The CPT codes for these services occur frequently enough
to obtain accurate measures of both out-of-pocket and transaction prices at this level.
Table 2.1 presents the price coefficient and elasticity estimates for each service.11 Col-
umn 1 presents the baseline results with no endogeneity correction, and columns 2
and 3 show the control function specifications for the two-stage residual inclusion and
11The complete model estimates are presented in Table B1 and Table B2 in the appendix.
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polynomial cases, respectively. For lipid panel demand, the estimates are quite similar
across the three specifications and imply a very small degree of price sensitivity. For
colonoscopy demand, controlling for the endogeneity of out-of-pocket prices causes
the coefficient to increase in magnitude, which is consistent with prior work in this
area (Whaley et al., 2017).12
Table 2.1: Choice Model Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Control Function Form: None Linear Flexible
Panel A: Lipid Panel
Spot Out-of-Pocket -0.0059∗∗∗ -0.0061∗∗∗ -0.0058∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Spot Elasticity -0.1758 -0.1825 -0.1735
Psuedo R2 0.45 0.45 0.45
N 1,740,214 1,740,214 1,740,214
Panel B: Diagnostic Colonoscopy
Spot Out-of-Pocket -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Spot Elasticity -0.0921 -0.3672 -0.3403
Psuedo R2 0.50 0.51 0.51
N 524,915 524,915 524,915
Controls not shown above include distance, distance squared, interac-
tions of individual characteristics (age, gender, CCI, and income) with
distance, interactions of individual characteristics with a hospital in-
dicator, and provider fixed effects. Elasticity denotes mean own-price
elasticities at observed prices.
To better understand the role of non-price attributes that enter utility, I present
the complete set of parameter estimates for colonoscopy demand in Table B1 and lipid
12The coefficient estimates in the control function specifications are equal, to three decimal places,
to those reported by Whaley et al. (2017) who also estimate the demand for colonoscopies using a
similar strategy but different population.
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panel demand in Table B2. Notably, the coefficient estimates on non-price attributes
are quite similar across the two services, suggesting a number of core structural rela-
tionships in medical care demand. First and foremost, distance is strongly negatively
associated with provider choice. Older individuals are less likely to travel far to get
to a provider, while individuals from high-income areas are more likely to travel.
Sicker patients, as measured by their CCI, are more likely to travel and more likely
to choose a hospital-based facility, although these effects are relatively weak. Income
is positively associated with choosing a hospital, although this may reflect the corre-
lation between wealth and the presence of multiple hospitals nearby. Point estimates
of provider-fixed effects vary substantially across providers, suggesting potentially
significant dispersion in latent quality.13
A well-known drawback of the multinomial logit specification for choice probabil-
ities is the implication of independence from irrelevant alternatives. To address this,
I estimate a number of alternative specifications for colonoscopy demand, which per-
mit more flexible substitution patterns and present the results in Table B3. First, I
allow the coefficient on out-of-pocket price to vary based on individual characteristics
as well as the distance to the provider. The estimates suggest that price sensitivity
varies by income, with individuals from higher-income areas less responsive to out-
of-pocket prices than those from lower-income areas. I also estimate two mixed logit
specifications, allowing price sensitivity to vary flexibly across individuals. Column 2
of Table B3 reports the results of a model in which the out-of-pocket price coefficient
is distributed lognormal in the population, and all other coefficients are fixed. In a
second specification, I allow coefficients on both price and distance to be distributed
multivariate normal with nonzero covariance, as those more likely to travel may tend
to be less price-sensitive. The results from the mixed logit models are very similar to
13Alternatively, one could include observable quality measures such as patient ratings or rates of
complications, but these may not capture important brand effects.
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the baseline model. The estimated mean of the price coefficient distribution in each
case matches the fixed-coefficient estimate to four decimal places. The estimated
standard deviation of this distribution is also quite small. In the case that the hier-
archical structure embedded in the mixed logit specification is closer to reality, the
results here suggest that the baseline case provides a very good approximation. In
the correlated specification, the covariance between the coefficients on out-of-pocket
price and distance is estimated to be positive, indicating that more price-sensitive
individuals are also less inclined to travel.
2.1.5 Shadow Incentives
It is well known that, in the presence of a nonlinear budget set induced by deductibles
and out-of-pocket-maximums, a full-information consumer should respond only to
the expected end-of-year marginal price, also called the shadow price (Keeler et al.,
1977; Ellis, 1986). Interestingly, many empirical studies find that consumers respond
strongly to spot incentives and respond weakly or not at all to shadow incentives.
Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2015), Dalton, Gowrisankaran, and Town (2015),
and Abaluck, Gruber, and Swanson (2015) studying the infamous “donut hole” cover-
age region in Medicare Part D, all find significant effects of the donut spot price irre-
spective of end-of-year price. In the context of a high deductible plan, Brot-Goldberg
et al. (2017) show that individuals reduce spending when under their deductible,
conditional on their expected end-of-year price and prior year end-of-year price. On
the other hand, Aron-Dine et al. (2015) exploit variation in the timing of when in-
dividuals join a plan to show some price-responsiveness to the expected end-of-year
price.
Understanding the role of shadow prices is particularly important in the context of
studying tiered cost sharing and other consumer-directed plans given that deductibles
play a central role in many of these plans. As Equation 2.1 shows, the out-of-pocket
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cost differential between hospital-based and independent facilities is driven by the fact
that individuals face a marginal price of one at hospital-based facilities while under
their deductible. This structure implies that individuals should not account for these
spot incentives if they expect to exceed their deductible. This constitutes a potential
limitation of tiered cost sharing and other deductible-based incentives to the extent
that consumers are cognizant of this machinery. To examine this issue, I construct
expected end-of-year prices and include them in the demand model specified above.
The expected end-of-year price for a particular individual-provider pair depends
on plan characteristics and expected cumulative spending towards the deductible.
Following Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) and Stockley (2016), I use the full sample
to estimate the conditional expectation function for cumulative end-of-year spending
Y EOYijτ , given cumulative current spending Yiτt, prior-year total spending Yit−1, and
health and demographics Xit.
E[Y EOYijτt |Wijτt] = G(Yiτt, Yit−1, Xit; %)
I then construct expected-end-of year out-of-pocket prices using the mapping implied
by each plan, Sj, and expected cumulative end-of-year spending, Ŷ
EOY
ijτt
OOPEOYijrtτ = Sj(pjrt, Ŷ
EOY
ijτt )
This procedure differs from Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) and Stockley (2016) in that
I assume individuals form expectations about future spending and then apply this
expectation to their plan mapping to forecast future out-of-pocket prices. In contrast,
Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017) and Stockley (2016) use similar individuals to form a
spending distribution and then integrate the plan mapping over this distribution.
My approach allows for more realistic expectations by generating exact zeros for
consumers with high expected spending. As with spot prices, end-of-year prices may
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be endogenous, given their dependence on cumulative spending and plan features.
To form the control function for expected end-of-year prices, I conduct the same
procedure as for spot prices but replace average plan-month cost sharing with plan-
month expected end-of-year cost sharing.14 To compute expected end-of-year cost
sharing, I regress observed end-of-year cost share on cumulative spending and demo-
graphics for each month and take the average fitted value.
Following Brot-Goldberg et. al (2017) and Stockley (2016), I include both spot
and end-of-year prices directly in the estimating equation, which in this case means
in the utility index
uijrt = −θ1OOPijrtτ − θ2OOPEOYijrtτ + δijrt + εijrt (2.4)
This leads to choice probabilities analogous to (2.3) which I estimate with maximum
likelihood. The estimates are presented in Table 2.2. For both services, the majority
of demand-responsiveness is concentrated around the spot price. For lipid panels, the
end-of-year price elasticity is actually positive, although this is mostly attributable
to the correlation between spot and end-of-year prices. The own-price elasticity with
respect to spot prices is estimated to be about -0.07, suggesting very little respon-
siveness on the intensive margin. For colonoscopies, the estimates imply a very small
degree of responsiveness to end-of-year prices, with an estimated own-price elasticity
of about -0.1. The elasticity with respect to spot prices is significantly higher, with
estimates between -0.28 and -0.31 depending on the functional form of the control
function.
Overall the demand estimates suggest that consumers exhibit a small degree of
substitution on the intensive margin, mostly driven by a response to differences in
14This approach is similar to Stockley (2016), who constructs instruments for spot and shadow
prices by generating predicted values based on similar individuals. Here this step is, roughly speak-
ing, subsumed into the first stage estimation of residuals.
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spot prices, rather than forward-looking incentives. These findings are consistent with
prior work in this area. Brot-Goldberg et al. (2015) and Stockley (2016), modeling
monthly spending, find no evidence of forward-looking behavior, while Aron-Dine
et al. (2015) and Einav et al. (2015) find evidence of slightly forward-looking be-
havior. Studying the intensive margin, Prager (2016), Brown (2019b), and Whaley
et al. (2017) find some degree of responsiveness to spot prices for inpatient admis-
sions, imaging services, and colonoscopies, respectively. This paper is the first, to
my knowledge, to study responsiveness to both spot and shadow prices in a discrete
choice context.
2.1.6 Attention Effects of Tiered Cost Sharing
The previous results suggest that consumers respond modestly to incentives on the
intensive margin for colonoscopies and almost negligibly for lipid panels. In terms of
plan design, this provides a normative mechanism with which to influence demand.
That is, to the extent that the elasticity estimates reflect a stable underlying rela-
tionship, plans can mediate demand predictably by modifying spot prices. However,
given the normal opacity of medical service prices, there is reason to suspect that
the salience of out-of-pocket prices is both important and variable across individu-
als and circumstances. Tiered cost-sharing plans may increase the salience of spot
prices by simplifying the information set of consumers. In contrast to a typical high-
deductible plan, tiered plans provide consumers with a simple grouping of high-price
and low-price providers. To assess this possibility, I modify the choice model to allow
price-responsiveness to vary across tiered cost sharing and other plans. In particular,
I specify utility as
uijrt = −θ1OOPijrtτ − θ2OOPijrtτ × tieredijt + δijr + εijrt (2.5)
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Table 2.2: Choice Model Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Control Function Form: None Linear Flexible
Panel A: Lipid Panel
Spot Out-of-Pocket -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0026∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Shadow Out-of-Pocket 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Spot Elasticity -0.2427 -0.0707 -0.0792
Spot Elasticity tiered 0.1693 0.1455 0.1457
Psuedo R2 0.45 0.45 0.45
N 1,74,0214 1,740,214 1,740,214
Panel B: Diagnostic Colonoscopy
Spot Out-of-Pocket -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Shadow Out-of-Pocket 0.0001 -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Spot Elasticity -0.0963 -0.3125 -0.2791
Spot Elasticity tiered 0.0399 -0.0995 -0.1027
Psuedo R2 0.50 0.51 0.51
N 524,915 524,915 524,915
Controls not shown above include distance, distance squared, interac-
tions of individual characteristics (age, gender, CCI, and income) with
distance, interactions of individual characteristics with a hospital in-
dicator, and provider fixed effects. Elasticity denotes mean own-price
elasticities at observed prices.
Here, θ2 reflects the difference in price sensitivity between the tiered and non-tiered
groups. Under the assumption that there is no underlying difference in elasticities due
to unobserved individual characteristics, any difference in observed price responsive-
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ness between these groups can be interpreted as the effect of the tiered cost-sharing
environment.
The results from this specification are presented in 2.3. For lipid panels, there is a
clear difference in responsiveness between the two populations. In fact, the estimates
suggest that there is virtually no price substitution among the non-tiered group, but
moderate price responsiveness among those under tiered cost-sharing plans, with an
elasticity estimate of about -0.77. In contrast, for colonoscopies, there appears to
be no difference in responsiveness between the two groups. Overall, these results
provide some insight into the mechanisms underlying the effects of tiered cost sharing
documented in the first section.
In particular, the demand-side effects are driven in part by a structural response
to the associated spot incentives and in part by an increase in responsiveness to the
underlying incentives. For endoscopic procedures, the changes appear to be driven
mostly by a structural response to out-of-pocket prices. This finding suggests that
other plans could achieve a similar demand response by modifying cost sharing ap-
propriately. In contrast, for lab services, demand-side changes appear to be driven
in large part by an increase in the attention paid to price differences.15 This finding
supports the notion that plans should account for behavioral factors like attention
and usability when constructing benefit design.
15An alternative explanation for these estimates is that consumers in tiered plans are inherently
more sensitive to lab service prices. However, I find no additional evidence to support the case that
these populations are fundamentally different, making this explanation unlikely.
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Table 2.3: Choice Model Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Control Function Form: None Linear Flexible
Panel A: Lipid Panel
Out-of-Pocket -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Out-of-Pocket × Tiered -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Spot Elasticity -0.0268 -0.0209 0.00590
Spot Elasticity Tiered -0.433 -0.774 -0.763
Psuedo R2 0.46 0.46 0.46
N 1,740,214 1,740,214 1,740,214
Panel B: Diagnostic Colonoscopy
Out-of-Pocket -0.0003∗∗∗ -0.0013∗∗∗ -0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Out-of-Pocket × Tiered 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.000169) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Spot Elasticity -0.0932 -0.3713 -0.3380
Spot Elasticity Tiered -0.087 -0.347 -0.344
Psuedo R2 0.50 0.53 0.53
N 524,915 524,915 524,915
Controls not shown above include distance, distance squared, interac-
tions of individual characteristics (age, gender, CCI, and income) with
distance, interactions of individual characteristics with a hospital in-
dicator, and provider fixed effects. Elasticity denotes mean own-price
elasticities at observed prices.
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2.1.7 Aggregate Elasticities
I now use the colonoscopy demand estimates to study aggregate substitution patterns
in the market.16 The elasticity estimates given in the regression tables above are
computed at the individual choice level and averaged over all choices. However,
the substitution effects most relevant for insurers and providers are in terms of the
response of aggregate patient flows to provider costs. To summarize this, I compute
the aggregated out-of-pocket elasticity of demand as the response in market share to







where Nr is the number of consumers with provider r in their choice set (Ben-Akiva
and Lerman, 1985).17 Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of elasticity estimates derived
from the demand model. The mean of the distribution is -0.28, and there is a moderate
degree of dispersion across providers. Overall, the estimates are in line with prior
empirical work in this area. Importantly, the aggregated elasticity estimates are not
directly comparable to many of the benchmark estimates, as these typically reflect the
responsiveness of total spending to cost sharing, rather than the response of market
shares.18 There is, however, a small literature in which elasticity estimates on the
intensive margin are reported. Using a similar discrete choice model, Prager (2016)
studies substitution with respect to fixed tiered copayments for hospital admissions,
16I focus on colonoscopies, as opposed to lipid panels or other services, in this section, and the
remainder of the paper. Colonoscopies are attractive in this context because they are relatively
common, moderately costly, and amenable to price shopping. Moreover, the demand estimates
are relatively stable across specifications and match estimates from prior work closely. This result
suggests that estimates derived from this model are likely generalizable.
17This measure reflects the change market share of each provider with respect to a change in
out-of-pocket price.
18The canonical estimate from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment is -0.2 (Manning et al.,
1987) although the reestimate from this experiment of Aron-Dine et al. (2013) is -0.5. Perhaps
the most comparable extensive margin elasticity comes from Ellis, Martin, and Zhu (2017), who
compute estimates for disaggregated services, reporting an estimate of -0.29 for outpatient services.
62
finding elasticities of -0.02 to -0.24. Similarly, Gowrisankaran et al. estimate own-
price elasticities with respect to expected coinsurance rates of -0.10 to -0.15. The
most comparable estimates come from Whaley et al. (2017), who report a mean
own-price aggregated elasticity of -0.70. The larger estimate reported by Whaley et
al. (2017) is likely driven by higher cost sharing in their sample.19
Figure 2·2: Estimated Distribution of Aggregated Out-of-Pocket Price
Elasticity Among Colonoscopy Providers
Notes: Kernal density estimate of the distribution of aggregated out-of-pocket price
elasticity for colonoscopy providers in New Hampshire. Individual elasticities are
computed at observed out-of-pocket prices in each choice situation.
To examine the effect of market concentration on these elasticities, I compute
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each hospital service area (HSA). Figure
2.3 plots the estimated aggregate own-price elasticities and the Herfindahl-Hirschman
19Applying a similar degree of cost sharing as in the Whaley et al. (2017) population leads to a
mean estimated elasticity of about -0.50 among New Hampshire providers.
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Index (HHI) of each colonoscopy provider. Overall, these markets are quite concen-
trated, with the majority of HSAs exhibiting HHIs in excess of 2500. Interestingly,
these estimates support the simple prediction that providers in more concentrated
markets face less elastic demand.
Figure 2·3: Aggregate Demand Elasticity by HHI
Notes: Kernal density estimate of the distribution of aggregated out-of-pocket price
elasticity for colonoscopy providers in New Hampshire. Individual elasticities are
computed at observed out-of-pocket prices in each choice situation.
2.1.8 Partial Equilibrium Counterfactuals
The results presented thus far suggest that tiered cost sharing is effective in steering
consumers toward pre-specified low-cost facilities. From a policy perspective, how-
ever, it is relevant to know how the tiered design compares to alternative incentive
structures that are commonly employed. In this section, I use the colonoscopy demand
estimates above to simulate counterfactual outcomes under a number of alternative
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insurance regimes. Here I focus on isolating the demand-driven effects of each plan
design by holding transaction prices fixed and letting choice probabilities vary based
on the out-of-pocket price schedule induced by each plan type.
I consider five alternative insurance designs in addition to tiered cost sharing: full
insurance (no cost sharing), constant coinsurance of 25%, high-deductible, referencing
pricing, and tiered fixed copayment. Under the high-deductible plan, individuals
pay the full marginal cost of all care until they have reached $2500 in out-of-pocket
spending, after which they pay nothing. For reference pricing, I use a model very
similar to the CalPERS program described in Whaley et al. (2017). In addition to
a deductible, individuals are subject to the full marginal price above the reference
level of $2500. That is, for providers whose price exceeds $2500, individuals are
responsible for their remaining deductible as well as the difference between the cost
of treatment and this reference price.20 Under tiered cost sharing, consumers face
a $75 copayment at incentivized facilities and are subject to their full deductible
remaining at non-incentivized facilities.21 I also consider a variant of the tiered cost-
sharing plans studied throughout in which consumers face a fixed copayment amount
for all providers in a tier. Under the hypothetical tiered fixed copayment plan, I
assume that individuals face a $250 copayment at providers whose price is below
$2500 and a $750 copayment at providers whose price exceeds this amount.22 This
plan resembles those studied by Prager (2016) in the context of hospital inpatient
demand
Figure 2.4 illustrates the price-to-out-of-pocket mappings generated by each hy-
pothetical plan design.23 It is clear that each design offers different incentives for
20These parameters are slightly different than in the CalPERS program, which used a reference
price of $1500 and only applied to hospitals. See Whaley et al. (2017) for details.
21I specify that any provider on either Anthem or Harvard Pilgrim’s list of low-cost providers is
an incentivize facility in the simulations.
22I assume that a provider’s tier is a deterministic function of its price. If this were true, there
would likely be a notch problem surrounding this cutoff price.
23For illustrative purposes, to construct the figure, I assume that consumers with tiered cost
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both consumers and providers. Reference pricing provides marginal incentives ev-
erywhere outside of the interval between the remaining deductible and the reference
price but is also the most costly for consumers. The coinsurance plan also provides
broad marginal incentives with no notch problem, although it fails to deliver strong
arc incentives between even the highest-priced and lowest-priced facilities. The dia-
gram makes apparent a limitation of deductible-only plans, which is that marginal
incentives drop to zero once the deductible is met. For expensive surgical procedures,
consumers may exceed their deductible using almost any provider, giving them no rea-
son to shop around. Tiered cost-sharing remedies this issue to some extent by offering
consumers a set of providers at which they bear almost no cost. Consumers thus face
substitution incentives both among non-incentivized facilities based on the deductible
and across incentivized and non-incentivized facilities based on the deductible and low
copayment amount. In the tiered fixed copayment design, all shopping incentives are
based entirely on the spread across the two tiers.
To compare each of these plan designs, I recompute choice probabilities by apply-
ing the associated out-of-pocket schedule to the fitted demand model above. Table
2.4 shows the counterfactual mean levels and differences relative to the observed
outcomes for total payments, out-of-pocket payments, high-cost provider share, and
non-hospital share. Full insurance, with no steering incentives, leads to an increase in
payments of almost 1% relative to baseline, and a corresponding increase in the share
of high-cost providers and hospitals. Coinsurance, tiered fixed copayments, and the
high-deductible plan all perform similarly, leading to a 2-4% reduction in expected
payments. Notably, the high-deductible plan imposes the largest financial burden on
consumers among these three plans, suggesting that this incentive structure is not
efficient in steering consumers. Reference pricing performs best in terms of total pay-
sharing or deductible-only plans have $2500 remaining on their deductible while those in reference
pricing plans have $2000 remaining.
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Figure 2·4: Illustration of Different Incentive Designs
Notes: Figure shows the relationship between negotiated price and out-of-pocket
price generated by each plan design. For high-deductible and tired cost-sharing
plans, the deductible remaining is $2500.
ments, leading to a decline of nearly 11% relative to the baseline case. This finding is
not surprising given that reference pricing offers the most substantial incentives over
the entire spectrum of provider prices. This structure induces a significant shift in
demand toward low-cost and non-hospital facilities, with expected shares of 0.68 and
0.62, respectively. Tiered cost sharing is also successful in tapering expenditures, with
an expected reduction of almost 7%. Compared with reference pricing, tiered cost
sharing imposes significantly less out-of-pocket costs on consumers for both low-cost
and high-cost facilities, leading to a difference of about $900 per episode.
To examine the market-level effects of tiered cost sharing more generally, Figure
2.5 plots the expected change in market share and expected change in total revenue
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for each provider when moving from full insurance to tiered cost sharing.24 Over-
all, demand and revenue are declining in provider price, although the slope of the
regression line is modest. Consistent with the underlying incentives, low-cost non-
hospital facilities tend to gain market share and revenue, while expensive hospitals
tend to experience the opposite. Notably, these changes are especially stark for a
handful of low-cost and high-cost facilities. In particular, there are about four am-
bulatory surgery centers that gain a lot of traction due to tiered cost sharing and
roughly six to ten hospitals that lose it. This pattern is largely driven by the fact
that the impact of out-of-pocket price on provider choice is dwarfed by other factors
such as distance and latent proclivity (captured by provider fixed effects), rendering
substitution effects small for most provider pairs.
While out-of-pocket-based substitution effects are small in general, tiered cost
sharing is more effective at steering consumers toward low-cost providers than other
plans. Figure 2.6 depicts the change in market share, relative to full insurance, for
each incentive structure. Consistent with the summary results, the coinsurance, high-
deductible, and tiered copayment plans induce minimal movement toward cheaper fa-
cilities. Reference pricing leads to substitution away from highly-priced facilities with
low latent desirability, although this patient volume is more uniformly distributed
across lower-cost facilities than in the tiered cost-sharing case.
24I adopt full insurance as the baseline case here to highlight most clearly the market-level effects
of different insurance plans.
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Table 2.4: Counterfactual Payments and Market Shares
Total Payments Out-of-Pocket High-Cost Non-Hospital
Panel A: Counterfactual Mean Levels
Full Insurance 2467.12 0.00 0.45 0.52
Tiered Cost Sharing 2284.08 370.66 0.36 0.66
25% Coinsurance 2363.65 590.90 0.40 0.56
High-Deductible 2378.36 1117.35 0.41 0.56
Reference Pricing 2188.64 1274.27 0.32 0.62
Fixed Tiered Copayment 2394.18 502.77 0.41 0.58
Actual Plans 2445.97 210.59 0.44 0.53
Panel B: % Difference Relative to Actual
Full Insurance 0.86 -100.00 0.97 -0.97
Tiered Cost Sharing -6.62 76.02 -8.37 13.11
25% Coinsurance -3.37 180.60 -3.69 2.67
High-Deductible -2.76 430.59 -3.09 2.47
Reference Pricing -10.52 505.11 -11.69 8.94
Fixed Tiered Copayment -2.12 138.75 -2.77 4.83
Panel A summarizes counterfactual expected values computed using the estimated demand parameters
and various out-of-pocket price schedules. Total payments and out-of-pocket payments are mean per-
episode values in 2011 dollars. High-Cost denotes the expected share of episodes with providers whose
median price is above the median overall price. Panel B shows the percent change relative to the
actual plan composition case in the first two columns and the percentage point difference in the last
two columns.
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Figure 2·5: The Effect of Tiered Cost Sharing on Market Shares and
Revenue
Notes: The top figure plots the change in market share by median bundled price
for each colonoscopy provider. Change in market share relative to full insurance is
computed by summing choice probabilities under each scenario over all episodes in
the period and dividing by the total number of episodes. The bottom figure plots
change in mean yearly revenue by median bundled price. Revenue is computed by
multiplying the expected number of episodes by price.
70
Figure 2·6: Market Effects of Tiered Cost Sharing vs. Other Plans
Notes: Each figure plots the change in market share by median bundled price for
each colonoscopy provider under five different out-of-pocket cost schedules. Change
in market share relative to full insurance is computed by summing choice proba-
bilities under each scenario over all episodes in the time span, and dividing by the
total number of episodes.
2.2 Supply
The counterfactual simulations presented in the previous section suggest that tiered
cost sharing promotes an effective balance between consumer welfare and moral haz-
ard. In these simulations, I alter out-of-pocket prices while holding all negotiated
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prices fixed. Interestingly, the estimates from the reduced form supply-side models
suggest that changing benefit designs may have led to a decrease in prices overall. In
line with this statistical evidence, Tu and Gourevitch (2014) report that a number of
providers in the state have renegotiated lower rates with both Anthem and Harvard
Pilgrim in response to the increased prevalence of shopping incentives. Here I try to
capture this type of behavior in a structural model of price formation in order to study
the role of benefit design in general, and tiered cost sharing in particular, in determin-
ing equilibrium prices and quantities. I apply the bargaining model of Gowrisankaran
et al. (2015), used in a very similar context by Brown (2019b), to examine the effect
of tiered cost sharing on equilibrium prices. Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) use this
model to study the effect of hospital mergers on prices and welfare, while Brown
(2019b) applies the framework to examine the effect of consumer information about
prices (or the lack thereof). My focus here is on the role of benefit design in price
negotiations and outcomes, and so more attention is given to the formulation of out-
of-pocket prices. Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) compute expected coinsurance rates for
each consumer using a Tobit model and assume the relevant price for consumers is
this expected coinsurance times the negotiated price. Importantly, this specification
imposes a constant coinsurance rate across individual-provider pairs and dispenses
with the role of deductibles and copayments.25
I first discuss the incentives of insurers. Each insurer m ∈ M maintains a set of
plans jm, each of which covers a set of enrollees Ijm. For a particular medical service
k, each plan specifies a mapping from negotiated prices and remaining deductible
to out-of-pocket prices.26 From the insurer’s perspective, I assume that the relevant
25Brown (2019b) captures deductibles within the constant coinsurance framework by imputing a
rate of one while individuals are under their deductible and zero when they are over. In the model of
Prager (2016), out-of-pocket prices vary across tiers for consumers who are in tiered network plans,
but are assumed to be constant across hospitals for consumers in other plans.
26For clarity, I focus on bargaining over the price of a single service throughout. Studies of
hospital inpatient pricing focus on bargaining over case-mix-adjusted prices while Brown (2019b)
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information for bargaining is the set of expected out-of-pocket prices paid by enrollees,
given the plan parameters, denoted OOPjm = E[{OOPjmr}r∈Rm|Ijm]. This quantity
is just the average amount paid by consumers at each provider, which is sufficient
information to compute expected costs.27
Expected insurer surplus given a network Rm (withholding the time subscript on








where CSijm denotes consumer surplus given the network and plan, sijmr denotes
the probability that individual i uses provider r, ω is the insurer’s weight on consumer
surplus relative to costs, and αi is the probability that enrollee i receives care in the
upcoming year.28
Denote the insurer surplus absent provider r by V (Rm \ r,pm,OOPm). Then the
net surplus accruing to insurer j via provider r is
∆Vmr(Rm,pm,OOPm) = V (Rm,pm,OOPm)− V (Rm \ r,pm,OOPm)
(2.6)
As discussed by Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), an important modeling choice in this
context is the formulation of insurer incentives. Here I take the set of plans and
cost-sharing parameters as fixed at the time of negotiations. The primary competing
studies service-level prices. In the domain of shoppable services, I view service-level prices to be the
appropriate quantity. While I estimate the model for colonoscopies, it can readily be applied to any
sufficiently common service.
27This expectation is taken over individual spending in the case of deductibles and out-of-pocket
maximums. Presumably, insurers can compute this expectation given a proposed deductible level
and prior claims data on its enrollees.
28Following Small and Rosen (1981) and Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003) consumer sur-








specification, pioneered by Ho and Lee (2017), models insurer profit directly by spec-
ifying plan demand and a model of premium-setting and insurer competition. While
this framework may be preferred in some settings, I argue that the approach taken
here provides a better approximation to the New Hampshire market over the sample
period for the services studied here. First, the majority of individuals in my data are
part of employer-based groups, which rarely switch insurers over the sample period.
This suggests that an inertial model of insurer competition, as opposed to a fluid
one, is more appropriate. Second, insurers in New Hampshire are under significant
scrutiny by the State Insurance Department to release innovative plans and control
costs.29 This lends credence to using the functional form above as an approximation
to the insurer’s objective function, as opposed to a pure profit function.
On the provider side, I assume that profit accruing to provider r through a contract








where mcr denotes marginal cost. Importantly, I assume that providers know the out-
of-pocket mappings associated with each plan, and thus internalize the connection
between the negotiated price and choice probabilities sijmr(OOPjm).
30
Given the net surpluses accruing to both the provider and insurer in the event of a
29Each year the state commissions a report on medical cost drivers in which the claims and
premium data from each major insurer is analyzed and summarized. Insurers must also speak at
an annual public hearing regarding costs and innovations. These reports and hearing minutes are
available on the New Hampshire Insurance Department’s website.
30Given that providers observe the cost sharing of patients that they treat, I view this as a
reasonable assumption in this context.
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contract, I assume that the equilibrium price pmr∗ maximizes the Nash product
pmr∗ = argmax (πmr(pmr,OOPm,mcmr))σ (∆Vmr(Rm,pm,OOPm))
1−σ
(2.8)
where σ is the bargaining power of providers relative to insurers. In this model, the
equilibrium price associated with each insurer-provider pair is optimal given the set
of all other negotiated prices. I assume that a potential contract failure between any
pair does not affect the equilibrium prices and network status of all other pairs (Horn
and Wolinsky, 1988; Collard-Wexler et al., 2014).
2.2.1 Equilibrium Prices
To study the role of benefit design on the equilibrium distribution of prices, I use
the first-order condition of the Nash bargaining equation along with data on negoti-
ated prices and demand estimates to estimate the model parameters. For notational
simplicity, I withhold the sum over plans and instead write the sum over individuals
covered by each insurer Im, but maintain a plan subscript. The derivative of the Nash
product can be arranged to yield










































Benefit design enters prominently in this equation via the choice probability gradient
with respect to prices. In general, choice probabilities derivatives are negatively
associated with prices because greater responsiveness here means that providers face
a stronger trade-off between price and quantity. As is evident in expression (2.9), plans
mediate these derivatives via the relationship between negotiated prices and out-of-
pocket prices, captured by
∂OOPijmr
∂pmr
. The type of cost sharing applied to the service at
hand determines this value. Under coinsurance, it is given by the coinsurance rate. In
a deductible plan, this derivative is roughly the expected fraction of consumers who
are under their deductible at the time of service.31 Under a fixed copayment, out-




implication from this model is, therefore, that flat copayment plans (which includes
zero cost-sharing plans) tend to drive prices up.
In the New Hampshire tiered cost-sharing plans, consumers are subject to a small
flat copayment when using incentivized facilities and to a deductible payment other-
31More precisely, it is the expected out-of-pocket payment amount divided by price, which I also
refer to as the expected cost share.
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wise. In this model, for an insurer that adopts this structure for all plans, prices of
incentivized facilities are given by






This condition is analogous to equation (17) in Gowrisankaran et al. (2015). For
these providers, revenues from each provider are proportional to the marginal value
they add to the network. For all other providers, assuming the expected cost share
is ρ, prices are given by















These conditions provide some insight into the incentives of insurers and providers
under a tiered cost-sharing structure. There are two key differences between these two
expressions for equilibrium pricing. The first is given by the first term in the brackets
in (2.12), what I call market-based incentives. This term reflects the incentives of
providers to set low prices in order to boost demand. This depends on price sensitivity,
θ, as well as expected cost sharing, ρ. Insurers can thus apply downward pressure
on prices though market-based mechanisms by increasing cost sharing, so long as
expected cost sharing depends on negotiated prices. The second difference is based
on the derivative of insurer surplus with respect to price, what I call bargaining-
based incentives. In the copayment case, consumer surplus does not respond to
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price changes, and the derivative of total costs is just the market share. Among
non-incentivized facilities, insurers account for a more complex relationship between
prices, consumer surplus, and total costs, given by the numerator of the second term
in brackets in (2.12).
2.2.2 Estimation of Bargaining Equation
I now turn to the procedure for estimating the parameters bargaining model above.
In similar settings, Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) and Brown (2019b) parameterize
marginal cost to include an econometric error term that is potentially correlated with
price, and estimate the bargaining first-order condition using a generalized method of
moments estimator. This approach is very rich in parameters-to-estimate, and thus,
is fairly demanding of the data. On the other end of the spectrum, for any particular
values of σ and ω, the marginal cost for each insurer-provider-year combination is just-
identified by the bargaining first-order condition. I take an intermediate approach
by specifying a small number of parameters to estimate. Specifically, I estimate a
single cost parameter, mcr, for each provider, along with the bargaining weight σ and
consumer surplus weight ω. With this parameterization, I define the squared model
error, now accounting for the time dimension, as
gmrt(pmt,Λ; γ) =








and estimate Λ with a two-step M-estimator described by







Here, Λ includes the bargaining parameters (σ, ω,mc), and γ̂ denotes the choice model
parameter estimates. I use the first-stage estimate γ̂ to construct choice probabilities
and their derivatives, which enter prominently in the expressions for insurer surplus
and provider surplus. To construct expected out-of-pocket prices, I compute the mean
out-of-pocket price for each plan-provider-year using realized visits. Identification
relies on the consistency of the choice model estimates as well as variation in the
empirical expressions for insurer and provider incentives over time and across pairs.
The estimates from this model are presented in Table 2.5 below. The estimate
of ω, the insurer’s weight on consumer surplus, is 1.5, which is similar to the analo-
gous estimate in Brown (2019b) of 1.76. Practically, this suggests that insurers and
consumers value large networks of colonoscopy providers. The estimated bargaining
weight of providers is .45, suggesting insurers have slightly more bargaining power in
this market. Again, this is similar to Brown (2019b)’s estimate of 0.37.32 I estimate
a unique marginal cost parameter for each provider. The mean estimated marginal
cost is $1,362, which is reasonable given observed prices. To give prices and marginal
cost estimates some more context, I compute the implied Lerner index, (p −mc)/p,
for each provider. The mean Lerner index overall is 0.32, although there is significant
dispersion across providers, suggesting that there is wide variation in the degree of
competitive pricing.33 Unsurprisingly, the Lerner is much higher for hospitals (0.49)
than for non-hospital facilities (0.23), providing motivation for tiered cost-sharing
incentives.
32Ho and Lee (2017) estimate bargaining weights close to 0.5 while Gowrisankaran et al. (2015)
estimate a smaller provider weight.
33This finding is consistent with Brown (2019b), who finds large differences in the Lerner index
of different medical imaging procedures, and Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) who find variation in
competitive pricing of inpatient admissions across hospital systems.
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Table 2.5: Bargaining Model Estimates Summary
Quantity Mean SD (SE)
Marginal Cost 1,361.67 852.13
Markup 996.03 1317.22
Mean Lerner Index 0.32 0.26
Consumer Surplus Weight (ω) 1.50 (0.12)
Provider Bargaining Weight (σ) 0.45 (0.17)
Parameter estimates from two step M-estimation of bargaining
model. Mean is taken over all providers and years. Standard
errors for ω and σ derived from the bootstrap with 100 repli-
cations.
2.2.3 General Equilibrium Counterfactuals
For the partial equilibrium scenario, I used the estimates from the demand model to
simulate counterfactual outcomes while holding prices fixed, but altering insurance
plan characteristics. Anecdotal evidence, the reduced form estimates from chapter 1,
and the first-order conditions of the Nash bargaining problem all suggest that benefit
design can impact equilibrium prices as well. In this section, I use the estimates from
both the demand and bargaining models to simulate counterfactual prices and choices
under each alternative incentive design used in the partial equilibrium simulations.
Table 2.6 shows several summary measures of the market equilibrium under each
insurance regime. The first three columns break down total payments by insurers
and individuals, and column 4 reports the non-hospital market share.34 There are
two interesting points of comparison here: outcomes relative to the baseline observed
case and relative to the partial equilibrium case. The former comparison provides
34Relative to Table 2.4, I add a column on insurer payments and omit the column on high-priced
provider share as prices now change.
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information about each plan design overall, while the ladder comparison sheds light
on the role of price adjustment relative to demand adjustment. Echoing the results
of Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), full insurance leads to a large increase in expen-
ditures. Moreover, mean per episode payments are significantly higher than in the
partial equilibrium case, as prices rise due to unresponsive consumer demand. The
coinsurance, high-deductible, reference pricing, and tiered cost-sharing plans lead to
a reduction in expenditures of roughly 10-20%. Moreover, in each case, the mean per-
episode payments are lower than in the partial equilibrium scenario. Interestingly,
the tiered fixed copayment plan performs poorly in equilibrium, leading to nearly a
20% increase in mean expenditures.
Table 2.6: Counterfactual Payments and Non-Hospital Share
Total Payments Insurer Payments Out-of-Pocket Non-Hospital
Panel A: Counterfactual Mean Levels
Full Insurance 2984.33 2984.33 0 0.52
Tiered Cost Sharing 2143.09 1791.89 351.21 0.66
25% Coinsurance 2139.66 1604.74 534.91 0.57
High-Deductible 2211.21 1140.63 1070.57 0.51
Reference Pricing 1979.02 816.61 1162.40 0.58
Fixed Tiered Copayment 2919.61 2419.30 500.31 0.51
Actual Plans 2445.97 2235.38 210.59 0.53
Panel B: % Difference Relative to Actual
Full Insurance 22.01 33.50 -100 -0.97
Tiered Cost Sharing -12.38 -19.84 66.78 8.23
25% Coinsurance -12.52 -28.21 154.01 3.90
High-Deductible -9.60 -48.97 408.38 -2.16
Reference Pricing -19.09 -63.46 451.98 4.83
Fixed Tiered Copayment 19.36 8.22 138.74 -2.35
Panel A depicts counterfactual expected values computed using the estimated demand parameters from the
second column of Table 6 and various out-of-pocket price schedules. Total payments and out-of-pocket payments
are mean per-episode values in 2011 dollars. Panel B shows the percent change relative to the actual plan
composition case in the first three columns and the percentage point difference in the last column.
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To better understand the summary measures, Figures 2.7 and 2.8 plot weighted
equilibrium price changes for each provider and expected demand curves, respec-
tively. Looking at price effects sheds light on the relative performance of each plan
in terms of mean payments. Coinsurance and reference pricing put substantial down-
ward pressure on prices over nearly the entire market, while full insurance and tiered
copayments do the opposite. This figure makes clear the main issue with the tiered
cost-sharing programs currently being employed that these incentives put upward
pressure pricing pressure on the facilities they promote. While these plans do reduce
expenditures by steering, this is somewhat offset by the increased bargaining power of
these providers. This result highlights the importance of incentivized designation on
the part of insurers. Here I assume that incentivized facilities are constrained to set
prices below $2500, which is roughly the maximum in Anthem and Harvard Pilgrim’s
programs.35
The demand curves depicted in Figure 2.8 plot the expected market share and price
of each provider. In contrast to the results on price changes, these plots illustrate the
upside of tiered cost sharing in equilibrium. Tiered cost sharing and reference pricing
are the only plans that generate a negative correlation between price and quantity.
This result highlights how tiered cost sharing reduces expenditures despite inducing
price increases by some providers.
Overall, the counterfactual results suggest that tiered cost sharing is effective in
reducing costs while also maintaining a relatively small out-of-pocket burden on con-
sumers. This incentive system is particularly effective in steering consumers toward
low-cost providers, generating overall savings. However, the results also highlight
some potential weak points of the current structure and other tiered designs with
35More work is needed to better understand the bargaining dynamics of incentivized designation.
Prager (2016) models tier assignment as a stochastic mapping from negotiated prices. The setting
here is slightly different in that incentivized status depends primarily on being an ambulatory surgery
center, which is not negotiated over.
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cost sharing fixed within a tier. In particular, market-based incentives are weak
within a tier, which makes the bargaining process with these facilities important in
constraining prices.
Figure 2·7: Equilibrium Price Changes by Plan Type
Notes: Each figure plots the change in equilibrium price, relative to the baseline case
of observed plans, for each colonoscopy provider in the data under each alternative
benefit design. Each bar reflects a single provider’s price change. Prices are weighted
by the demand from each insurer and deflated to 2011 dollars.
2.2.4 Endogenous Tiers
Here I consider a refinement of the above bargaining model that incorporates endoge-
nous assignment to tiers in a tractable manner. The general equilibrium counterfactu-
als described in the previous section show that tiered cost sharing performs similarly
to coinsurance and high-deductible plans. In contrast, in the partial equilibrium sim-
ulations, where prices are held fixed, tiered cost sharing performs much better than
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Figure 2·8: Empirical Demand Curves by Insurance Type
Notes: Each figure plots the estimated equilibrium market share and price under
each alternative benefit design. Prices are weighted by the demand from each insurer
and deflated to 2011 dollars.
these plans. This reversal is driven by the prediction in the general equilibrium case
that low-cost providers raise prices significantly under tiered cost sharing because
the low copayment stifles incentives to compete on price. However, this prediction
is unrealistic for a number of reasons. First, empirically, there has not been an in-
crease in the prices of incentivized facilities since the introduction of tiered plans. The
model above does not account for the ability of insurers to revoke preferred status
in the event of a price increase, effectively treating tiers as exogenously determined.
While this seems to be a good approximation to the early stages of tiered plan use,
the long-run will likely involve providers switching tiers. To develop a more realis-
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tic counterfactual, I consider a modification of the above model in which tiers are
determined endogenously.
For this counterfactual, I assume that insurers first specify the cost sharing as-
sociated with a preferred and non-preferred tier. For simplicity, I assume that cost
sharing takes the form of a coinsurance rate, which is cp at preferred providers and
cnp at non-preferred providers, with cp < cnp. Now, let
NSmr(pmr, cmr) = (πmr(pmr, cmr,mcmr))
σ (∆Vmr(Rm,pm, cmr))
1−σ
denote the value of the nash surplus at the negotiated price pmr, and under tier
assignment cmr ∈ {cp, cnp}. Then, equilibrium prices and tiers are determined jointly






That is, tiers are chosen to maximize the nash surplus, given the equilibrium price
that would prevail under each tier. The equilibrium of this game consists of a vector
of prices pm and tiers cm such that, for each insurer-provider pair, (pmr, cmr) solves
(2.14), given the equilibrium prices and tiers of all other providers. Importantly, both
insurers and providers face a trade-off in regards to tier assignment. For the insurer,
higher cost sharing reduces consumer surplus but also reduces expected costs. For
providers, higher cost sharing raises the effective price elasticity of demand. On the
intensive margin, this will reduce revenues at relatively more expensive providers and
raise revenues at relatively less-expensive providers.
A simpler approach to incorporating endogenous tier assignment is to allow a
provider’s tier to be a function of its negotiated price. For example, providers who
negotiated prices below $2000 are considered preferred, while those with prices above
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this threshold are non-preferred. However, this model predicts that prices will bunch
directly under the cutoff price, which is empirically untrue. An alternative approach is
developed by Prager (2016), who studies the tiering of Massachusetts-based hospitals
in tiered network plans. Specifically, the author estimates a stochastic mapping from
negotiated prices to tiers, exploiting variation in hospitals’ tiers over time and across
insurers. This permits the equilibrium distribution of prices to be more smooth. In
contrast with Prager (2016), I do not incorporate endogenous tiering in the moment
conditions used to estimate marginal costs and bargaining weights. Instead, I treat
plan designs as given, and assume observed prices maximize the Nash product. I then
treat these parameters as stable under alternative plan design regimes. I argue that
the approach used here to simulate counterfactuals under tiered cost sharing provides
a closer approximation to the negotiation process that occurs in a tiered setting.36
To simulate counterfactual outcomes under this cost-sharing regime, I assume
that cp = 0.05 and cnp = 0.50. As previously, since there is no closed-form solution
to describe equilibrium, I simulate equilibrium prices and tiers numerically. Figure
2.9 summarizes the results of this simulation. Overall, these counterfactual projec-
tions are more realistic and suggest that this process of tiering is more effective than
alternative cost-sharing regimes. In particular, this process generates both price cuts
overall as well as non-negligible substitution across providers. Relative to actual
levels, endogenous tiered cost sharing reduces mean per episode spending by 14.49%.
Moreover, out-of-pocket spending declines by 0.80% as many consumers are projected
to use preferred providers. The top panel of Figure 12 depicts equilibrium prices and
market shares, as well as the tier of each provider. Around two-thirds of providers end
up in the preferred tier, with these providers dominating overall in terms of market
share.
36In the Prager (2016) environment, insurers specify a stochastic mapping of prices to tiers, which
is fixed and known to providers, and then prices are negotiated. In my setting, insurers and providers
simultaneously negotiate over a price and tier.
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Figure 2·9: Equilibrium Price Changes by Plan Type
Notes: Top panel plots the estimated equilibrium market share and price under
the endogenous tiering simulation. Prices are weighted by the demand from each
insurer and deflated to 2011 dollars. Bottom panel plots the change in equilibrium
price, relative to the baseline case of observed plans, for each colonoscopy provider
in the data under endogenous tiering.
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2.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the equilibrium effects of tiered cost sharing, an innovative
plan design that uses sizeable out-of-pocket cost differentials to nudge consumers to-
ward low-cost facilities. In doing so, I provide new evidence on the effectiveness of
demand-side incentives in constraining health care expenditures. Using comprehen-
sive administrative claims data, I explore what financial incentives consumers respond
to, and estimate models of supply and demand to compare different plan designs. My
results suggest that tiered incentives that are both large and salient offer several
advantages over more traditional designs based on deductibles and coinsurance alone.
I next estimate a complete model of supply and demand for colonoscopies to
simulate counterfactual expenditures and market shares under a number of popular
insurance designs. I find that the tiered programs used in New Hampshire are highly
effective compared to alternative plan designs in terms of shifting demand toward
low-cost facilities. I show that consumers respond modestly to out-of-pocket prices
in choosing a provider, implying that clear and sizable incentives are necessary to
affect demand meaningfully. This insight provides an explanation for the success of
the tiered cost-sharing programs in New Hampshire and provides useful principles for
designing plans in the future.
In my model of insurer-provider bargaining, the substitution patterns of consumers
enter the price-setting incentives of providers, implying that plans which motivate
more active consumer behavior also tend to reduce prices. Tiered incentive plans
put downward pressure on expensive hospital-based facilities, but may put upward
pressure on low-cost incentivized facilities depending on how the bargaining dynamics
with these providers. These results suggest that applying a fixed copayment across
a large group of providers is likely inferior to using coinsurance, which preserves the
connection between negotiated and out-of-pocket prices.
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My findings suggest that the tiered design, as applied by Anthem and Harvard
Pilgrim in New Hampshire, is effective in steering consumers, and is likely supe-
rior to an alternative tiered design with less disperse fixed copayments and to other
consumer-focused designs. The equilibrium model highlights the fact that low fixed
copayments for incentivized facilities may put upward pressure on the prices of these
providers. More work is needed to address the negotiation process over both incen-
tivized designation and well as negotiated price, as some providers have begun to
negotiate low prices to attain preferred status with insurers. In adding a new layer to
the bargaining process, tiering providers’ out-of-pocket costs may offer an additional
lever to managed care organizations to contain costs. Simulations that incorporate
this type of endogenous tiering provide more realistic and more promising predictions
than the fixed tiering case.
On the policy side, this paper yields significant results toward the goal of leveraging
consumer-directed health care to constrain expenditures. Overall, the findings suggest
a cautious optimism for future programs and provide insights for future innovations.
Future work may attempt more directly to derive implications for the optimal plan
design in this context.
Chapter 3
Health Care Demand on the Intensive
Margin
3.1 Introduction
In the market for medical services, in contrast with most other markets, consumers
typically lack information on prices. As a result, factors such as physician referrals,
location, and notions of quality serve as the primary determinants of where individu-
als receive care. By dampening the market forces that would typically promote price
competition among providers, this consumer behavior likely contributes to the level
and dispersion that characterize medical care prices in the United States.1 To address
this issue, policymakers and insurers have become increasingly supportive of initia-
tives aimed at increasing consumer engagement in the health care decision-making
process. The two primary thrusts of these initiatives have been to increase the finan-
cial incentives of consumers to shop for care and to enhance the information available
to facilitate this shopping.
Initial efforts towards improving the information available to consumers took the
form of online or phone tools that allowed consumers to search for price information
for certain procedures. States such as New Hampshire, Maine, and Colorado have
used information from their all-payer claims databases to create state-sponsored price
transparency websites available to all residents. At the insurer level, companies such
1For example, the costs of a lower-limb MRI vary by a factor of twelve across the country and
roughly two-fold within hospital referral regions (Cooper et al., 2019).
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as Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina have created online price lookup tools
specifically for its members.2 There are also third-party administrators such as Com-
pass Professional Health Services and Vitals that contract with insurers and insured
groups to provide tailored information tools to consumers.3
While undoubtedly increasing in popularity, a number of limitations with these
price transparency tools have become apparent. For one, many of the cost estimators
report average negotiated prices and do not tailor the estimates to reflect the actual
plan characteristics of the individual. In many instances, such as for consumers whose
plans have low deductibles or rely heavily on copayments, negotiated prices do not
reflect the relevant price to consumers. More generally, plans may not provide strong
incentives for consumers to shop around, even in the presence of full information.
Thus, consumers may not seek out price information to begin with. Even apart
from the incentives to seek out and act upon price information, many consumers
are likely unaware that such price transparency tools are available. Then, perhaps
unsurprisingly, take-up of transparency tools has reportedly been low.
In tandem with price transparency efforts, employers and insurers have increas-
ingly adopted cost-sharing provisions to better incentivize consumers to shop for care.
The most popular mechanism in this spirit has been a high deductible, which exposes
consumers to variation in provider prices provided that they are less than the remain-
ing deductible amount. There has been tremendous growth in the share of individuals
enrolled in high-deductible health plans, reaching about 29% in 2018.4
Another mechanism that has been steadily increasing in popularity is tiered cost
2See http://www.bcbsnc.com/content/providersearch/treatments/index.htm
3Lieber (2017) studies the effects of one such tool.
4Importantly, status as a high-deductible health-plan or a consumer-directed health plan, as
defined by the Internal Revenue Service, is not a prerequisite for using a high deductible. In general,
deductible levels have been increasing across plan types. The fraction of privately insured individuals
whose primary deductible level is greater than $1,000 has grown from 38% in 2013 to 58% in 2018
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018).
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sharing. Plans with this feature sort providers into tiers, and levy out-of-pocket
prices that vary by tier. These plans more directly address the intensive margin of
demand by creating explicit out-of-pocket price differentials across provider groups.
An important advantage of this structure is that it significantly simplifies the choice
environment for consumers. Rather than comparing a potentially large number of
providers with varying costs and quality levels, consumers can easily identify out-of-
pocket costs associated with different providers.
Despite the proliferation of both shopping incentives and price transparency tools,
there is scant evidence of the degree to which consumers respond to such incentives
when choosing a provider. Indeed, the majority of prior work on the demand for health
care focuses on the extensive margin, that is, the response of total spending to cost
sharing. Moreover, the literature on these consumer-driven mechanisms is relatively
narrow, with most papers focusing on a single initiative such as a price lookup-tool
or a high deductible. In this paper, I fill this gap by providing new estimates of the
intensive margin elasticity of demand for a variety of common services such as MRIs
and arthroscopic knee surgery. That is, I estimate the responsiveness of consumers
to variation in out-of-pocket prices on the dimension of provider choice.
To study the shopping behavior of consumers, I use detailed administrative claims
data from New Hampshire, a state at the forefront of both price transparency and
directed incentives. I first document the significant degree of price dispersion that
exists across providers for the services I study. I then show how this variation gets
translated via health plans into variation in out-of-pocket costs relevant to consumers.
Importantly, incentives to shop for care have increased dramatically over time. The
mean cost share borne by patients on imaging, emergency room, lab services, and
dermatology has grown from around 10% in 2006 to nearly 30% in 2015. This has
translated into a significant increase in the spread of out-of-pocket costs relevant to
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any one consumer when choosing a provider.
To estimate consumer responsiveness to these out-of-pocket price differentials, I
first consider a linear model that relates the price of the chosen provider to the ex-ante
expected cost sharing of the individual. To address the endogeneity of individual-level
cost sharing, I employ an instrumental variable approach that exploits consumer in-
ertia and average plan characteristics. Identification is driven by significant variation
across both plans and time in the degree of cost sharing imparted upon consumers as
well as how cost sharing changes within a year. Across all services, the estimated price
elasticity of demand is -0.02, which is roughly 5% to 10% of conventional elasticity es-
timates which measure the response of total spending as opposed to realized provider
price. I show that the responsiveness on this margin is driven primarily by individuals
switching from expensive hospital-based facilities to independent outpatient facilities
when faced with higher cost sharing.
I next move to a discrete choice context to estimate both individual-choice and
market-level demand elasticities. My empirical model again accounts for potential
endogeneity in out-of-pocket prices and allows for heterogeneity in price sensitivity
across individuals. These estimates suggest considerable heterogeneity across service
types in these elasticity measures. Imaging services exhibit the largest estimated
demand elasticity of -0.61, endoscopic and lab yield more modest elasticity estimates
of -0.23 and -0.045, respectively. Arthroscopic surgeries, emergency room use, and
dermatology services so not exhibit any degree of substitution between providers,
with intensive margin demand elasticities that are not statistically distinguishable
from zero at liberal significance thresholds.
Overall, my results suggest that consumers respond quite modestly to out-of-
pocket prices on the intensive margin of demand and that the extent of this respon-
siveness varies across services. To the extent that this result is driven by institutional
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features such as physician agency and price obfuscation, the results suggest that there
are potentially large gains to diminishing these barriers. Conversely, to the extent that
these low elasticity estimates are the result of innate consumer preferences against
shopping for health care, the implication is that insurers and policymakers should
focus more on supply-side policies for cost containment.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper fits into two primary strands in the literature. Principally, this work is
related to the large literature focused on estimating the price elasticity of demand
for health care. The fundamental challenge addressed in this literature is that prices
faced by consumers are generally mediated by insurance plans, leading to potential
endogeneity in a standard demand model. To address this issue, studies have typically
relied on natural experiments and instrumental variable methods to obtain unbiased
estimates. Perhaps most famously, Manning et al. (1987) analyze data from the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment, in which enrollees were randomly assigned to
a cost-sharing scheme to eliminate selection bias. Duarte (2012), analyzing data
from Chile, exploits government regulations requiring private insurance companies to
modify cost-sharing parameters in the middle of the year based on public insurance
parameters. Eichner (1998) and Kowalski (2016) use the occurrence of injuries during
the year as an instrument for individual cost sharing, as these increase the likelihood
of meeting family deductibles, thus reducing the expected marginal price of care.
In this paper, I adopt an instrumental variable approach most similar to Stock-
ley (2016), Ellis, Martins, and Zhu (2017), and Scoggins and Weinberg (2017). The
common idea among these papers is to use aggregate plan features to instrument for
individuals’ own cost sharing at a point in time. Scoggins and Weinberg (2017) use
knowledge of exact plan characteristics to construct expected monthly coinsurance
rates as an instrument for realized cost shares. Ellis, Martins, and Zhu (2017) instru-
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ment for individual monthly cost shares using employer-year-plan average monthly
cost shares. Stockley (2016) constructs instruments by leveraging inertia in individu-
als’ plan enrollment and using plan characteristics to simulate monthly out-of-pocket
prices. This approach addresses both biased plan selection and within-year correlation
between health status and cost sharing.
A central difference between this paper and much of the prior literature in this
area is that I focus on demand responsiveness at the level of provider choice, i.e.,
the intensive margin.5 There are a number of papers that get at this margin by
estimating discrete choice models of hospital demand, although there is significant
variation in how prices are treated. The majority of papers simply exclude price from
the utility index.6 More recently, improvements in the quality of data available have
permitted researchers to construct out-of-pocket price measurements. Gowrisankaran
et al. (2015) construct expected coinsurance rates for hospital admissions. Prager
(2019) obtains exact information on copayment rates that differ across hospitals in
a network. Most similar to this paper are Whaley et al. (2017) and Brown (2019b),
who model the demand for specific medical services as opposed to hospital admissions.
Whaley et al. uses exact plan characteristics to construct each individual’s out-of-
pocket price schedule for colonoscopies. Brown (2019b) uses realized out-of-pocket
prices to construct a coinsurance rate which is assumed to be uniform across providers.
This paper combines the approaches of Whaley et al. (2017) and Brown (2019b), using
inferred plan characteristics and exact negotiated prices to construct out-of-pocket
price vectors relevant for each choice instance.
This paper is also related to the literature focused on evaluating consumer-driven
5The term “intensive margin” may also be used to refer to the quantity of services provided,
conditional on the quantity being positive. Throughout, I use this term to refer to an individual’s
choice among providers, conditional on the fact that the individual chooses one.
6These include Kessler and McClellan (2000), Town and Vistnes (2001), Tay (2003), Capps et al.
(2003), and Ho (2006).
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plan designs such as high deductible plans and tiered networks. Haviland et al. (2016)
use a sample of large employers to study the effects of consumer-directed health plans,
specifically defined, on utilization.7 Brot-Goldberg et al. (2015) conduct a detailed
study on the effect of high deductibles using a natural experiment in which a large
firm switched all employees into a high-deductible health plan. These authors report
a considerable reduction in spending on the extensive margin, but find no evidence
of consumers switching to less-expensive providers. Frank et al. (2015) and Prager
(2019) examine the effect of tiered pricing on hospital choice and find that these
plans generate savings by shifting consumers toward the lower-cost options. Similarly,
Sinaiko and Rosenthal 2014) study tiered physician networks and Starc and Swanson
(2019) study tiered pharmacy networks.
Information on prices and out-of-pocket costs relevant to consumers has histori-
cally been sparse. More recently, there has been a flurry of initiatives on the part of
states, insurers, and policymakers to increase price transparency for consumers. Wha-
ley et al. (2014), Lieber (2015), Desai et al. (2016, 2017), and Mehrotra et al. (2017)
study the effects of providing consumers with some form of a price transparency tool.
These studies report relatively modest effect sizes and generally low take-up. Also us-
ing data from the New Hampshire All-Payer Claims Database, Brown (2019a) studies
the impact of New Hampshire’s price transparency website, reporting a 3% reduction
in spending on imaging services. Most closely related to this paper is Chernew et al.
(2019), who authors use a very large and detailed dataset to examine specifically the
shopping behavior of consumers who obtain lower-limb MRIs. These authors report
that higher cost sharing is associated with using less-expensive providers, but that
physician referrals heavily influence patient choices, and thus, dampen responsiveness
to out-of-pocket prices.
7Consumer-Directed Health Plans (CDHPs) include both a high-deductible and a tax-advantaged
health savings account.
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3.1.2 Data and Context
The majority of the data used in this study are from the New Hampshire All-Payer
Claims Database (NHAPCD). These data are collected from all payers that operate
in the State through the New Hampshire Comprehensive Health Care Information
System. (NHCHIS). The construction of this database began in 2005, and, since
2007, has been used to power NH Healthcost, the State’s price transparency website.
I focus on six primary service groups: imaging, arthroscopic procedures, lab tests,
endoscopic procedures, emergency room visits, and dermatology procedures. I concen-
trate on procedures within these relatively broad categories because they are common,
relatively standardized, and potentially amenable to price shopping. I use Current
Procedural Terminology (CPT) and Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
(HCPCS) codes provided with each claim to filter episodes. Table A8 lists all of the
CPT/HCPCS codes used to filter claims. I restrict to procedures that are both listed
on the NH Healthcost website, and sufficiently common to generate accurate price
information across all plans and providers.
I aggregate claims into episodes of care based on the primary procedure performed
for a particular patient on a given day. I define a primary procedure as the most
expensive procedure performed in a particular day. For example, a day in which the
patient receives both a colonoscopy and a lab test is categorized as a colonoscopy
episode. I discard episodes that occur during multiple-day inpatient stays given, that
patients almost surely do not have the opportunity to choose a different provider in
these instances.
Each claim line includes rich information on payments made by individuals and
insurers to providers for the specified service. In particular, I observe the total charges
billed, the amount paid by the insurer, and the amount paid by the patient. The sum
of payments made by the insurer and the patient constitutes the effective negotiated
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price, also called the allowed amount. Using the information on payments, I construct
two different prices associated with each episode. First, I define the procedure price
as the negotiated price at the service line level. Second, I compute the visit price as
the sum of all payments that occur on the same day as the primary procedure. This
includes the primary procedure price plus the sum of ancillary procedure prices. The
primary procedure price is less noisy than the visit price and is more relevant in the
context of insurer-provider negotiations, but the visit price is more relevant for the
consumer.8
For each claim, I observe detailed information on the insurance plan covering the
patient. In particular, I observe the major carrier (i.e., Anthem, Harvard Pilgrim,
etc.), type of plan (i.e., HMO, PPO, etc.), purchasing group size, whether the group
is fully insured or contracting with the carrier as administrative services only (ASO),
and a unique purchasing group identifier. An important aspect of the identification
strategy used throughout this paper is variation across plans in the degree of cost
sharing imposed on patients. For example, large group plans typically have signifi-
cantly lower cost sharing than individual plans.
In terms of demographics, I observe the patient’s gender, age, zip code, race, and
relationship to the primary policyholder. I augment this basic demographic infor-
mation with zip-code-level statistics on education, income, and population density
from the American Community Survey. Importantly, I observe an encrypted patient
identifier that allows me to track individuals over the sample period. I use ICD-9
diagnoses codes to compute each individual’s CCI for each year.
New Hampshire has been at the cutting edge of injecting consumerism into health
care since the mid-2000s. Perhaps most notably, the state mandated the construc-
tion of an all-payer claims database to be used in both state-sponsored and outside
8NH Healthcost reports the visit price given that its primary objective is to facilitate consumer
decision-making.
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research. In 2007 this powerful data source was used to launch NH HealthCost, a
price transparency website. Residents can use this website to obtain cost estimates
for a variety of common procedures at different providers.
In tandem with transparency efforts, insurers have bolstered the level and va-
riety of demand-side cost sharing. Deductibles, in particular, have been increasing
throughout the state. HDHP enrollment has increased from 1.5% of the commercial
market in 2006 to 18% in 2011 to about 47% in 2016 (New Hampshire Insurance De-
partment, 2008, 2014; Samgula et al., 2017). Insurers have also made use of selective
contracting with providers to cut costs. The common thrust among these network
plans is that consumers face significantly different out-of-pocket costs at different
sets of providers. In the most extreme case, the limited network HMO, consumers
face negotiated rates and cost sharing at in-network providers and charge prices at
out-of-network providers. Relatedly, tiered network plans subject consumers to vary-
ing out-of-pocket costs across provider tiers, but maintain a broad network overall,
protecting patients from charge prices.
As a result of these demand-side initiatives, the share of costs borne by consumers
has increased substantially for the six major service categories I study. Figure 3.2
plots the mean cost share per episode over time for each of the six service categories.
Figure C4 breaks this measure down by plan type, indicating that the most significant
increases have come in the individual and small group markets, although cost sharing
has nonetheless been rising in the large group market as well. The fundamental
question posed in this paper is, thus, how do consumers respond, on the intensive
margin, to this increase in cost sharing?
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Table 3.1: Average Characteristics of Epsiodes
Imaging Arthroscopic Lab Tests Endoscopic Emergency Room Lesion Removal
Total Payments 723.39 6, 264.00 153.41 1, 922.55 647.39 230.79
OOP Payments 129.29 495.55 23.58 185.68 153.09 54.89
Non-Hospital Share 0.58 0.73 0.49 0.65 0.41 0.89
Distance in Miles 16.12 18.13 27.65 17.01 14.22 15.59
Age 44.71 45.64 49.48 51.07 34.04 41.46
Male 0.42 0.54 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.45
Charlson Score 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.09
Median Income 41, 230.51 41, 629.43 41, 344.18 41, 600.69 40, 182.73 42, 950.50
HMO 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.41
PPO 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.35
POS 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.16
EPO 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Anthem 0.44 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.47
Harvard Pilgrim 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.12 0.23
Modal CPT 71020 29881 80061 45378 99283 17110
N 1, 280, 155 33, 559 1, 515, 878 314, 797 669, 189 183, 321
Notes : Summary statistics describing episodes of care grouped by major service category. Total payments are
computed as the total payments for the primary procedure as identified by the CPT/HCPCS code. All monetary
values deflated to 2011 dollars.
3.2 Framework
I first describe the underlying model that is assumed to be generating observed data
of provider choices. Individual i, who needs medical procedure k, and is enrolled in
insurance plan j, chooses a provider r from among the set of providers in her insurance
plan’s network that offer this service, denoted Rjk. The perceived utility of selecting
provider r is a function of price, OOPijrτ , provider characteristics, zr, and individual
characteristics, xi , as well as an unobserved component εijr:
uijkr = U(xi, zr, OOPijkrτ ; Θ) + εijkr
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Figure 3·1: Price Dispersion for Common Services
Notes: Each bar represents the median bundled price of a single provider for CPT
codes 80053, 45378, 29881, and 66984, respectively. The sample is restricted to
providers who performed billed for the associated CPT code at least 30 times over
the period. All prices deflated to 2011 dollars.
I adopt the canonical assumptions that individuals choose the provider that maximizes
utility and the the error term is distributed i.i.d type 1 extreme value. Under these
assumptions, the probability that individual i selects provider r is given by
sijkτr =
exp(U(xi, zr, OOPijkrτ ; Θ))∑
r′∈Rjk exp(U(xi, zr′ , OOPijkr′τ ; Θ))
(3.1)
The object of central importance in the above terms is OOPijkrτ , which denotes
the out-of-pocket cost that individual i faces at provider r, for service k, given the
individual’s plan j and day τ . More specifically, each plan j defines a mapping
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OOPj(pjkr, dedijkτ ) from the negotiated price, pjkr, and the amount remaining on
an individual’s deductible, dedikτ , to the out-of-pocket price.
9 For example, in a
plan with no deductible and a coinsurance rate of α, OOPijkrτ = αpjkr. Under
a deductible plan with no coinsurance, OOPijkrτ = min{pjkr, dedijkτ}. Figure C1
depicts graphically the relationship between negotiated price and out-of-pocket price
under various cost-sharing mechanisms.
The primary objective of this paper is to study the responsiveness of individuals
to out-of-pocket prices on the margin of provider choice. As Figure C1 makes clear,
different plans impose vastly different out-of-pocket prices on consumers. Given that I
am focusing on the intensive margin of choice, what is most important is the variation
in out-of-pocket costs within an individual’s choice set. For example, for any services
subject to a fixed copayment, individuals face no variation in out-of-pocket prices
across providers in their choice set. Individuals subject to a deductible face the full
marginal variation in prices below the deductible level but no variation in prices above
this level.
Table 3.2 summarizes the variation in both negotiated prices and out-of-pocket
prices present in choice sets in the sample for each of the six primary service groups.
I compute two measures of variation within choice sets: the interquartile range and
the feasible savings amount.10 I define the feasible savings amount as the difference
between the realized payment and the counterfactual payment amount had the in-
dividual used the least expensive provider among those providers within the median
distance traveled of the individual’s zip code centroid.11 As Table 3.2 suggests, there
9Plans typically also include an out-of-pocket spending maximum. Once an individual hits this
level, prices at all (in network) providers are zero.
10For these calculations, I define prices and out-of-pocket costs at the CPT code level, as opposed
to the visit level. This likely results in an underestimate of the true gains from shopping given
that the cost of ancillary procedures is likely correlated with the cost of primary procedures, thus
exacerbating price differences.
11This measure is similar to the “money left on the table” measure used by Chernew et al. (2019),
although it is slightly more conservative. The measure used by Chernew et al. (2019) computes the
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is significant dispersion in negotiated prices within choice sets. The mean interquartile
range in negotiated prices is $1,107 for arthroscopic procedures, $441 for diagnostic
imaging procedures, and $241 for emergency room services. Given that consumers
typically pay only a fraction of the negotiated price, and may not face any variation in
out-of-pocket costs under some plans, the average within-choice-set dispersion in out-
of-pocket costs is significantly lower than for prices. However, among those episodes in
which the individual faced positive variation in out-of-pocket prices across providers,
the dispersion and potential savings can be considerable. For these episodes, the
mean feasible savings amount is $165 for emergency care, $193 for diagnostic imaging
procedures, and $293 for endoscopic services.
Table 3.2: Price Variation Within Choice Sets
Imaging Arthroscopic Lab Tests Endoscopic Emergency Room Lesion Removal
Median Price 484.81 2, 868.90 68.05 1, 038.23 315.73 148.45
SD Price 251.59 994.20 46.82 402.86 150.42 37.94
IQR Price 441.36 1, 106.74 69.38 684.23 240.98 67.71
Price Savings 210.94 473.76 32.61 324.65 143.72 34.49
Share Any Cost Share 0.37 0.40 0.22 0.28 0.58 0.59
Mean Cost Share 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.31 0.24
IQR OOP Price 96.88 119.49 12.44 63.53 63.53 17.34
IQR OOP Price if Positive 280.56 390.72 57.49 241.61 110.87 30.19
OOP Price Savings 94.97 282.67 20.71 134.77 117.18 35.07
OOP Price Savings if Positive 197.51 632.32 76.35 293.00 165.23 41.86
Notes: Summary statistics describing choice situations for each major service category. Statistics are taken over all providers in an
individuals choice set and then the mean is taken over all choice situations. Cost share is defined as the ratio of out-of-pocket price to
total price. Price savings is computed as the difference between the price of the chosen provider and the price of the least expensive
provider within the median distance travelled for the particular service. The analagous calculation is used to compute OOP price
savings. All values deflated to 2011 dollars.
With the growth of consumer-driven health initiatives both nationally and in New
Hampshire in particular, there has been a significant increase over time in the degree
of cost sharing subjected upon consumers. Figure 3.2 plots the mean cost share,
savings obtained under the counterfactual of using the least expensive provider within a 60-minute
drive of the individual’s home.
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defined as the ratio of out-of-pocket payments to total payments per episode for each
of the six major service types. Emergency services, dermatology, imaging, and lab
procedures have seen significant growth in patient cost sharing over time, reaching
around 30% by 2015. There has been significant relative growth in cost sharing for
arthroscopic services, moving from around 2% to over 10%. Given that arthroscopic
services are the most expensive procedures of the six major categories, this represents
a relatively significant increase in dollar terms. Cost sharing for endoscopic services
has remained relatively flat over the sample period, likely driven by restrictions on
cost sharing for preventative colonoscopies. The increases in cost sharing for each
service are driven partly by an increase in the share of episodes with any cost sharing
and partly by an increase in the level of cost sharing overall. Figure C2 plots the share
of episodes with any cost sharing over time for each service category. For arthroscopic
services and imaging procedures, there has been a sizable increase in the fraction of
episodes with any cost sharing. For the other four services, there has been modest to
now growth in this measure.
While an increase in the average cost share of a particular service is suggestive of
an associated increase in individuals’ shopping incentives, the degree to which this
is actually the case depends on the type of cost-sharing instruments being used. To
get a sense of how the rise in mean cost share has translated into shopping incen-
tives, Figure C3 plots the mean interquartile range in out-of-pocket prices, among
episodes with any cost sharing, over time. For each service type, there is has been a
measurable increase in this measure of shopping incentives over time. Substantively,
this suggests that consumer behavior on the intensive margin of provider choice has
become increasingly important. The equilibrium impact of increased cost sharing,
both in terms of prices and welfare, depends on the elasticity of demand with respect
to out-of-pocket price. Thus, in order to determine optimal plan parameters, one
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Figure 3·2: Patient Cost Share by Service Over Time
Notes: Depicts mean patient cost share over time for episodes in each of the six
main service categories. Mean is taken over all episodes that fall in a given service
category. Cost share is computed as the ratio of out-of-pocket payments to total
payments at the service line level.
must know the approximate distribution of these demand elasticities.
3.3 Linear Model Estimates
I first consider the reduced form relationship between the realized price of a particular
episode and the incentives faced by consumer ex-ante. To motivate this approach in
terms of the underlying discrete choice model, note that, for a particular individual
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i, in plan j, seeking service k, the expected provider price is given by




Under the assumptions that out-of-pocket prices enter utility in an additively sepa-
rable fashion, and are determined as a fixed share, csijk, of the negotiated price, we
have





sijkrτ (1− sijkrτ )p2jkr (3.2)
where θ reflects marginal price sensitivity. This expression indicates that the expected
price paid is declining in cost share, provided that θ < 0. That is, as long as price
elasticity of demand is negative, increasing the cost share will reduce mean per-episode
spending. Moreover, the extent to which mean per-episode spending declines with
cost share depends on the degree to which consumers respond to out-of-pocket costs
on the intensive margin.
The expressions above motivate the following reduced-form equation relating price
to cost share:
log(pijk) = α + γcsijτt + βXijt + λk + λt + λjt + εijt (3.3)
where pijk is the log of the total price of an episode associated with individual i,
enrolled in plan j, at time t, and csijt is the ex ante expected cost share of an episode.
I adjust for individual characteristics Xijt, which include age, gender, and CCI. I
also include year and month fixed-effects, λt, to control for seasonality and year-
to-year trends. To account for geographic heterogeneity in provider accessibility, I
absorb zip code fixed effects. I also include procedure fixed effects, λk, which are
defined at the CPT code level. I estimate (3) across various levels of procedure-level
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aggregation, from including all services in the sample, to much narrower groups such
as upper gastrointestinal endoscopies. Reported coefficient and elasticity estimates
should thus be interpreted as a weighted average across specific procedures.
To capture the intensive margin of demand, I include plan-year fixed effects.
Within a plan-year, negotiated prices are fixed, having been determined through a
bargaining process between insurers and providers. Therefore, observing lower prices
within a plan-year corresponds directly to individuals having chosen lower-priced
providers. The parameter of interest in the above equation is γ, which captures
the relation between the realized provider price and the expected cost share of the
individual.
I define expected cost share as the average cost share taken across all providers in
an individual’s choice set.12 The cost share associated with an individual choice situ-
ation varies markedly (1) across plans in a given year, (2) across time in a given plan,
and (3) within an individual-year due to deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums.
Figure 3.3 depicts the mean expected cost share across all episodes by group size
and plan type for the six major service categories. For all plan categories, the mean
expected cost share is declining within the year, due in most part to deductibles. The
individual and small group plans demonstrate much larger declines during the year
and have much higher cost sharing in general, than the large group plans.
An important concern with using individual-level expected cost sharing in the
model above is that, because this measure depends on plan characteristics and within-
year individual spending, it is potentially correlated with unobservables that affect
12I use this measure, as opposed to the realized ratio of out-of-pocket price to negotiated price, to
mitigate notch issues created when the distribution of prices spans the region around the deductible
remaining. For example, consider a situation in which an individual has $400 remaining towards
her deductible and there are three providers available with prices $200, $400, and $800, respectively.
The realized cost share under each of these providers would be 1, 1, and .5, respectively, whereas the
mean expected cost share is .83. In instances where the plan uses a constant coinsurance or where
all prices are uniformly under or uniformly over the deductible remaining, the mean expected cost
share is equal to the realized cost share.
107
Figure 3·3: Cost Sharing by Month and Plan Type
Notes: Depicts mean patient cost share by month and plan type for each of the six
major service categories. Mean is taken over all episodes that fall in a given service
category. Cost share is computed as the ratio of out-of-pocket payments to total
payments at the service line level.
demand. To address this issue, I take an instrumental variables approach motivated
by Ellis, Martins, and Zhu (2017) and Stockley (2016). In particular, I construct
instruments for individual-level expected cost shares based on the plan-month-service
average cost shares of an individual’s inertial plan. I define each individual’s inertial
plan as the plan they would be enrolled in if they did not switch from the prior year. I
then compute the mean cost share across all other individuals in a given plan for each
service category.13 These instruments are strongly correlated with individual cost
13This approach synthesizes the approaches of Ellis, Martins, and Zhu (2017) and Stockley (2016).
The former use leave-one-out plan-month average cost shares, but do not use inertial plans. The
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shares–F-statistics in the first-stage regressions exceed 1000 for each major service
category.
3.3.1 Results
Table 3.3 presents the coefficient estimates and implied elasticities for all services,
the six major service categories, and ten finer service level categories. The elastic-
ity across all services in the sample is estimated to be -0.023, and there is some
heterogeneity across service types. Imaging services exhibit the highest estimated
elasticities at -0.027 across all imaging and -0.060 for MRIs and -0.061 CT scans,
in particular. Emergency room use, lab tests, endoscopic services, and emergency
room services have intermediate estimated elasticities of -0.023, -0.015, and -0.009,
respectively. Arthroscopic surgeries and dermatology services do not exhibit much
responsiveness on this intensive margin, with estimated elasticities that are positive
and not statistically distinguishable from zero.
Importantly, the interpretation of the elasticity estimates given here differs from
the more commonly reported demand elasticities, which typically capture the response
of total spending or discrete utilization measures to cost sharing, which I refer to as
extensive margin elasticities. In contrast, the estimates here reflect the response of
realized provider price to cost sharing, described by equation (3). In this way, the
elasticity estimates here are narrower than conventional estimates, which reflect the
aggregation of many different margins of demand. Put another way, total spending
aggregates choices on (1) whether to use any care, (2) how much or how often care
to use, (3) where to obtain care given that one has decided to seek it. This paper
focuses specifically on the latter.
Overall, the estimates here are plausible, and, although they are not directly com-
latter uses inertial plans and the simulated prices of other individuals in the same risk cell as if they
were the instrumented individual’s predicted plan.
109
Table 3.3: Linear Model Coefficient and Elasticity Estimates
Model : Log Realized Price Estimate Elasticity SE
All Services -.113 -.023 .002
Imaging -.116 -.027 .005
Arthroscopic .055 .005 .020
Lab -.092 -.015 .003
Endoscopic -.085 -.009 .005
ER -.075 -.023 .007
Dermatology .015 .004 .005
X-Ray -.074 -.017 .006
MRI -.253 -.060 .0134
CT Scan -.291 -.061 .022
Ultrasound -.121 -.028 .008
Knee Arthroscopy .191 .018 .024
Shoulder Arthroscopy -.385 -.026 .033
Colonoscopy -.125 -.009 .007
Upper GI Endoscopy -.186 -.026 .015
Nasal Endoscopy -.001 -.000 .008
Laryngoscopy .037 .007 .010
Notes: Each row reports the cost share coefficient estimates and implied elas-
ticities from a separate regression reflecting a particular aggregation of pro-
cedures. Each model includes controls for age, gender, CCI, and fixed effects
for month, year, procedure, zip code, and plan-year. Individual cost shares
are instrumented with inertial plan-month mean cost shares. Coefficient stan-
dard errors are clustered at the plan level, and elasticity standard errors are
computed via the delta method.
parable to much of the literature, they are consistent with these estimates given that
they reflect only a fraction of total spending responsiveness. The most comparable
existing estimates in the literature are given by Ellis, Martins, and Zhu (2017), who
estimate a model of total spending conditional on nonzero spending. These authors
estimate elasticities of -0.04 for outpatient services, -0.03 for radiology, and -0.02 for
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diagnostic services, although the standard errors reported are relatively large.
These intensive margin demand elasticity estimates suggest that some medical
services are, to some degree, shoppable. That is, higher cost sharing induces some
consumers to switch to lower-cost providers. In terms of price, the most salient di-
chotomization of providers is based on their status as a major hospital or independent
outpatient facility. With the exception of dermatology, all of the major services stud-
ied here can be performed at either facility type. Moreover, hospitals tend to be
significantly more expensive than non-hospital-based facilities. Table C1 shows the
mean service-level and visit level prices for the relatively disaggregated service types.
For both cost measures, hospital-based facilities are uniformly more expensive, on the
order to 150%-300% of the cost of the non-hospital facilities.
I next address the extent to which the elasticities presented above are driven by
consumers switching to non-hospital facilities when faced with higher cost sharing.
To do so, I estimate Equation 3.4, but with an indicator for non-hospital status as
the dependent variable as opposed to the logarithm of price. In the first specification,
I adopt the same cost share measure as above. In a second specification, I use an
indicator for whether or not the individual faces any cost sharing. Given that the
distribution of expected cost share exhibits large mass points at zero and one, the
estimates from the second specification are easier to interpret. In particular, the
coefficient estimates reflect the change in the probability of using a non-hospital
facility when going from no cost sharing to positive cost sharing.
Among all services, positive cost sharing is associated with a 4.7% increase in the
probability of using a non-hospital-based facility. There is some heterogeneity across
service types, likely reflecting the different nature of these services as well as differ-
ences in the savings associated with non-hospital use. Lab services are particularly
amenable to non-hospital use in the presence of cost sharing, with a treatment effect
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estimate of 12.7%. Imaging, endoscopic, and emergency services exhibit responsive-
ness close to the mean overall level. For arthroscopic surgeries, consumers do not
appear to respond much on this margin.
3.4 Structural Model Estimates
I now specify and estimate an explicit functional form for the underlying discrete
choice model given by equations (1) and (2). In particular, I parameterize utility as
a function of individual characteristics, provider characteristics, distance, and out-of-
pocket price:
uijkr = −θiOOPijkrτ + µt(dir) + β1xitdir + β2xitvr + λr︸ ︷︷ ︸
δijkr
+εijkr (3.4)
Distance is known to be a first-order factor governing provider choice, so I include
the driving distance in miles between the individual and provider, dir, as well as its
square and cube, captured by t(dir). In addition, I include interactions of distance
with individual characteristics, xitdir, allowing heterogeneity in willingness to travel
based on age, sex, health, income, and education. To account for heterogeneity in
preferences for provider type, I interact individual characteristics with an indicator
for hospital status. Given that the ultimate objective is to measure consumer re-
sponsiveness to out-of-pocket prices, rather than to quality, I include provider fixed
effects, λr. These parameters account for underlying, actual and perceived, brand
or quality differences across providers. Importantly, provider fixed effects also help
account for differences in physician referral patterns.14 An important deficit in the
standard multinomial logit model is the implication of implication of independence
14Brown (2019b) and Chernew et al. (2019) highlight the importance of physician referrals in
determining where patients receive follow-up care. In this specification, providers that are heavily
referred will tend to have larger estimated intercepts.
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from irrelevant alternatives, effectively restricting substitution patterns. To allevi-
ate this, I incorporate heterogeneity in price-responsiveness with individual-specific
coefficients, θi, assumed to be distributed according to f(θ). In the primary specifi-
cation, I assume this distribution is normal with mean θ̄ and variance σ2θ .
15 Under




r′∈Rjk exp(−θiOOPijkr′tτ + δijkr)
f(θ)dθ (3.5)
I estimate the parameters of this model, including the mean and variance of distri-
bution of price sensitivity, via maximum simulated likelihood (Train, 2009).
To address the potential endogeneity of spot out-of-pocket prices in the above
model, I apply a similar instrumental variable strategy as in the linear model, adapted
to this nonlinear setting. In particular, I adopt a control function approach using a
similar set of instruments as in the linear case. The intuition behind the control
function approach is to use instruments to construct a term that approximates the
component of the error term that is correlated with spot out-of-pocket prices. If this
term can be successfully approximated, then the econometrician can condition the
troublesome term out of the utility index (Hausman, 1978; Heckman, 1978; Petrin
and Train, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). I instrument for spot out-of-pocket prices us-
ing inertial plan-month mean out-of-pocket prices, OOP jkmr. To construct these, I
multiply the inertial plan-month average cost shares used previously by the insurer-
provider negotiated price for each service. To form the control function, I then regress
out-of-pocket price on δijkr and OOP jkmr, and obtain the residual. This residual is
then included directly in the utility index for estimation. As in the linear model case,
this instrument is both powerful and relevant.
15In alternative specifications, I assume a lognormal distribution, which has the appealing property
that restricts price elasticity to be negative, and a multivariate normal with nonzero covariance
between price and distance sensitivities. The results obtained from each of these specification are
similar.
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Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Whaley et al. (2017), I use the
parameter estimates from the demand model to compute the aggregated out-of-pocket







where Nr is the number of consumers for whom provider r is in the choice set. This
measure captures demand-responsiveness at the provider level, giving insight into
market conditions.
Table 3.4 summarizes the out-of-pocket price coefficient estimates and implied
elasticities for each of the six primary service types. The coefficient estimates cor-
respond to the estimated mean of the distribution of θ. Individual elasticities are
defined as the elasticity of choice probabilities with respect to out-of-pocket costs.16
Imaging services exhibit the most price-responsiveness, with estimated individual and
aggregated elasticities of -0.92 and -0.61, respectively. Endoscopic services are the
next most elastic, with estimated individual and aggregated elasticities of -0.36 and
-0.23, respectively. Lab and ER services demonstrate very small but non-negligible,
elasticities of -0.054 (individual) and -0.04 (aggregated) for lab services and -0.07 (in-
dividual) and -0.02 (aggregated) for ER use. Arthroscopic and dermatology services
do not show any extent of price-responsiveness on this margin, with coefficient and
elasticity estimates that are not statistically distinguishable from being positive at
liberal significance levels.
To get a sense of how elasticities vary across providers, Figure 3.4 plots the distri-
bution of elasticities across providers for imaging, lab, endoscopic, and ER services.17
Among imaging providers, elasticities vary quite a bit, with some providers actually





. I evaluate this expression for every realized instance in the
data and report the mean.
17I leave out arthroscopic and dermatology services given that there does not appear to be mean-
ingful substitution in the markets for these services.
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Table 3.4: Discrete Choice Model Coefficient and Elasticity Estimates
Coefficient (θ̄) Individual Elasticity Aggregated Elasticity
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Imaging -0.010 0.002 -0.918 0.111 -0.611 0.074
Arthroscopic 0.001 0.002 0.125 0.330 0.073 0.192
Lab -0.026 0.001 -0.105 0.010 -0.080 0.008
Endoscopic -0.005 0.002 -0.364 0.119 -0.230 0.075
ER -0.037 0.021 -0.068 0.166 -0.016 0.056
Dermatology -0.016 0.013 -0.481 0.350 -0.297 0.216
Notes: Coefficient and elasticity estimates derived from maximum simulated likelihood estimation
of equation 3.6. Each model includes controls as shown in Tables C4-C9 and provider fixed-effects.
The coefficient estimate is the estimated mean of the distribution of out-of-pocket price sensitivity,
assumed to be normal. Individual elasticities are evaluated at observed out-of-pocket prices. Aggregate
elasticities are computed as equation 3.7. Standard errors for both elasticity means are computed via
bootstrap with 100 replications.
demonstrating elastic demand. There is also moderate heterogeneity across providers
of endoscopic and lab services. In contrast, elasticities do not exhibit much variation
across emergency care providers.
To explore the role of market structure in determining these elasticities, I compute
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each hospital service area and service
category in the state. Figure 3.5 plots the estimated aggregate own-price elasticities
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of each provider for each of these service
types. Unsurprisingly, these markets are quite concentrated, with mean HHIs of 4976,
6304, 5501, and 6166 for imaging, lab, endoscopic, and ER markets, respectively.
Interestingly, for all except lab providers, elasticities are decreasing (in absolute value)
with concentration. This result is in line with the simple prediction that providers
with more market power face less elastic market conditions.
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Figure 3·4: Demand Elasticity Distributions
Notes: Depicts kernal density estimates of aggregate own-price elasticities across
providers for each service type. Elasticities are computed according to equation 3.7
using mixed logit demand estimates.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the extent to which consumers respond to out-of-pocket differ-
ences when choosing a medical care provider. In particular, I study the demand for
providers for six common service categories. I document significant growth in the
degree to which consumers are exposed to cost sharing for these services, translating
to an increase in the incentives of consumers to shop around for care. To capture
demand, I consider an underlying discrete choice model in which out-of-pocket prices
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Figure 3·5: Demand Elasticity by HHI
Notes: Depicts estimates of aggregate own-price elasticities across providers and
the HHI in the associated hospital service area. Elasticities are computed according
to equation 3.7 using mixed logit demand estimates. HHI are computed separately
for each service category.
vary across providers in an individual’s choice set. I account for potentially endoge-
nous out-of-pocket prices using instruments based on inertia and average monthly
plan cost sharing.
Overall, my results suggest that elasticities on the intensive margin are quite low
and exhibit heterogeneity across services. Of the services I study, imaging procedures
elicit the largest degree of responsiveness from consumers. Endoscopic, lab, and ER
services demonstrate low but non-negligible demand responses, while consumers do
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not appear to respond at all to out-of-pocket price variation for arthroscopic and
dermatology services. These results are broadly consistent with prior work, although
contrast somewhat with Chernew et al. (2019), who conclude that very few indi-
viduals shop for lower-limb MRIs. While these authors do not explicitly estimate
demand, they report that referring physician fixed effects explain a majority of the
variation in prices paid. My results suggest that shopping for MRIs is more prevalent
than Chernew et al. (2019) indicate, although imaging services overall represent the
best-case scenario when it comes to price shopping.
This work has a number of implications for health care and insurance markets go-
ing forward. Importantly, these implications depend on the major reasons underlying
why price responsiveness is so low in general. One possibility is that institutional fric-
tions such as poor information and vertically integrated physician practices obstruct
shopping behavior. In this case, there are potentially large welfare gains to reducing
these barriers and facilitating consumers’ normatively ideal shopping environment.18
Another possibility is that the elasticity estimates reported here reflect the underlying
attitudes of consumers, implying that shopping for health services is not valued by
consumers, even when provided with the appropriate information and flexibility to do
so. In this case, further increasing demand-side shopping incentives will likely reduce
welfare, as consumers pay higher per-episode costs, and prices remain high due to the
lack of effective competition. Under this scenario, insurers and policymakers should
focus more attention on supply-side measures to contain costs.
18By “normatively ideal” I mean the level of price sensitivity that prevails in an ideal environ-
ment with perfect information and no processing cost. In this case, individuals behave as utility-




Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A1: Estimates by Insurer
Anthem Harvard Pilgrim
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Payments Non-Hospital Distance Total Payments Non-Hospital Distance
Panel A: Lab Tests
Tiered -0.085∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 7.006∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 9.520∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.680) (0.016) (0.011) (0.718)
R2 0.549 0.428 0.363 0.364 0.329 0.199
N 468,771 468,771 468,771 306,325 306,325 306,325
Panel B: Endoscopic
Tiered -0.067∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.555 -0.037∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.308
(0.011) (0.005) (0.030) (0.014) (0.017) (0.386)
R2 0.196 0.509 0.293 0.264 0.298 0.259
N 98,134 98,134 98,134 43,399 43,499 43,499
Panel C: Arthroscopic
Tiered -0.088∗∗∗ 0.025 1.677∗∗ -0.017 .111∗∗∗ 0.259
(0.017) (0.015) (0.595) (0.025) (0.028) (0.919)
R2 0.435 0.454 0.360 0.600 0.375 0.371
N 12,627 12,627 12,627 5,354 5,354 5,354
Notes: All equations estimated with controls for age, sex, CCI, and fixed effects for CPT, month, year, plan, and zip. Payments are
computed as total spending on all services performed on the same day as the primary procedure, and are deflated to 2011 dollars.
Standard errors, clustered at the plan level, are in parentheses.
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Table A2: Event Study Coefficient Estimates
Lab Endoscopic Arthroscopic
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Anthem 2010 -0.092 0.115 -0.056 0.072 -0.083 0.099
Anthem 2011 -0.125 0.053 -0.028 0.039 - 0.035 0.067
Anthem 2012 -0.104 0.031 -0.056 0.040 -0.082 0.065
Anthem 2013 -0.103 0.030 -0.075 0.040 -0.043 0.067
Anthem 2014 -0.041 0.027 -0.108 0.037 -0.049 0.066
Anthem 2015 -0.040 0.025 -0.085 0.040 -0.053 0.073
Anthem 2016 -0.046 0.0133 -0.111 0.017 -0.057 0.030
Harvard Pilgrim 2013 -0.127 -0.071 -0.069 0.082 -0.023 0.109
Harvard Pilgrim 2014 -0.190 -0.068 -0.089 0.081 -0.021 0.101
Harvard Pilgrim 2015 -0.230 -0.064 -0.075 0.084 -0.047 0.102
Harvard Pilgrim 2016 -0.344 -0.034 -0.222 0.036 -0.066 0.040
Notes: Table shows the estimated treatment effects for each insurer and year for each year that tiered plans were
operable. Payments are computed as total spending on all services performed on the same day as the primary
procedure, and are deflated to 2011 dollars. All equations estimated with controls for age, sex, CCI, and fixed
effects for CPT, month, year, plan, and zip.
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Table A3: Heterogeneous Demand-Side Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Lab Tests Endoscopic Arthroscopic
Panel A: Total Payments
Tiered × Charlson -0.0000 0.0077 0.0247
(0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0178)
Tiered × Spending -0.0006∗ -0.0006∗ -0.0009
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Tiered × HHI 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗∗ 0.0000∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tiered × First Half 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0005 0.0318
(0.0048) (0.0098) (0.0171)
R2 0.441 0.224 0.368
N 962,074 163,973 20,849
Panel B: Non-Hospital
Tiered × Charlson -0.0114∗ -0.0100∗ 0.0093
(0.0051) (0.0044) (0.0101)
Tiered × Spending 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Tiered × HHI -0.0000∗∗∗ -0.0000∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tiered × First Half -0.0276∗∗∗ -0.0029 -0.0107
(0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0147)
R2 0.223 0.216 0.130
N 967,643 164,035 20,871
Notes: Coefficients on interactions of tiered status with four potential
modifiers. Spending is computed as the total medical spending in the year
prior to the episode. HHI is computed based on procedure group at the
hospital service area level. All equations estimated with controls for age,
sex, CCI and fixed effects for month, year, plan, and zip. Standard errors
clustered at the plan level are in parentheses.
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Figure A1: Saturated Model Supply-Side Estimates
Notes: Each point corresponds to the estimate of the coefficient on the interaction
term of year and insurer. The dependent variable in the regression is log total
payments. I include fixed effects for each combination of insurer-provider-procedure
and controls for demographics and calendar month.
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Table A4: Average Characteristics Tiered vs Non-Tiered
Arthroscopic Lab Endoscopic
Non-Tiered Tiered Non-Tiered Tiered Non-Tiered Tiered
Episode Payments 6, 386.20 4, 944.05 160.09 67.02 1, 951.18 1, 605
Epsiode Out-of-Pocket 480.64 377.15 23.53 12.61 186.11 167.46
Total Spending 15, 801 15, 067 10, 060 9, 146 13, 049 12, 278
Total Out-of-Pocket 1, 867 2, 549 905 1, 164 1, 165 1, 705
Non-Hospital Share 0.71 0.91 0.47 0.77 0.62 0.89
Age 45.49 45.51 49.36 50.43 50.85 50.82
Male 0.54 0.55 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48
Charlson Score 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.25
Median Income 41, 568 41, 940 41, 250 41, 426 41, 585 41, 292
College 34.96 34.58 33.97 32.98 34.91 33.86
Notes : Table shows summary statistics of episodes associated with tiered and non-tiered plans. Episode pay-
ments, episode out-of-pocket, and non-hospital share relate directly to characteristics of the episode itself. Total
spending and total out-of-pocket reflect total yearly spending of the individuals across all services.
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Table A5: Baseline Estimates With Individual Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Total Payments Lab Endoscopic Arthroscopic
Tiered -0.108∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.060
(0.013) (0.025) (0.081)
R2 0.831 0.664 0.687
N 972,613 61,523 4,771
Dependent Variable: Non-Hospital
Tiered 0.068∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.105∗
(0.008) (0.024) (0.041)
R2 0.815 0.737 0.798
N 972,613 61,523 4,771
Notes: All equations estimated with fixed effects for CPT, month, year, plan, and individual. Pay-
ments are computed as total spending on all services performed on the same day as the primary
procedure, and are deflated to 2011 dollars. Standard errors, clustered at the plan level, are in
parentheses.
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Table A6: Plan Selection Model Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Tiered Enrollment Prior Lab Prior Endoscopic Prior Arthroscopic
Female -0.0019 -0.0068∗ -0.0052
(0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0072)
Age -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Charlson 0.0042∗ 0.0024 0.0303∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0107)
Non-Hospital Prior Use 0.0041∗∗ 0.0060 0.0099
(0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0075)
Mean Yearly Spending -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0013)
R2 0.524 0.527 0.577
N 155,550 32,945 5,351
Notes: Each column reflects estimates on the sample of individuals who used the specified service
prior to the rollout of tiered programs. Non-Hospital prior use indicates that the individual used
non-hospital-based facilities for the majority of prior visits. All equations include fixed effects for
insurer, year, and zip.
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Table A7: Baseline Estimates on Sample with Only One Plan Choice
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Total Payments Lab Endoscopic Arthroscopic
Tiered -0.180∗∗∗ -0.0855∗∗∗ -0.0070
(0.0123) (0.0114) (0.0151)
R2 0.394 0.542 0.598
N 790,500 129,485 15,929
Dependent Variable: Non-Hospital
Tiered 0.0734∗∗∗ 0.0377∗∗∗ .
(0.0084) (0.0052) .
R2 0.251 0.257 .
N 790,921 127,862 .
Notes: Estimates from baseline model (1) with only plan and year fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the plan level are in parentheses. Estimates for non-hospital use among arthroscopic
episodes omitted due to insufficient identifying variation.
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Figure A2: Anthem Site of Service Program Advertisement
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Figure A3: Harvard Pilgrim LP Program Advertisement
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Figure A4: Anthem Site of Service Program Advertisement
Name Phone number/Website
«Ammonoosuc Community Health 
Services
«Lab services are done by Quest Diagnostics, 
limited to patients at this practice.  
ammonoosuc.org
Androscoggin Valley Hospital 1-603-752-2200 
avhnh.org




Franklin Regional Hospital Lab 1-603-934-2060 ext. 3200 
lrgh.org
Granite State Lab 1-603-330-7057 
granitestatelab.com
Interlakes Clinical Laboratory 1-603-279-2269 
lrgh.org
Laboratory Corporation of America 1-855-277-8669  
labcorp.com
Laconia Clinic Laboratory 1-603-524-5151 
lrgh.org
Lakes Region General Hospital Lab 1-603-524-3211 
lrgh.org




Quest Diagnostics Incorporated  
  Quest provides at-home lab service in 
certain ZIP codes within Carroll, Coos, 
Grafton and Sullivan counties. 
1-866-697-8378 
questdiagnostics.com
Upper Connecticut Valley Hospital 1-603-237-4971 
ucvh.org
Wentworth-Douglass Hospital 1-603-742-5252 
wdhospital.com
£Androscoggin Valley Hospital
£Concord Hospital Independent 
Outpatient Laboratory 






£Newfound Clinical Lab 
£Nordx
£Quest Diagnostics Incorporated
  Quest provides at-home lab service in certain 





Great news! We’ve got high-quality, Site of Service lab choices for you.
Please take a look at our map and contact list of labs in New Hampshire.  
As a member, your visits will be covered 100% by your health plan.
For the most up-to-date information or for questions, please 
contact Anthem Member Services at 1-800-870-3122 or visit our 
website at www.anthem.com/siteofservicenh
Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield is the trade name of Anthem Health Plans of New Hampshire, Inc. HMO plans are administered by Anthem Health Plans of New Hampshire, Inc. and underwritten by Matthew Thornton Health Plan, Inc.  
Independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association. ANTHEM is a registered trademark of Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. 
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Table A8: List of CPT/HCPCS Codes
CPT Description Category CPT Description Category
29850 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45378 Diagnostic colonoscopy Endoscopic
29851 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45380 Colonoscopy and biopsy Endoscopic
29855 Tibial arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45385 Lesion removal colonoscopy Endoscopic
29856 Tibial arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45383 Lesion removal colonoscopy Endoscopic
29870 Knee arthroscopy dx Arthroscopic 45384 Lesion remove colonoscopy Endoscopic
29871 Knee arthroscopy/drainage Arthroscopic 45385 Lesion removal colonoscopy Endoscopic
29873 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45386 Colonoscopy dilate stricture Endoscopic
29874 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45387 Colonoscopy w/stent Endoscopic
29875 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45391 Colonoscopy w/endoscope us Endoscopic
29876 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 45392 Colonoscopy w/endoscopic fnb Endoscopic
29877 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43239 Upper gi endoscopy biopsy Endoscopic
29879 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43235 Uppr gi endoscopy diagnosis Endoscopic
29880 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43249 Esoph endoscopy dilation Endoscopic
29881 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43259 Endoscopic ultrasound exam Endoscopic
29882 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43248 Uppr gi endoscopy/guide wire Endoscopic
29883 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43251 Operative upper GI endoscopy Endoscopic
29884 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43234 Upper gi endoscopy exam Endoscopic
29885 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43236 Uppr gi scope w/submuc inj Endoscopic
29886 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43237 Endoscopic us exam esoph Endoscopic
29887 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43238 Uppr gi endoscopy w/us fn bx Endoscopic
29888 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43239 Upper gi endoscopy biopsy Endoscopic
29889 Knee arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43240 Esoph endoscope w/drain cyst Endoscopic
29805 Shoulder arthroscopy dx Arthroscopic 43241 Upper GI endoscopy with tube Endoscopic
29806 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43242 Uppr gi endoscopy w/us fn bx Endoscopic
29807 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43243 Upper gi endoscopy inject Endoscopic
29819 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43244 Upper GI endoscopy/ligation Endoscopic
29820 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43245 Uppr gi scope dilate strictr Endoscopic
29821 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43246 Place gastrostomy tube Endoscopic
29822 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43247 Operative upper GI endoscopy Endoscopic
29823 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43250 Upper GI endoscopy/tumor Endoscopic
29824 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43252 Uppr gi opticl endomicrscopy Endoscopic
29825 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43255 Operative upper GI endoscopy Endoscopic
29826 Shoulder arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43256 Uppr gi endoscopy w/stent Endoscopic
29830 Elbow arthroscopy Arthroscopic 43257 Uppr gi scope w/thrml txmnt Endoscopic
29834 Elbow arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 43258 Operative upper GI endoscopy Endoscopic
29835 Elbow arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 83036 Glycosylated hemoglobin test Lab
29836 Elbow arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 82306 Vitamin d 25 hydroxy Lab
29837 Elbow arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 85027 Complete cbc automated Lab
29838 Elbow arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 84153 Assay of psa total Lab
29840 Wrist arthroscopy Arthroscopic 84439 Assay of free thyroxine Lab
29843 Wrist arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 85025 Complete cbc w/auto diff wbc Lab
29844 Wrist arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 84443 Assay thyroid stim hormone Lab
29845 Wrist arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 80048 Metabolic panel total ca Lab
29846 Wrist arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 80050 General health panel Lab
29847 Wrist arthroscopy/surgery Arthroscopic 80051 Electrolyte panel Lab
29860 Hip arthroscopy dx Arthroscopic 80053 Comprehen metabolic panel Lab
66984 Cataract surg w/iol 1 stage Arthroscopic 80055 Obstetric panel Lab
80061 Lipid panel Lab
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B1: Colonoscopy Choice Model Parameter Estimates
Estimate SE
Spot Out-of-Pocket -0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Miles -0.3547∗∗∗ (0.0422)
Miles Squared 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Miles × Male 0.0001 (0.0011)
Miles × Charlson 0.0011 (0.0011)
Miles × Income 0.0203∗∗∗ (0.0041)
Miles × % College -0.0001∗ (0.0001)
Hospital × Age -0.0132∗∗∗ (0.0015)
Hospital × Male 0.0808∗ (0.0358)
Hospital × Charlson 0.0611 (0.0445)
Hospital × Income 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College -0.0007 (0.0020)
Psuedo R2 0.46
N 524,915
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of fixed-coefficient multinomial logit demand model
for colonoscopies. Specification includes a linear control function for out-of-pocket prices
which uses inertial plan-month average prices as excluded instruments.
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Table B2: Lipid Panel Choice Model Parameter Estimates
Estimate SE
Spot Out-of-Pocket -0.0061∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Miles -0.6292∗∗∗ (0.0118)
Miles Squared 0.0015∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Male -0.0030∗∗∗ (0.0003)
Miles × Charlson -0.0001 (0.0003)
Miles × Income 0.0447∗∗∗ (0.0011)
Miles × % College -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × Age -0.0045∗∗∗ (0.0007)
Hospital × Male 0.0927∗∗∗ (0.0163)
Hospital × Charlson 0.0317 (0.0171)
Hospital × Income 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0046∗∗∗ (0.0010)
Psuedo R2 0.45
N 1,740,214
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of fixed-coefficient multinomial logit demand model
for lipid panels. Specification includes a linear control function for out-of-pocket prices
which uses inertial plan-month average prices as excluded instruments.
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Table B3: Colonoscopy Demand Flexible Specification Results
(1) (2) (3)
Saturated Mixed Logit Correlated Mixed Logit
Miles -0.3607∗∗∗ (0.0422) -0.3552∗∗∗ (0.0422) -0.2772∗∗∗ (0.0574)
Miles Squared 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001) -0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001) -0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Miles × Male 0.0001 (0.0011) 0.0001 (0.0011) 0.0005 (0.0015)
Miles × Charlson 0.0011 (0.0012) 0.0011 (0.0011) 0.0015 (0.0018)
Miles × Income 0.0208∗∗∗ (0.0041) 0.0203∗∗∗ (0.0041) 0.0144∗∗ (0.0055)
Miles × % College -0.0001∗ (0.0001) -0.0001∗ (0.0001) -0.0003∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Hospital × Age -0.0129∗∗∗ (0.0015) -0.0133∗∗∗ (0.0015) -0.0143∗∗∗ (0.0015)
Hospital × Male 0.0826∗ (0.0364) 0.0809∗ (0.0358) 0.0792∗ (0.0371)
Hospital × Charlson 0.0626 (0.0452) 0.0611 (0.0445) 0.0611 (0.0465)
Hospital × Income 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0000 (0.0020) -0.0008 (0.0020) 0.0005 (0.0021)
Out-of-Pocket -0.0036∗∗∗ (0.0005) -0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0969) -0.0014∗∗∗ (0.1017)
Out-of-Pocket × Income 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × Miles 0.0000 (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × Age 0.0000 (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × Charlson -0.0000 (0.0002)
Out-of-Pocket × Male 0.0001 (0.0001)
Out-of-Pocket × % College -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket σ 0.0000 0.0000
Miles σ 0.0113
Covariance ω -0.0087
Psuedo R2 0.46 0.46 0.46
N 524,915 524,915 524,915
Notes: Column 1 reports maximum likelihood estimates from multinomial logit specification. Columns 2 and 3 report maximum
simulated likelihood estimates. For random coefficients, the mean of the estimated distribution is reported in the main table
and standard deviation reported below. Column 2 results correspond to the mixed logit model with out-of-pocket price normally
distributed. Column 3 results correspond to the mixed logit model with out-of-pocket price and distance distributed multivariate
normal with covariance ω.
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Derivations
Following Small and Rosen (1981) and Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003)

























































Then the derivative of insurer surplus with respect to the price of a particular provider,














































































Appendix to Chapter 3
Table C1: Prices at Hospital vs Non-Hospitals
Service Line Price Visit Price
Hospital Non-Hospital Hospital Non-Hospital
X-Ray 189.78 76.00 359.51 126.07
MRI 1647.01 756.31 2170.51 931.93
CT Scan 1464.07 506.92 2634.96 838.84
Ultrasound 412.97 208.98 704.69 321.63
Knee Arthroscopy 3552.07 2664.67 7130.00 5176.28
Shoulder Arthroscopy 5190.43 3078.28 11697.91 7331.12
Lab 84.43 43.75 204.62 100.81
Colonoscopy 1485.18 986.20 2864.67 1790.02
Dermatology 177.30 146.53 280.25 224.43
ER 388.03 257.41 797.43 433.51
Laryngoscopy 380.13 284.50 598.06 443.44
Upper GI Endoscopy 1417.40 893.99 3036.46 1759.75
Notes: Depicts service line and visit level prices for each service at hospitals and non-hopsitals. Service
line prices computed at the CPT code level. Visit prices computed as the sum of all payments less
than than the primary procedure for a given patient-day. Values are deflated to 2011 dollars. Prices
are averaged across all procedures in a given category.
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Figure C1: The Relationship Between Out-of-Pocket Price and
Provider Price Under Different Plan Types
Notes: Figure depicts the relationship between negotiated price and out-of-pocket
price induced by different cost sharing designs. Under the hypothetical deductible
plan, there is $2000 remaining on the deductible. For illustrative purposes I assume
the amount remaining to reach the out-of-pocket maximum exceeds $4000
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Figure C2: Fraction With Any Cost Sharing Over Time
Notes: Depicts mean share of episodes with any cost sharing over time for episodes
in each of the six main service categories. Cost share is computed as the ratio of
out-of-pocket payments to total payments at the service line level.
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Figure C3: Mean Interquartile Range of Out-of-Pocket Prices Over
Times
Notes: Depicts mean interquartile range of out-of-pocket prices across providers.
Statistic is taken over all providers in an individuals choice set and then the mean
is taken over all choice situations. All values deflated to 2011 dollars.
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Figure C4: Mean Cost Share by Plan Time Over Time
Notes: Depicts mean patient cost share over time for episodes in each of the six main
service categories across six major plan types. Mean is taken over all episodes that
fall in a given service category. Cost share is computed as the ratio of out-of-pocket
payments to total payments at the service line level.
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Table C2: Non-Hospital Use Estimates
Cost Share Measure: Continuous Binary
Estimate SE Estimate SE
All Services 0.026 0.003 0.047 0.002
Imaging 0.043 0.004 0.040 0.004
Arthroscopic 0.132 0.047 0.040 0.014
Lab 0.134 0.005 0.127 0.005
Endoscopic 0.107 0.018 0.063 0.011
ER 0.067 0.004 0.064 0.004
Dermatology 0.034 0.009 0.028 0.008
X-Ray 0.041 0.007 0.037 0.006
MRI 0.049 0.012 0.046 0.046
CT Scan 0.042 0.012 0.036 0.011
Ultrasound 0.033 0.008 0.031 0.008
Knee Arthroscopy 0.175 0.050 0.055 0.016
Shoulder Arthroscopy -0.049 0.154 -0.012 0.038
Colonoscopy 0.172 0.025 0.096 0.014
Upper GI Endoscopy 0.085 0.034 0.041 0.016
Nasal Endoscopy -0.042 0.037 -0.036 0.032
Laryngoscopy 0.056 0.030 0.064 0.035
Notes: Each model includes controls for age, gender, CCI, and fixed effects for
month, year, procedure, zip code, and plan-year. Individual cost shares are instru-
mented with inertial plan-month mean cost shares. Coefficient standard errors are
clustered at the plan level. Binary cost share denotes an indicator for a patient
cost share greater than zero.
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Table C3: Instrumental Variables Diagnostic Test Results
Statitsic: Kleibergen-Paap LM Kleibergen-Paap F J-statistic P-value
All Services 30.78 251.46 0.03 0.87
Imaging 30.06 258.17 0.50 0.48
Arthroscopic 16.87 217.35 0.00 0.97
Lab 26.70 139.95 0.19 0.66
Endoscopic 22.94 181.34 0.17 0.68
ER 16.25 437.62 1.13 0.29
Dermatology 22.44 206.72 4.02 0.04
X-Ray 28.22 194.34 0.78 0.38
MRI 24.07 103.79 1.13 0.29
CT Scan 20.52 80.93 0.80 0.37
Ultrasound 28.84 228.98 1.45 0.23
Knee Arthroscopy 14.18 212.03 0.11 0.74
Shoulder Arthroscopy 21.71 60.30 0.40 0.53
Colonoscopy 16.59 107.22 0.03 0.85
Upper GI Endoscopy 20.09 67.25 0.00 0.97
Nasal Endoscopy 13.13 58.60 2.75 0.10
Laryngoscopy 14.15 53.37 0.36 0.55
Notes: Each row reports the diagnostic statistics associated for the instrumental variables regression corresponding
to the specified service category. Each model includes controls for age, gender, Charlson Score, and fixed effects
for month, year, procedure, zip code, and plan-year. Standard errors are clustered at the plan level. The J-test of
overidentification is performed using inertial plan-month-service and inertial plan-month overall cost shares.
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Table C4: Mixed Logit Demand Estimates: Imaging
(1) (2)
No Control Function Linear Control Function
Fixed Coefficients
Miles -0.4689∗∗∗ (0.0362) -0.4689∗∗∗ (0.0361)
Miles Squared 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Male 0.0003 (0.0009) 0.0003 (0.0009)
Miles × Charlson 0.0050∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.0050∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Miles × Income 0.0284∗∗∗ (0.0035) 0.0284∗∗∗ (0.0035)
Miles × % College 0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0000)
Hospital × Age -0.0083∗∗∗ (0.0009) -0.0062∗∗∗ (0.0010)
Hospital × Male 0.0191 (0.0323) 0.0351 (0.0325)
Hospital × Charlson -0.1025∗ (0.0419) -0.1031∗ (0.0421)
Hospital × Income 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0001 (0.0018) -0.0025 (0.0018)
Random Coefficients
Out-of-Pocket Mean -0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0001) -0.0097∗∗∗ (0.0019)
Out-of-Pocket SD 0.0000 (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0002)
N 495,779 495,779
Notes: Maximum simulated likelihood estimates of provider demand. Specification 2 includes
a control function for out-of-pocket prices in which inertial plan-month average prices are
included as an excluded instrument. Random coefficient on out-of-pocket price is assumed to
be normally distributed with constant mean and variance.
144
Table C5: Mixed Logit Demand Estimates: Arthroscopic
(1) (2)
No Control Function Linear Control Function
Fixed Coefficients
Miles -0.2319∗∗∗ (0.0700) -0.2299∗∗ (0.0701)
Miles Squared 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0001) -0.0004∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Miles × Male -0.0008 (0.0018) -0.0008 (0.0018)
Miles × Charlson -0.0039 (0.0029) -0.0039 (0.0029)
Miles × Income 0.0119 (0.0067) 0.0117 (0.0067)
Miles × % College 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Hospital × Age -0.0017 (0.0023) -0.0020 (0.0023)
Hospital × Male 0.0442 (0.0651) 0.0412 (0.0654)
Hospital × Charlson 0.0980 (0.0981) 0.0980 (0.0981)
Hospital × Income -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0099∗∗ (0.0035) 0.0101∗∗ (0.0035)
Random Coefficients
Out-of-Pocket Mean -0.0001∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0006 (0.0015)
Out-of-Pocket SD -0.0000 (0.0001) -0.0000 (0.0001)
N 114,163 114,163
Notes: Maximum simulated likelihood estimates of provider demand. Specification 2 includes
a control function for out-of-pocket prices in which inertial plan-month average prices are
included as an excluded instrument. Random coefficient on out-of-pocket price is assumed to
be normally distributed with constant mean and variance.
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Table C6: Mixed Logit Demand Estimates: Lab
(1) (2)
No Control Function Linear Control Function
Fixed Coefficients
Miles -0.9071∗∗∗ (0.0173) -0.9184∗∗∗ (0.0173)
Miles Squared 0.0023∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0023∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Male 0.0008 (0.0004) 0.0008 (0.0004)
Miles × Charlson 0.0008 (0.0005) 0.0009 (0.0005)
Miles × Income 0.0716∗∗∗ (0.0017) 0.0726∗∗∗ (0.0017)
Miles × % College -0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × Age -0.0017 (0.0009) -0.0022∗ (0.0009)
Hospital × Male 0.0633∗ (0.0272) 0.0528 (0.0271)
Hospital × Charlson 0.1109∗∗∗ (0.0315) 0.1135∗∗∗ (0.0314)
Hospital × Income -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0036∗ (0.0016) 0.0023 (0.0015)
Random Coefficients
Out-of-Pocket Mean -0.0100∗∗∗ (0.0007) -0.0263∗∗∗ (0.0010)
Out-of-Pocket SD 0.0163∗∗∗ (0.0011) 0.0171∗∗∗ (0.0011)
N 492,796 492,796
Notes: Maximum simulated likelihood estimates of provider demand. Specification 2 includes
a control function for out-of-pocket prices in which inertial plan-month average prices are
included as an excluded instrument. Random coefficient on out-of-pocket price is assumed to
be normally distributed with constant mean and variance.
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Table C7: Mixed Logit Demand Estimates: Endoscopic
(1) (2)
No Control Function Linear Control Function
Fixed Coefficients
Miles -0.4899∗∗∗ (0.0373) -0.4920∗∗∗ (0.0373)
Miles Squared 0.0012∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0012∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Male -0.0003 (0.0009) -0.0003 (0.0009)
Miles × Charlson 0.0023∗ (0.0010) 0.0023∗ (0.0010)
Miles × Income 0.0339∗∗∗ (0.0036) 0.0341∗∗∗ (0.0036)
Miles × % College -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000)
Hospital × Age -0.0105∗∗∗ (0.0012) -0.0093∗∗∗ (0.0013)
Hospital × Male 0.0202 (0.0328) 0.0228 (0.0328)
Hospital × Charlson 0.0169 (0.0490) 0.0165 (0.0490)
Hospital × Income 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0065∗∗∗ (0.0018) 0.0058∗∗ (0.0019)
Random Coefficients
Out-of-Pocket Mean -0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0001) -0.0046∗∗ (0.0015)
Out-of-Pocket SD -0.0000 (0.0003) -0.0000 (0.0003)
N 497,898 497,898
Notes: Maximum simulated likelihood estimates of provider demand. Specification 2 includes
a control function for out-of-pocket prices in which inertial plan-month average prices are
included as an excluded instrument. Random coefficient on out-of-pocket price is assumed to
be normally distributed with constant mean and variance.
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Table C8: Mixed Logit Demand Estimates: ER
(1) (2)
No Control Function Linear Control Function
Fixed Coefficients
Miles -0.2327∗∗∗ (0.0358) -0.2338∗∗∗ (0.0358)
Miles Squared 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0014∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Male -0.0011 (0.0009) -0.0011 (0.0009)
Miles × Charlson 0.0025∗∗ (0.0008) 0.0025∗∗ (0.0008)
Miles × Income 0.0050 (0.0035) 0.0051 (0.0035)
Miles × % College 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × Age -0.0029∗ (0.0012) -0.0027∗ (0.0012)
Hospital × Male -0.1428∗∗ (0.0467) -0.1392∗∗ (0.0467)
Hospital × Charlson 0.1034∗ (0.0487) 0.1032∗ (0.0487)
Hospital × Income -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0192∗∗∗ (0.0026) 0.0185∗∗∗ (0.0026)
Random Coefficients
Out-of-Pocket Mean 0.0016∗∗∗ (0.0002) -0.0370 (0.0206)
Out-of-Pocket SD -0.0000 (0.0004) -0.0000 (0.0004)
N 498,469 498,469
Notes: Maximum simulated likelihood estimates of provider demand. Specification 2 includes
a control function for out-of-pocket prices in which inertial plan-month average prices are
included as an excluded instrument. Random coefficient on out-of-pocket price is assumed to
be normally distributed with constant mean and variance.
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Table C9: Mixed Logit Demand Estimates: Dermatology
(1) (2)
No Control Function Linear Control Function
Fixed Coefficients
Miles 0.2439∗∗∗ (0.0515) 0.2418∗∗∗ (0.0515)
Miles Squared 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0001∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0001∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Male 0.0065∗∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0065∗∗∗ (0.0012)
Miles × Charlson 0.0008 (0.0012) 0.0008 (0.0012)
Miles × Income -0.0402∗∗∗ (0.0049) -0.0400∗∗∗ (0.0049)
Miles × % College 0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0001) 0.0006∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Hospital × Age -0.0005 (0.0010) -0.0004 (0.0010)
Hospital × Male 0.2358∗∗∗ (0.0410) 0.2379∗∗∗ (0.0411)
Hospital × Charlson 0.0255 (0.0398) 0.0252 (0.0398)
Hospital × Income -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000) -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College 0.0035 (0.0019) 0.0033 (0.0019)
Random Coefficients
Out-of-Pocket Mean 0.0053∗∗∗ (0.0006) -0.0175 (0.0128)
Out-of-Pocket SD 0.0107∗∗∗ (0.0015) 0.0108∗∗∗ (0.0015)
N 445,306 445,306
Notes: Maximum simulated likelihood estimates of provider demand. Specification 2 includes
a control function for out-of-pocket prices in which inertial plan-month average prices are
included as an excluded instrument. Random coefficient on out-of-pocket price is assumed to
be normally distributed with constant mean and variance.
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Table C10: Imaging Heterogeneous Effects
Coefficient SE
Out-of-Pocket -0.0113∗∗∗ (0.0007)
Out-of-Pocket × Income 0.0000∗ (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × Miles 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × Age -0.0000 (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × Charlson -0.0000 (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × Male 0.0000 (0.0000)
Out-of-Pocket × % College -0.0000 (0.0000)
Miles -0.4205∗∗∗ (0.0146)
Miles Squared 0.0012∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles Cubed -0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Age -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Miles × Male 0.0017∗∗∗ (0.0004)
Miles × Charlson 0.0032∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Miles × Income 0.0247∗∗∗ (0.0014)
Miles × % College 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × Age -0.0051∗∗∗ (0.0004)
Hospital × Male -0.0240 (0.0133)
Hospital × Charlson -0.0929∗∗∗ (0.0111)
Hospital × Income 0.0000∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Hospital × % College -0.0036∗∗∗ (0.0008)
Psuedo R2 0.427
N 3,073,344
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates of provider demand. Specifi-
cation includes a control function for out-of-pocket prices in which
inertial plan-month average prices are included as an excluded in-
strument.
References
Abadie, Alberto, Susan Athey, Guido W Imbens, and Jeffrey Wooldridge,
“When should you adjust standard errors for clustering?,” Technical Report, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research 2017.
Abaluck, Jason, Jonathan Gruber, and Ashley Swanson, “Prescription drug
use under Medicare Part D: A linear model of nonlinear budget sets,” Journal of
Public Economics, 2018, 164, 106–138.
Aron-Dine, Aviva, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Mark Cullen, “Moral
hazard in health insurance: Do dynamic incentives matter?,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 2015, 97 (4), 725–741.
, , and , “The RAND health insurance experiment, three decades later,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013, 27 (1), 197–222.
Ben-Akiva, Moshe E, Steven R Lerman, and Steven R Lerman, Discrete
choice analysis: theory and application to travel demand, Vol. 9, MIT press, 1985.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “How much
should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2004, 119 (1), 249–275.
Brot-Goldberg, Zarek C, Amitabh Chandra, Benjamin R Handel, and
Jonathan T Kolstad, “What does a deductible do? The impact of cost-sharing
on health care prices, quantities, and spending dynamics,” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 2017, 132 (3), 1261–1318.
150
151
Brown, Zach Y, “Equilibrium effects of health care price information,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 2019a, 101 (4), 699–712.
, “An empirical model of price transparency and markups in health care,” 2019b.
Bundorf, M Kate, “Consumer-Directed health plans: a review of the evidence,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2016, 83 (1), 9–41.
Callaway, Brantly and Pedro HC Sant’Anna, “Difference-in-differences with
multiple time periods and an application on the minimum wage and employment,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.09015, 2018.
Capps, Cory, David Dranove, and Mark Satterthwaite, “Competition and
market power in option demand markets,” RAND Journal of Economics, 2003,
pp. 737–763.
Chernew, Michael, Zack Cooper, Eugene Larsen-Hallock, and Fiona Scott
Morton, “Are health care services shoppable? Evidence from the consumption of
lower-limb MRI scans,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research
2018.
Christensen, Hans Bonde, Eric Floyd, and Mark G Maffett, “The only pre-
scription is transparency: The effect of charge-price-transparency regulation on
healthcare prices,” Chicago Booth Research Paper, 2018, (14-33).
Collard-Wexler, Allan, Gautam Gowrisankaran, and Robin S Lee, Bargain-
ing in bilateral oligopoly: An alternating offers representation of the” nash-in-nash”
solution, Citeseer, 2014.
Cooper, Zack, Stuart V Craig, Martin Gaynor, and John Van Reenen, “The
price ain’t right? Hospital prices and health spending on the privately insured,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2018, 134 (1), 51–107.
152
Dalton, Christina M, Gautam Gowrisankaran, and Robert Town, “Salience,
myopia, and complex dynamic incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D,” Tech-
nical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2015.
de Chaisemartin, Clément and Xavier D’Haultfoeuille, “Two-way fixed ef-
fects estimators with heterogeneous treatment effects,” Technical Report, National
Bureau of Economic Research 2019.
Desai, Sunita, Laura A Hatfield, Andrew L Hicks, Anna D Sinaiko, Michael E
Chernew, David Cowling, Santosh Gautam, Sze jung Wu, and Ateev
Mehrotra, “Offering a price transparency tool did not reduce overall spending
among California public employees and retirees,” Health Affairs, 2017, 36 (8), 1401–
1407.
, , , Michael E Chernew, and Ateev Mehrotra, “Association between
availability of a price transparency tool and outpatient spending,” Jama, 2016, 315
(17), 1874–1881.
Duarte, Fabian, “Price elasticity of expenditure across health care services,” Jour-
nal of Health Economics, 2012, 31 (6), 824–841.
Eichner, Matthew J, “The demand for medical care: What people pay does mat-
ter,” The American Economic Review, 1998, 88 (2), 117–121.
Einav, Liran, Amy Finkelstein, and Paul Schrimpf, “The response of drug
expenditure to nonlinear contract design: Evidence from Medicare Part D,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2015, 130 (2), 841–899.
Ellis, Randall P., “Rational behavior in the presence of coverage ceilings and de-
ductibles,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 1986, pp. 158–175.
153
, Bruno Martins, and Wenjia Zhu, “Health care demand elasticities by type
of service,” Journal of Health Economics, 2017, 55, 232 – 243.
Frank, Matthew B, John Hsu, Mary Beth Landrum, and Michael E Chernew,
“The impact of a tiered network on hospital choice,” Health Services Research, 2015,
50 (5), 1628–1648.
Fronstin, Paul, “Tiered networks for hospital and physician health care services,”
EBRI issue brief, 2003, (260).
Gaynor, Martin et al., “Competition and quality in health care markets,” Foun-
dations and Trends R© in Microeconomics, 2007, 2 (6), 441–508.
Goodman-Bacon, Andrew, “Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment
timing,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.
Gorman, Bela, Jennifer Smagula, and Jon Camire, “New Hampshire Insur-
ance Department 2011 Medical Cost Drivers,” Technical Report, Gorman Actuarial
2013.
Gruber, Jonathan and Robin McKnight, “Controlling health care costs through
limited network insurance plans: Evidence from Massachusetts state employees,”
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2016, 8 (2), 219–50.
Hausman, Jerry A, “Specification tests in econometrics,” Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, 1978, pp. 1251–1271.
Haviland, Amelia M., Matthew D. Eisenberg, Ateev Mehrotra, Peter J.
Huckfeldt, and Neeraj Sood, “Do “Consumer-Directed” health plans bend the
cost curve over time?,” Journal of Health Economics, 2016, 46, 33 – 51.
154
Heckman, James J, “Simple statistical models for discrete panel data developed
and applied to test the hypothesis of true state dependence against the hypothesis
of spurious state dependence,” in “Annales de l’INSEE” JSTOR 1978, pp. 227–269.
Herr, Annika and Moritz Suppliet, “Tiered co-payments, pricing, and demand in
reference price markets for pharmaceuticals,” Journal of Health Economics, 2017,
56, 19 – 29.
Ho, Kate and Ariel Pakes, “Hospital choices, hospital prices, and financial incen-
tives to physicians,” American Economic Review, 2014, 104 (12), 3841–84.
and Robin S Lee, “Insurer competition in health care markets,” Econometrica,
2017, 85 (2), 379–417.
and , “Equilibrium provider networks: Bargaining and exclusion in health care
markets,” American Economic Review, 2019, 109 (2), 473–522.
Ho, Katherine, “The welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the US medical
care market,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2006, 21 (7), 1039–1079.
Horn, Henrick and Asher Wolinsky, “Bilateral monopolies and incentives for
merger,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, pp. 408–419.
Huckfeldt, Peter J, Amelia Haviland, Ateev Mehrotra, Zachary Wagner,
and Neeraj Sood, “Patient responses to incentives in consumer-directed health
plans: evidence from pharmaceuticals,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research 2015.
Kowalski, Amanda, “Censored quantile instrumental variable estimates of the price
elasticity of expenditure on medical care,” Journal of Business & Economic Statis-
tics, 2016, 34 (1), 107–117.
155
Lieber, Ethan MJ, “Does It pay to know prices in health care?,” American Eco-
nomic Journal: Economic Policy, 2017, 9 (1), 154–79.
Manning, Willard G, Joseph P Newhouse, Naihua Duan, Emmett B Keeler,
and Arleen Leibowitz, “Health insurance and the demand for medical care: ev-
idence from a randomized experiment,” The American Economic Review, 1987,
pp. 251–277.
NHID, “Supplemental report of the 2007 health insurance market in New Hamp-
shire,” Technical Report, New Hampshire Insurance Department 2008.
, “Supplemental report of the 2012 health insurance market in New Hampshire,”
Technical Report, New Hampshire Insurance Department 2014.
Petrin, Amil and Kenneth Train, “A control function approach to endogeneity
in consumer choice models,” Journal of Marketing Research, 2010, 47 (1), 3–13.
Prager, Elena, “Tiered hospital networks, health care demand, and prices,” Job
Market Paper, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2016.
Robinson, James C, “Hospital tiers in health insurance: Balancing consumer choice
with financial Incentives: The health economy will not sustain permanent double-
digit cost inflation, and the health polity will not abide heavy-handed restrictions
on consumer choice.,” Health Affairs, 2003, 22 (Suppl1), W3–135.
, Timothy T Brown, Christopher Whaley, and Emily Finlayson, “Associa-
tion of reference payment for colonoscopy with consumer choices, insurer spending,
and procedural complications,” JAMA Internal Medicine, 2015, 175 (11), 1783–
1789.
156
Scoggins, John F and Daniel A Weinberg, “Healthcare coinsurance elasticity co-
efficient estimation using monthly cross-sectional, time-series claims data,” Health
Economics, 2017, 26 (6), 795–801.
Sinaiko, Anna D and Meredith B Rosenthal, “The impact of tiered physician
networks on patient choices,” Health Services Research, 2014, 49 (4), 1348–1363.
Smagula, Jennifer, Don Gorman, Gabriella Lockhart, Linda Kiene, and
Bela Gorman, “New Hampshire Insurance Department final report on 2014 med-
ical cost drivers,” Technical Report, Gorman Actuarial 2015.
, , , , and , “Final report of the 2016 health care premium and claim cost
drivers,” 2017.
Small, Kenneth A and Harvey S Rosen, “Applied welfare economics with dis-
crete choice models,” Econometrica, 1981, 49 (1), 105.
Sood, Neeraj, Zachary Wagner, Peter Huckfeldt, and Amelia M Havi-
land, “Price shopping in consumer-directed health plans,” in “Forum for Health
Economics and Policy,” Vol. 16 De Gruyter 2013, pp. 35–53.
Starc, Amanda and Ashley Swanson, “Preferred pharmacy networks and drug
costs,” Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research 2018.
Stockley, Karen, “Evaluating rationality in responses to health insurance cost-
sharing: Comparing deductibles and copayments,” Job Market Paper, 2016.
Tay, Abigail, “Assessing competition in hospital care markets: the importance of
accounting for quality differentiation,” RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, pp. 786–
814.
157
Tu, Ha, Rebecca Gourevitch et al., “Moving markets: lessons from New Hamp-
shire’s health care price transparency experiment,” Technical Report, Mathematica
Policy Research 2014.
Whaley, Christopher, Jennifer Schneider Chafen, Sophie Pinkard, Gabriella
Kellerman, Dena Bravata, Robert Kocher, and Neeraj Sood, “Association
between availability of health service prices and payments for these services,” Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association, 2014, 312 (16), 1670–1676.
Whaley, Christopher M and Timothy T Brown, “Firm responses to targeted
consumer incentives: Evidence from reference pricing for surgical services,” Journal
of Health Economics, 2018, 61, 111–133.
, Chaoran Guo, and Timothy T Brown, “The moral hazard effects of consumer
responses to targeted cost-sharing,” Journal of Health Economics, 2017, 56, 201–
221.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M, “Fixed-effects and related estimators for correlated random-
coefficient and treatment-effect panel data models,” Review of Economics and
Statistics, 2005, 87 (2), 385–390.
, Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, MIT press, 2010.
Zhang, Xinke, Amelia Haviland, Ateev Mehrotra, Peter Huckfeldt, Zachary
Wagner, and Neeraj Sood, “Does Enrollment in High-Deductible Health Plans
Encourage Price Shopping?,” Health Services Research, 2018, 53, 2718–2734.
CURRICULUM VITAE
159
160
